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PRINCIPAL CONTENTS

- | | |
|---|---|
| The Management of Defence and National Security | - Lt Gen A M Vohra, PVSM
LA (Retd) |
| National Security Management | - Lt Gen P N Kathpalia
PVSM, AVSM (Retd) |
| The Threat from Pakistan | - Brig D Banerjee |
| The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan - Perspectives | - Brig Subhash Kapila |
| What Ails our Military Medical Services | - Brig N B Grant (Retd) |
| India's Role in the Context of Indian Ocean Security | - Captain H Dharmarajan |

APRIL-JUNE 1990

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CONTENTS

Editorial.....	141
The Management of Defence and National Security	
Lt Gen A M Vohra, PVSM, IA (Retd)	142
National Security Management	
Lt Gen P N Kathpalia, PVSM, AVSM (Retd).....	147
The Threat from Pakistan	
Brig D Banerjee	162
The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan - Perspectives	
Brig Subhash Kapila	175
What Ails our Military Medical Services	
Brig N B Grant (Retd)	181
India's Role in the Context of Indian Ocean Security	
Captain H Dharmarajan.....	185
Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia	
Prashant Agarwal	199
A Conceptual Approach to C³I	
Maj Gen Yashwant Deva	210
The Thirty One Days War (Part I)	
Sahdev Vohra, ICS	215
The Magnificent Marathas	
Maj Anil Shorey	228
The Last of the Mughals	
Lt Gen S L Menezes, PVSM, SC (Retd)	230
Letters to the Editor	237
REVIEW ARTICLES	
Military Power Today	
by Evan Luard -- <i>Lt Gen P E Menon, PVSM (Retd)</i>	239
United States and The Third World	
by John W. Sewell, Richard E. Feinberg and Valesiana	
Kallab -- <i>Col R Rama Rao</i>	241
BOOK REVIEWS	
Political Ethics and Public Office	
by Dennis F Thompson -- <i>Lt Gen M L Thapan, PVSM</i>	243
The Search for Security: Controlling Conflict & Terrorism	
by Lt Gen E A Vas -- <i>Col Valmiki Katju (Retd)</i>	244
Marketing Warfare	
by Al Rics and Jack Trout -- <i>Maj Gen Surinder Nath</i>	245
Main Battle Tanks : Development in Design Since 1945	
by Rolf Hilmes -- <i>Maj Gen RL Chopra, PVSM (Retd)</i>	246
Super Powers in Crisis : Implications of Domestic Discord	
by Richard J. Krickus -- <i>Maj Gen Afsir Karim, AVSM (Retd)</i>	246

Iranscam : The Official Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the Iran Arms Sale (Iran-Contra Series, No I)	
-- "Tindi"	247
Vietnam : A History	
by Stanley Karnow -- <i>Lt Col A K Sharma</i>	248
USSR Foreign Policies after Detente	
by Richard F Staar -- <i>Lt Gen SPM Tripathi, AVSM</i>	248
Main Front : Soviet Leaders Look Back on World War II	
by Prof. John Erickson -- <i>Brig Rai Singh, MVC, VSM (Retd)</i>	249
The Old Army : A Portrait of the American Army in Peace Time 1784-1898	
by Edward M Coffman -- <i>Dr K M L Saxena</i>	250
The Men of Company K : The Autobiography of a World War II Rifle Company	
by Harold P Leinbaugh and John D Campbell -- <i>Col R R Chatterji</i>	251
Gunner at Large : The Diary of James Wood R.A. 1746-1765	
by Rex Whitworth -- <i>Maj Gen L S Lehl PVSM, Vr.C</i>	252
Clean Sweep	
by Rear Adm. Roy M. Davenport -- <i>Captain R P Khanna, AVSM</i>	252
The Seeds of Disaster : The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939	
by Robert Alan Doughty -- <i>Maj Gen S K Talwar</i>	253
Last Days of the Reich - The Collapse of Nazi Germany, May 1945	
by James Lucas -- <i>Lt Gen K P Candeth, PVSM (Retd)</i>	254
The Falklands Aftermath : Picking up the Pieces	
by Major General Edward Fursdon -- <i>Brig Y P Dev (Retd)</i>	255
Negotiating with the Chinese 1846-1987 : Problems and Perspectives	
by Parshotam Mehra -- <i>Lt Col Gautam Sharma</i>	255
Pakistan : Transition from Military to Civilian Rule	
by Golam W Choudhury -- <i>Air Marshal K D Chadha, PVSM, AVSM</i>	256
Sri Lanka : Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy	
by S J Tambiah -- <i>Brig Romesh Chandra (Retd)</i>	258
India Briefing, 1987	
by Marshal M Bouton -- <i>B C Chakravorty</i>	258
The Black Pom-Poms : History of the Madras Regiment 1941-1983	
by Lt Col J R Daniel (Retd) -- <i>Maj Anil Shorey</i>	259
The Baluchis and Pathans (Report No. 48)	
by Robert G Wirsing -- <i>Maj Gen BD Kale (Retd)</i>	260
Arms Control : Has the West Lost its Way? (Occasional Paper No. 28)	
by Robin Brown -- NBS	261
Additions to the USI Library.....	262

NOTE

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Much Ado About Something

Arun Singh's timely and thought-provoking paper on "The Management of Defence" published in the July-September 1989 issue of this Journal evoked critical reflections by Wg Cdr Amar Zutshi and Air Marshal ML Sethi in October-December issue. Continuing the debate, we now publish two more articles; one by Lt General AM Vohra, and the other by Lt General PN Kathpalia. These articles, bring to bear, on this vital subject, a great deal of expertise from senior experienced officers, who were personally involved with the management of defence from the lowest to the highest levels during the long years of their service in peace and war.

One major proposal, on which there appears to be general agreement in these articles, seeks the integration of the three services with the Ministry of Defence. In addition, to provide adequate knowledge on military matters, it has been suggested that the civilian officers should attend orientation courses at military institutions. Most of these officers could, then, continue to work in the Ministry of Defence during their entire career.

But a major theme, during this debate, has been the need for an organisation, at the highest level, to provide policy guidance on fundamental issues of National Security. Fortunately, the new Government has announced the establishment of the National Security Council (NSC) which would include the concerned members of the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs (CCPA), like the Prime Minister, Defence Minister, Foreign Minister, Home Minister, Finance Minister, etc. In addition, there will be a Strategic Policy Group (SPG), a committee of overworked secretaries, Chairman, Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Chiefs of Intelligence agencies. It is learnt that the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) may provide the secretariat to the NSC. The Government's announcement about the NSC has received mixed response, however. Whether the cosmetic changes now made in the National Security management process, would yield expected results, will be difficult to forecast at this stage.

What appears to be crucial, in the NSC context, is the need to reorganise the JIC, which in its present form may not be able to meet its new obligations. The changes in the present structure, and staffing of the JIC, must ensure that it becomes capable of interacting with experts, in a wide-ranging field of strategic, military, political, economic, scientific and technological disciplines. Only then, will the JIC be able to provide the SPG and the NSC, inputs necessary for formulating comprehensive and integrated national security policies in a long-term perspective.

The Management of Defence and National Security

LT GEN A M VOHRA, PVSM, IA (RETD)

It is an admirable development that views on the management of defence have been aired in the USI journal which has a sizeable readership among the armed forces. It is important that the officers of the Services acquire familiarity with the shortcomings in the higher control of defence so that they can contribute constructively to its improvement when they are in a position to do so.

National security is multifaceted and should not be confused with higher defence management even if some institutions like the erstwhile Defence Committee of the Cabinet (DCC) were appropriate forum to deal with both these matters ; national security and higher control of defence. The declared intention of the government to establish the National Security Council (NSC) is a step long overdue and I shall elaborate on this in the latter part of this article.

HIGHER CONTROL OF DEFENCE

Apropos higher control of defence, Wg Cdr Amar Zutshi has drawn our attention to the present state of affairs (October-December 1989 issue) in regard to the relationship between the Service HQs and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) ; the lack of direct and regular interface of military professionals with the political executives, the supremacy of the bureaucracy and the triplicated bureaucratic channel which requires examination of all matters first at Services HQ, then by the MOD and Finance (Defence) in turn. In his piece on this subject (July-September 1989 issue) Mr. Arun Singh has highlighted the bureaucratic bottleneck and the business of unnecessary repetitive analysis of issues. He says, "the passage of time has seen a growing tendency for the checks to overwhelm the balances". Further, he refers to the duplication (in fact triplication ; Service HQ, MOD, Defence Finance) of the thinking processes and says, "Thus a very fine set of intellects and experience in the form of middle and senior civil servants are spending an inordinate amount of time in relatively wasteful activity".

Drawing on the British experience and making the Service HQs part of the MOD to ensure an integrated approach by Service HQ, Finance and MOD, changing the role of the civil servant to a participatory one with uniformed specialists to provide advice on financial and political matters and ensuring continuity of the civil servants by not shifting them out of the MOD and other such reforms recommended by Amar Zutshi would

certainly improve matters. However, what is called for is drastic surgery and not palliatives.

It is logical that the management of defence is left entirely to Service HQs who should have integrated finance. The day to day running of the three services, their training, administration and operational planning should be the domain and the responsibility of the Services Chiefs exercised through their staff and their Army, Navy and Air Commands and lower headquarters. Since the operational planning would be within the framework of the operational charter laid down by the MOD on the directions of the NSC, emphasis on training would follow from this charter and the detailed expenditure on administration, training, operational works and the like would be within the approved budget and on the advice of the integrated finance, management by Service HQs would ensure checks and balances as well as speed and efficiency.

THE ROLE OF THE MOD

The MOD should concern itself primarily with national security issues. It would, for instance, provide the coordinated views of the Chiefs of Staff (CDS - Chief of Defence Staff - when established) to the NSC. It would also coordinate intelligence under the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), defence research and defence production. Procurement of weapons and equipment would also continue to be its responsibility. What it needs to give up is its present role of a superior military headquarters which requires that every issue has to be referred to it whether it pertains to courses to be run at the services schools of instructions or the establishment of a movement control detachment at a rail head or a railway junction where the movement of troops returning from leave or courses of instruction necessitates its presence.

Integration of the operational plans of the three services can best be achieved under the CDS system. Amar Zutshi has done well to bring out the inadequacies of the present system of Chairman Chiefs of Staff Committee where the Chief longest in the chair as head of a service assumes this position in addition to being the Chief of Army/Navy/Air Force staff. Having served in the Military Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat for 3 years in the late 1950s and sat on the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) as a staff officer, I can unhesitatingly vouch for it.

THE DEFENCE MINISTER'S COMMITTEE

In regard to coordination of issues affecting the three services in times

of peace such as conditions of service, peacetime logistics, training facilities (field firing ranges) and so on, either the MOD or the CDS could perform this function. For the time being, the MOD has this responsibility for which the Defence Minister's Committee (DMC) should be reactivated. In his article referred to above, Arun Singh has proposed that the informal 'Monday Meeting' should be formalised as the 'National Defence Committee (NDC)' chaired by the Defence Minister with the three Services Chiefs and the Defence Secretary as permanent members. The DMC was so constituted and had a coordinative role. The staff of the DMC should be found from the Military Wing of the Cabinet Secretariat, as in the past. However, the DMC or the NDC proposed by the former Minister of state for Defence cannot be a substitute for the NSC as he seems to suggest.

THE CHIEF OF DEFENCE STAFF

Most service chiefs have generally opposed the CDS system on the assumption that it would be dominated by the Army, which is so overwhelmingly large. Desirable as it might be to appoint the best man for the job as CDS, the sensible, workable solution is to fill the post by rotation. This should set at rest fears of Army domination. Equally, the CDS staff, drawn from the three services, will, in due course, establish its own ethos of integrated growth bereft of parochialism.

The politicians appear to have reservations about the CDS on the premise that he would be too strong and might, in certain circumstances, stage a coup. In fact, the CDS will not command any troops at all. Secondly, the Indian polity permits free expression of views, pent up feelings and change of power by regular, periodic elections obviating resort to extra-constitutional means. Thirdly, the polity is institutionalised in which the armed forces have the important role of the defence of the realm ; they do not fancy any political role for themselves. The experience of military take overs in Pakistan and Bangladesh is there for all to see including the military ; it discourages adoption of such a course.

Integrated operational planning as also the necessity of coordination among the services in peace make the acceptance of the CDS system imperative. To say that we have managed with the present arrangement is no argument against a change for the better. In any case, the present system does not work ; there is little coordination in peace and no integration of operational plans. The degree of cooperation depends purely on the personalities of the three chiefs.

A revised role for the MOD, integration of Finance Defence with

Service HQs and leaving the management of the three services to their respective chiefs, reactivation of the DMC and institution of the CDS are the measures suggested to ensure proper management, coordination and integrated operational planning.

NATIONAL SECURITY

As stated at the outset, national security is multifaceted. It is concerned with the safeguarding of national interests and thus with all aspects of the nation's security ; internal, economic, environmental or external, which includes the military threat. Policy to deal with such matters of national concern has to be based on multi-dimensional consideration of all factors. This can best be done by institutionalising this process of integrated planning by establishing the NSC. In our context, the NSC would be a Committee of the Cabinet and not an extra-constitutional authority. It would be chaired by the PM with the Foreign Minister, Home Minister, Defence Minister and Finance Minister as permanent members with officials of the concerned ministries, chiefs of staff and Chairman Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in attendance. Other ministers could be co-opted when matters relating to their subjects are being discussed.

The National Defence Committee proposed by Mr. Arun Singh with reorganised and expanded Defence Planning Staff (DPS) with representation from the civil services apart from the armed forces of "proven intellectual potential and experience in analysis and problem solving" would be no substitute for the NSC, which should, as stated above, be able to handle not only defence issues but safeguard all aspects of national security.

The NSC would need staff support but not of the DPS variety whose task should be integrated defence planning and who should rightly be placed under the CDS when instituted. National security staff would have to be broad based without being too large as the inputs would come primarily from the concerned ministries. In addition, inputs should be sought from think tanks like the IDSA (Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses), the USI, and similar bodies in other spheres. This staff should form part of the cabinet secretariat and it should also invite views of ministries concerned on national security issues apart from processing inputs received from them.

There is a good deal of ill-informed talk about the purpose and nature of the NSC. It should be clear from the foregoing that policy coordination to safeguard national interest needs an inter-ministerial body. Had such a body existed, Operation Bluestar at Amritsar in 1984, Exercise Brasstacks or the deterioration of the situation in J & K both from the aspect of

breakdown of administration or the build up of militancy in that state would not have had the handicap of one ministry analysis and planning but a multi-dimensional consideration and an integrated plan to meet the crises.

As is the case of all institutions, a lot would depend on how the NSC works. The national security staff can ensure follow up action. It can also, as mentioned above, ask for inputs on important issues from the ministries concerned and from think tanks. It must see that officials concerned are present but only the Chairman (the PM) can ensure the correct atmosphere for free discussions in which the ministers as well as the officials can speak out and offer advice freely.

COORDINATION OF INTELLIGENCE

The JIC should be made responsible for providing intelligence inputs to the NSC. It can do this satisfactorily only if the coordination of all intelligence agencies is made effective under a professional head. There is a crying need for coordination of intelligence. This can be achieved by reviewing their present set up and providing full support to the reorganised arrangement.

National Security Management

LT GEN P N KATHPALIA, PVSM, AVSM (RETD)

INTRODUCTION

A nation's security rests on many resources : human, economic, natural, technological, political to name but a few. Among its most important assets is the ability to organise these resources, to arrange and focus them, in a coherent, intelligent pattern. This organisational capacity is a prime factor in the management of national security. As some one has said that "It depends primarily on individuals, the nation's leaders, since men are of the essence : what they carry in their heads, and how they use their minds, and where they look for information". Yet no less important are the means these men employ to achieve national goals, the institutions and processes involved and evolved in the formulation and implementation of national security policy. These institutions and processes may be referred to as the national security structure, the organisation that needs to be evolved and would function effectively with cooperation only, provided there is an understanding of the Defence problems and the pride for the motherland that determines the ability of a country to survive in the present complicated power thirsty world. Before proceeding any further it would be prudent to understand the basic management concepts.

BASIC MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS

Management may be truly said to pervade all of civilisation. Civilised activity is generally purposeful ; accordingly, the management function is indispensable in consciously guiding human action towards its goals. Generally speaking, management is involved whenever a set of implied or stated objectives are endeavoured and which then bring to bear the factors, both material and human, that can contribute to their realisation. Therefore, central to the management concept is concern for objectives and their attainment. Management as a "process of organising and employing resources to accomplish predetermined objectives. The proof of success of management is operational effectiveness".¹ Some confusion could result from the use of the term "management" in an organisational sense. "Management" is seen as a relationship, system process, or function, rather than as the group of people in the upper levels of an enterprise. However, it is these group of people who formulate the policy and see its implementation through management.

POLICY AND MANAGEMENT

The distinction between policy formulation and management, as given

by Frederic Hooper is that "management encompasses all business operations below the corporate actions of the board of directors, as distinct from action involved in framing corporate policy".² This distinction, although it cannot always be rigidly applied, serves to separate conceptually two areas that may be considered to be basically different. As an example of the difficulty of separation, it is found that in a government the primary roles of the legislative branch in creating policy and of the executive branch in implementing policy are becoming more and more blurred. It is generally accepted that policy formulation, in the hierarchy or organisation, outranks management. In fact, the policy formulation roles of the holders of ultimate authority (stockholders, dues paying members, or voters) and their representatives (boards of directors or legislators) give these groups hierarchical precedence over the top executives. But management and policy formulation depend on each other. Bad policy carried out by effective management is the essence of oppressive dictatorship. Poor management, in contrast, can subvert and negate good policy. Needless to say, good policy and effective management together mean successful accomplishment of worthy purposes.

Yet some feel that the executive holds an all embracing position - responsible for the work of others - for decisions of both policy and practice, and for ensuring that decisions are carried out as intended. they argue that it is reasonable to assume - if executives are at the highest rank in the specifically managerial pyramid - that their participation in the formulation of an organisation's policies and objectives should be intimately associated with their more specifically managerial functions such as organising, coordinating and delegating. Where does then administration fit in ?

ADMINISTRATION AND MANAGEMENT

While some draw hardly a distinction between administration and management, others would consider administration to be concerned more with providing direction - the planning of goals - and would regard management to be related more to executive - leading and controlling subordinates' action - and ensuring achievement of laid down goals.

COMMAND AND MANAGEMENT

Similarly, difficulties arise with the concept of "command". Although "command" is occasionally equated with "management" there is usually a difference in degree, if not in substance, of meaning. A distinction was proposed by a student of the Industrial College of the US Armed Forces in 1958 :

Command is the process by which far reaching objectives are determined and prescribed and the use of resources directed towards the accomplishment of them Its keynotes are effectiveness and direction.

Management is the manner in which resources are used to accomplish prescribed objectives..... It keynotes are economy and balance.³

An element of command including leadership is frequently mentioned in the military context is that of authority over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Though managers also exert a degree of authority, this factor is not considered to be as prominent for management as it is for command. General Earle G Wheeler related the two concepts in this way : "Management is inherent in command, but the converse is not true since management does not include as extensive authority and responsibility as command."⁴

ORGANISATION

In broad terms, organisations may be defined as systems of human relationships spelled out in terms of inter dependent activities. A later definition by John M. Pfiffner and Frank P. Sherwood, is perhaps most useful here being more detailed and specific in its concern for only complex, and large scale organisation like the Defence services : "organisation is the pattern of ways in which large numbers of people, too many to have intimate face to face contact with all others and engaged in a complexity of tasks, relate themselves to each other in the conscious systematic establishment and accomplishment of mutually agreed purposes."⁵

Another term that is related to organisation is "bureaucracy"/ Today the term is used less often in the pejorative sense of meaning inflexibility, or red-tape, of governmental administrative organisation. However Max Weber, the German sociologist saw bureaucracies as neither good nor bad but as the rational, universal institution of large scale enterprise, either public or private. He further suggested that professionalisation and protection of these complex bureaucratic aggregations of people are required to systematise them to maximise their efficiency.⁶

Marshall E Dimock, for example, has found Weber's theory of bureaucracy inadequate both in terms of efficiency and in terms of human relations. In bureaucracies, says Dimock, the role of the individual and the role of the group are out of balance. although people are the true motive power of organisations, in the orthodox bureaucracy, individuality is overcome

by the impersonality of the organisation, individual initiative is neutralised by rules, and motivation is excluded by automatic processes. thus the people become self centred, avoid responsibility, and find it easier to fall in line with the easily understood rules than to try to seek inspiration from the larger objectives of the organisation.⁷ Therefore, a requirement arises for good management.

NECESSITY FOR MANAGEMENT

Not only is more management needed as a nation industrialises, but the skill-level of management must be continually improved as a prerequisite for increasing the productivity of labour/worker. As investments are made in labour-saving and in modern and more complicated methods there is a constantly greater need for the technical machinery know-how involved in supervising and controlling these production processes. Hence the requirement for more sophisticated top management team for planning, coordinating and directing the enterprises, who understand their social responsibility towards the people and the nation as a whole.

Having understood the basic concepts and the management thought process, it will now be worth the while to apply this to the Defence Services starting with the basic premise of inter and intra cooperation.

BACKGROUND TO LACK OF INTER SERVICE COOPERATION

In our country we have always paid lip service to cooperation within and between the civil and defence services. In fact, cooperation is the most important element or the fuel for running of the National Security structure. We do not have the updated type of organisation and institutional processes that bring forth cooperation which is actually required either within Defence Services or between the Defence and Civil Services, although we have fought four wars since 1947. The various reasons for the lack of co-operation and the non-creation of suitable and appropriate institution/organisation are :

- (a) The evolvement of the three Defence services under different environments has moulded them into separate entities.
- (b) The three service establishments and organisations not being similar/uniform.
- (c) Non-existence of a permanent coordinating body for the three services.
- (d) The ignorance about National Security by the bureaucracy and the politicians because of the lack of empirical knowledge about the

conduct of war which in fact is an extension of Nation's Foreign Policy, in conjunction with a Nation's economic capability.

(e) The vesting of power in the Ministry of Defence, without any deep rooted experience and accountability.

(f) The scenario within the neighbouring countries which has made the politicians sensitive to dangers of militarism.

(g) Total lack of political aim and direction in regard to an integrated long term strategic policy.

(h) Land threat being more than the air or sea threat places the Army in a dominant role.

(j) The non-existence of mechanism for coordinating military instruments of national policy with other Government agencies responsible for making and carrying out National Security policy.

(k) The lack of pride in being an Indian and in not making use of the institutionalised procedures and processes for decision making.

Over the years the above factors and some other have helped in developing a distinctive pattern of relationship between the politicians, the bureaucrats, and the Defence Services as far as national security is concerned. The deliberate traditional isolation of the Armed Forces from the rest of the country - a colonial legacy - but used beautifully by the civilian administrators has prevented the people from deep involvement in the security affairs of their own country. The Defence Services are remembered only in time of war or in natural calamities. It is for this reason that the three Defence services have practically remained unintegrated into the system and process of policy making. The 1962 Debacle was an unhappy and a disconcerting experience in the conduct of higher directions of war. However, the fear of alleged militarism persisted and as such nothing was done to integrate the conduct of National Security affairs. Thus, even in 1971 the Defence Forces took approximately 8 to 9 months to be adequately prepared and that too mostly by improvised and ad-hoc organisations. Even though we accomplished a lot yet the weakness of adequate and a permanent structure for the development of a National Policy for strategic planning and its logistic implementation cannot be overlooked. The civil and military relationship still remains far from congenial from the management view point.

CHANGE OF THE OLD ORDER

India today is on the threshold of taking and accepting new

International responsibilities. In order to meet these responsibilities, it would require a far better and more sophisticated National Security structure than the nation has ever needed before. The recent happenings clearly bring out this aspect.

Many old ideas would have to be discarded. Changed concepts and pattern of warfare will bring in new combinations of forces, command systems and support machinery. The emergence of new weapons of vast power and range, swifter system of communications, and more critical time factors in military equation require a bold new look at strategy including diplomacy, tactics, organisation, economised Defence capability. The services roles and missions require a new look. The present independent and self-contained department of the three Services need to be integrated or unified at various levels. There obviously would be a major problem of breaking loose from deep-rooted institutional patterns, traditional areas of control and parochial jealousies, but all these will have to be over-looked in the interest of National goals and a National Security Act needs to be passed to encompass instruments of collaboration and cooperation besides creating unified commands with uniform pay and ration scales and a unified recruitment policy.

The defence establishments are but one element in the National security structure ; while the new defence organisation may be a subject of heated controversy but there are many other aspects of national security which at least we should agree upon. India's future security would depend not only upon the Armed Forces, but also upon the skill and wisdom applied to the conduct of foreign relations. Improved organisational and managerial means need to be designed to relate military, foreign and domestic policies within an integrated scheme of national goals and means. In another conflict with any of our adversary, India could hardly count on time to prepare as hitherto. So, there is far greater need than in the past for careful, thorough advance planning based on correct intelligence to guarantee a readiness posture capable of meeting any Emergency without being unbalanced, and upsetting the nation's normal requirement of social and civic services.

THE NEED FOR A NATIONAL SECURITY ACT AND A NATIONAL SECURITY STRUCTURE

The requirement therefore is of a National Security Act which will create a new Defence establishment retaining separate Service Headquarters, but placing them with a unified organisation under centralised authority with strengthened machinery to coordinate their activities. There is also the requirement of establishing new top-level civilian agencies in the national

security field provided with powerful additional instruments within the Cabinet Secretariat to help the Cabinet achieve unity of purpose and effort in national security matters after having consulted the opposition shadow cabinet. With these mechanisms, it is hoped that the chief executive authority - Cabinet would be better equipped to develop background information and to obtain the balanced advice it needs to make swift, intelligent decisions and translate the national will into coherent goals and objectives for National Security. The element of ego, politics, and corruption should be kept far far away wherever national Security is concerned.

The enlarged role of the Defence Services to a certain extent may raise the question of its effect on the traditional concept of civilian control, as the architects of national policy matters will be more dependent on professional military advice than before. And never before has it been so important for civilian leaders to carefully develop goals and processes and to make sure that they are clearly understood by the National and Military leaders. Civilian control is meaningless and possibly even dangerous without civilian controllers being capable of intelligently interpreting security strategy and competent enough to make wise decisions at the right time, in the proper manner, and with the skill to direct their effective implementation by the Armed Forces. Civilian and military roles are not only interlinked but are also complementary. The answer lies in finding the best means for coordinating their strength towards a common and dynamic end. This can best be done by effectively balancing restraint and imperative, pros and cons, civil and military, foreign and domestic, and a host of other multifaceted priorities. In the end, the national security structure should provide that blending of its constituent elements, the fluidity and flexibility, best suited to the effective development and implementation of the Nation's Security policy. It should properly integrate responsible individuals and institutions, orchestrate their view and knowledge, and coordinate their action with speed in support of mutually designed objectives so as to offer a clear sense of direction and coherence of policy at the top Government level.

ECONOMY IN DEFENCE

In a developing country like ours, only limited amount of the Gross National Product can be allotted for defence expenditure because bulk of the money must be spent on the economic betterment of the Nation. It becomes imperative that these limited funds are utilised after a most careful and comprehensive consideration of all factors so that the Defence Services get the best value of money. In this, the prime importance is to see that the requirements of the services, which are often conflicting, are carefully and impartially assessed and coordinated so that the available limited funds

are used for the most cost effective weapons systems which will best enable the Services to achieve the national objectives.

This can best be done by the Systems Analysis Approach so that for the money that we wish to spend, the options can be very clearly seen from the example given below. The figures that have been taken are just for illustration and not even approximately correct. For example, if one wishes to ensure better air defence for the country, then the choices may well be as follows :

- (a) 500 anti-aircraft guns, needing 5,000 men and Rs. 100 crores.
- (b) 1500 missiles needing 300 men and Rs. 250 crores.
- (c) 100 fighter and FB aircraft needing 500 men and Rs. 2,400 crores.
- (d) Units of Special Forces grouped with helicopters, needing 4,000 men and Rs. 400 crores.

Now an assessment has to be done by an impartial professional body consisting of representatives of three services, civilian professionals including financial experts who must carefully examine these alternatives and decide upon the best one under the prevailing circumstances. At the moment, there is no such institutionalised body. The politicians and the bureaucrats, who have the responsibility of resolving Inter Services differences of opinion, have proved to be woefully unequal to this task, most of them still follow the divide and rule policy, with great detriment to the nation. A cadre of trained civil servants, specialising in Defence matters has unfortunately not been built up so far while the number of MPs who have taken even a cursory interest in Defence matters is negligibly small, in fact not more than six in a house of 500 members.

The success of a Defence Minister depends as much on his managerial ability as on his judgement in the policy area. Directing and administering a colossal department, like the defence services which employs several million people, operates air and shipping lines, supply systems, communications systems and maintenance establishments, calls for a superb skill as a manager. Nor should it be overlooked that effective civilian control of the military within the Ministry of Defence depends upon the effective civilian management of that Ministry. But unfortunately this is not the way the Ministry of Defence functions at present. The Defence Ministry without any accountability sits on judgement of the Services Headquarters. They have no project or policy of their own. There is no financial; civil or scientific integration at any level as far as the three Service Head Quarters are

concerned, nor is there any formal cooperation or coordination possible between the three Services except at the highest level.

The question that arises is, then, how should a Minister for Defence carry out his responsibilities ? Basically, he can choose from two modes of action : he can be either a passive or an active leader. This obviously presupposes that the defence ministry and the Service Head Quarters would have been integrated and not what they are today.

A passive Defence Minister, would allow his military advisers to run the department while maintaining the appearance of civilian control. His role might vary from that of a chairman of a board of directors approving the decisions of the company executive to that of a judge choosing between opposition positions.

An active Defence Minister would provide aggressive leadership on managerial and administrative matters and he would take an active part in the defence decision making process. Such a role includes realisation that national security problems are no longer purely military or purely political, and that the decisions and recommendations made by the Minister must be used on consideration in both areas. Sending troops to Siachin glacier and IPKF to Srilanka are good examples to quote.

There is no doubt that the Defence Services should be treated like an industry as a whole. Therefore, the civilian decisions should be made on an informed basis which means working closely with the Defence Services, centralised authority. The professionals may influence the policy, but the decision is not theirs and they do not create policy. On the other hand, while laying down the policy, the civilians must also provide the resources which they are unable to do as there is no accountability, the sense of urgency, the moral reputation of a decision taker does not exist at the moment. It is the ego that takes the better of them.

It is submitted that the time has come either to have a CDS or a separate permanent Chairman, Chief of Staff Committee. This is a large subject by itself and is not being elaborated here. However it is reiterated that the above elucidation brings to a logical conclusion the requirement of an organisation which must give an unbiased and expert advice to the Cabinet.

A meaningful trilateral cooperation can only start after the organisation of a separate body namely CDS or a separate Chairman, Chief of Staff Committee, has been established assisted by a Joint Staff of civilian and Defence Services. At the moment, the Committees that exist are only dealing

with routine and mundane matters and there is little chance of their becoming more active.

It appears that these Committees have been allowed to become ineffective because there has been in some quarters a mistrust that if the Defence Services worked in close cooperation, they may also develop political ambitions after realising their combined strength. Such fear is totally baseless as it is well known that even when the country was passing through certain phases of great political instability and upheaval, the Services kept totally apolitical and did not even try to take advantage of the weaknesses of the Government in power.

It is also relevant to emphasise that at Command and lower levels, the headquarters of all concerned Defence Services must be co-located and must achieve a higher degree of integration than exists today. The Army and Air Force need to be together with the navy for the defence of the country's large coast line and islands. May be the creation of unified commands, depending upon the type of threat would be more beneficial and economical. The integration and cooperation between the three Services would thus come much faster.

INTER SERVICE KNOWLEDGE

The officer's cadre does have some theoretical knowledge but theory is of limited value in war. What we need is practical experience of the other Services which is not adequate at present. It can be effectively achieved only after close cooperation at the top echelons has been achieved, and the three services have trained together. This includes attending inter services courses run at Company level and above.

COMBINED OPERATIONS

Unfortunately, the tremendous value of combined operations is not fully appreciated. Combined ops is the futuristic perspective which is like the five fingers of the hand, army, air force, navy para-military forces and the civilian back up. It is now, that one should start acting towards such a combined organisation and practicing such operations as it would need a concentrated effort of 5 to 7 years to streamline such organisation and operations. Imagine the strategic advantage one shall have when India has the amphibious capability to launch a divisional group force under air umbrella. this would tie down large reserves of the adversary for the likely employment of such a force.

There is a definite need for a combined operations organisation. Now, that all the three Services are operating in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands,

one should utilise this opportunity to establish a proper institution, which should be thinking in a futuristic manner, so that as the requisite equipment is received, the techniques and tactical doctrine is ready to be practiced.

BUDGETING AND ECONOMY

There should not be any blanket ceiling on budget. Defence needs are not static. Due to change in threats and the capability of the adversaries periodic assessment of the requirements of the Services must be made, which will tend to fluctuate. By accepting a ceiling a commitment is made for the level of expenditure. Therefore there is a tendency to "situate the appreciation" as far as external threats are concerned. With ceilings, it is also possible that the expenditure does not come down when actually threats have receded. Therefore, in principle, the ceiling on expenditure should not be applied as a general rule. Indeed the overall fiscal budget cannot be lost sight of. The Services must continuously look inward, review and analyse their organisations, procedures etc. with a view to achieving greater efficiency and economy.

The level of investment, the capital output ratio and the rate of growth are computed on the basis of alternative sets of assumptions, but there is no machinery which coordinates this with the defence plan even though the development plan of the nation and the defence plan are coterminous. Such un-coordinated working leads to unrealistic assumption and planning, resulting in delay. In fact the last Defence plan was not finalised for three years after its commencement. The planning process must start with an assessment of the international environment over the next five to ten years in which this country would attempt to achieve its developmental and security objectives within the available resources, which should be worked out as cautiously and realistically as possible. The forecasts about the future may not be completely accurate, but certainly would provide a reasonable accurate base for working, with possible alternative scenarios.

It is regrettable that even after 15 years of experience in defence planning, an adequate machinery for preparing such assessments does not exist. Even the need for it is not felt strongly enough. Whom to blame, is for the people to decide. Therefore the planning processes in this country are either extrapolations of the present policies or reactions to international developments after they take place, making the bureaucracy look egoistic and immature and the politician uneducated.

If steps are to be taken to reduce the defence burden and help the national exchequer a lead time of four to five years is necessary, provided political aim and direction is given and a strategic policy is enunciated, that

early to meet the likely challenges of the security environment. The defence planning staff created in 1986 in the Joint Chiefs of Staff Secretariat is woefully small and with a rapid turn-over of the personnel, the planning mechanics become further weak and ineffective.

PARA MILITARY FORCES

Without going into the reasons or the background it is well known that para military forces have proliferated out of all reasonable proportions. Their requirement has never been carefully and systematically analysed. It is felt that the para military forces should be composed as follows :

(a) *BSF and ITBP*. This must be a small body whose only job would be the manning of the border during peace time and assisting the Army during war time. It must be lightly armed. It should have no responsibility whatsoever towards assistance in maintenance of internal law and order. Considering its role, it should be a wing of the Ministry of Defence directly under the COAS and not under the Home Secretary. Then only can the maximum efficient and coordinated use be made of its forces. Its strength can be drastically reduced. However all effort by the army to coordinate training at the moment with the BSF has not borne any fruits. This will have adverse ramifications in time of war. A strong BSF under the control of COAS will greatly contribute to the war effort.

(b) *CRPF*. This should be the Central Governments reserve forces for enforcing law and order and assisting the states as required. Its strength should be based on the requirement of forces for maintenance of internal law and order. It should be ensured that the force is mobile, self contained, so trained and located that the Army is not called in aid of civil authorities. Of late it has been observed that at the smallest ripple the state Governments requisition the Army - this is highly detrimental to the functioning and morale of the Army and equally detrimental to the cause of democracy.

(c) *State Police*. These are very sick, ineffective and misused forces, who need to be revitalized and made to do their basic jobs. Basically it is the State police who must maintain law and order in the state. They are authorised armed wings at the District and Armed Police Battalions at the State levels. Since both these bodies are grossly misused and diverted to tasks for which they are not meant, at the slightest fear of a breakdown in law and order, the State Governments pressurise the Centre to pump in CRPF, BSF or the Army. Better managerial skills and management at the state level will reduce such costs.

A high level expert committee should go into the entire question of the set up of the Police and para military forces and the maintenance of law and order, in order to optimise the use of various agencies and rationalise the expenditure incurred on such organisation. Such a committee should include management experts and members from the Defence Services. May be it would help in the rehabilitation of the ex-servicemen to a very great extent in a useful and beneficial manner to the Government and its exchequer, if the recruitment to the para military forces are from the Defence Services. This would help the Defence Services in retaining younger force and also help the ex-servicemen in being rehabilitated. Besides, it will help the country in making use of trained manpower for a longer period thus reducing the pension budget.

PRIORITY TO DEFENCE

Defence is not accorded its appropriate priority and nor does adequate machinery exist to take full cognizance of the need of the Defence services.

At the present, at the top most level, the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs does not seem to be effective enough as far as the National Security and its strategic planning is concerned. Despite this, the Service Chiefs should be invited to attend the deliberations of this body on most issues because directly or indirectly, these have an interaction with Defence. This will enable the needs of the Services to be properly appreciated and for the Defence to contribute more usefully to other spheres of National activity. The Service Chiefs should also have regular dialogues with other Ministries, e.g. the Ministry of External Affairs, Home etc. The time has probably come when there should be a body like the National Security Council of the USA, which takes a comprehensive view of National problems, rather than the compartmentalised system of ours.

TRAINING

At present, no systematic training is being given either to the Defence personnel to appreciate the working of the various agencies of the Civil Government or to the bureaucrats and politicians into the working of the Defence Services. Both these bodies need to be educated about each other.

As far as the Defence Services are concerned, there is some theoretical training on various courses of instruction. The overriding need is that, at various stages of their service, officers of the rank of Major onward should be deputed to serve with various Ministries, Institutions and Agencies on the civil side. Here their experience and knowledge will benefit the civilians and this experience would broaden their horizons and improve their

knowledge. Certain places where such secondments can be very useful are the Ministries of Petroleum, Transport, Industrial Development, Medicine and Public Health, Civil Aviation, Shipping, Food and Agriculture, Coal, External Affairs, Education, Works and Housing, Home, Economic Affairs, Banking, Law, etc.

It is high time that the Ministry of Defence was fully integrated with the Service Head Quarters on the lines of Pentagon in the USA or the Ministry of Defence in the UK whereby a civil servant who came to the Ministry, was mostly employed within the Defence Services and more Service Officers were employed in the Ministry. It is only these civil servants who can benefit by being detailed on the Staff College or the NDC. At present these people come from States, do the courses and go back to the States and therefore all the knowledge they have been imparted is totally wasted.

MORALE

Morale is the linch pin on which the National Security is based. It is a factor that needs a deliberate in-depth study and long term progressive planning by the hierarchy at the top echelons. The powers that be, must realise that there are no runners up in battle and the factor of morale to be raised to a level where in an assault on the enemy objective the man crosses the minefield under heavy enemy cross fire out of a wave of will rising from within. "At the present juncture there is a certain sense of disenchantment in the Defence Forces. Perhaps more so in the officer cadre." The British were highly farsighted in creating an image and culture for the defence forces based on dignity, implicit moral values and a high standard of living, and there was lot to it. After independence there has been a considerable erosion in the prestige, culture and values of the Defence forces and the politicians and bureaucrats are to be fairly and squarely blamed for such a syndrome. It will be pertinent to bring out two facets for consideration here ; it takes a long time to build and nurture morale and that no individual will give his life for a nation that does not consider him a part of it. A stage has arrived when morale cannot be built on rhetorics only.

CONCLUSIONS

The enlarged and the leading role that India is to assume in world affairs in the years to come call for a concept that the Nation's security must be the collective responsibility of all Government agencies/departments. Military strategy would have to function within the framework of national objectives and interests. Domestic, foreign, and military policies would have to be more closely coordinated. In order to adjust to the new environment

with its likely expanded responsibilities for the Indian nation, Government leaders must realize and foresee the pressing requirement for a new organisational arrangement that would provide greater integration of defence efforts and would overcome service parochialism and civil-military alienation. It is therefore imperative that the Defence Minister should be assisted by a Deputy Defence Minister ; Minister of States for research, for procurement and mobilisation and for legislative and public affairs ; a single and a separate Chairman of joint Chiefs of Staff for Army, Navy and Air Force, and who would command and coordinate the military forces in the field ; and a single common logistical and supply agency. Finally each Service Headquarter in the Defence Ministry must be headed by Minister of State who is accountable for that particular Service's efficiency and capability to perform its tasks effectively. The Chief of that particular service will deal directly with him.

A national security act must give statutory recognition to a new and broadened concept of National Security in close interlocking relationships among military and civilian elements of the Government. Organisationally, two agencies need to be created outside the Ministry of Defence to effect coordination for National Security - the National Security Council, presided over by the Prime Minister himself to advise him concerning the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security and the National Intelligence Authority⁸ under the council's direction, to ensure a sound and adequate intelligence base for the formulation and execution of national security policies. The Planning Commission would also act as the National Security Resources Board, to advise the Prime Minister concerning the coordination of military, industrial and other resources. Thus the guardianship of the Nation's security remains the collective responsibility of the entire Government. Conceptually, the new organisational arrangements, it is hoped, will have a more orderly and logical approach to the National Security problems in the 21st Century without fear of a military takeover, or the receipt of kickbacks for a weapon system.

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The Threat from Pakistan

BRIG D BANERJEE

BACKGROUND

The Indian sub-continent is truly a single geographic, socio-cultural and historical entity. Even though different civilisational influences have contended for superiority here in the past, over a period of time their diverse characteristics have blended smoothly to form a single homogeneous identity. Then why is it that Indo-Pak relations continue to be more conflictual than cooperative, and have resulted in three major wars (1947-48, 1965 and 1971) and two skirmishes (in the Rann of Kutch in 1965 and in Siachen 1984-87) since the establishment of their separate identities? One answer is that nationalism is a more complex issue and especially where it relates to states created through a process of dissolution of larger entities. Nation-building then becomes an even more onerous task. The history of Europe since the 17th Century bears ample testimony to the complexity of this process.

In assessing the threat from Pakistan, the issue concerns both its nature and dimension. The threats that a nation poses to another are ideological, political, economic and in the present day world even ecological; only its manifestation is military. To discuss the question then one must appropriately examine the basis of Pakistan's nationalism and what constitutes its nationhood. Next, one needs to address the question of civil-military relations in that country which plays an important role in its overall decision making framework. It is only in this perspective that an examination of Pakistan's evolving strategic doctrine and its nuclear warfare potential assume relevance.

THE QUESTION OF NATIONALISM

A nation is not merely a geographic entity, it is also endowed with an unique quality, the attribute of sovereignty. The French philosopher Jean Dobin defined sovereignty as, "A State's supreme authority over citizens and subjects". Yet sovereignty today is no longer the divine right of a king bestowed from heaven, but rests on the will of the state's citizens and sanctified and buttressed by a phenomenon that is termed as 'nationalism'. In its broadest interpretation nationalism can be described as, "A people's sense of collective destiny through a common past, and the vision of a common future." Another definition by Ernest Renan at Sorbonne in 1882, describes it as, "What constitutes a nation is not speaking the same tongue, or belonging to the same ethnic group, but having accomplished great things in common in the past and the wish to accomplish this in the future."

When we examine these attributes of nationalism contradictions immediately come to the fore in Pakistan. For Pakistan is neither born out of revolution nor is it a spontaneous expression of the people, but it is a consequence purely of colonial dispensation. It was essentially the demand of a select, politically aroused but itinerant minority seeking new domicile in a congenial environment.¹ The basis of its founding was Islam, and its geographic boundaries were determined by the areas where the Muslims predominated. But the reality was that the very areas that constitute present Pakistan were the last to accept the idea of this separate nationhood, and the NWFP rejected this altogether till the very end² This also left behind in India large numbers of underprivileged Muslims for whom it was to be the homeland; to fend for themselves in a climate of increased hostility that was the result of this new 'nationalism'. If it were not for the belief in secularism, ensuring the peaceful co-existence of all segments of society irrespective of religion or creed, that was in turn to be the basis of Indian nationalism, it is not difficult to visualise the even greater holocaust that would surely have resulted during this transition. The irony today is that of the three major nations in South Asia, Pakistan has the smallest number of Muslims.

It was also not possible for Pakistan to identify a 'common past' separate from that of the rest of India without resorting to blatant falsifications. An important fall-out is in its deliberate distortion of Indian history which is apparent from a perusal of the books taught in its schools which mould and shape immature minds. References to the Hindu civilisation between 3,500 BC to 712 AD is glossed over as if no history exists; "there is only myth and legend". The pre-Prophet (Mohammad) period is described as one during which the society was "unjust, barbaric and devoid of any achievement in art, culture, literature, philosophy and science." Anything to do with India and the Hindus is portrayed as evil. Hinduism is described as "unjust, profane and devious." and the Hindus as "treacherous, untrustworthy and weak".³ Such deliberate misperceptions even if to justify its own nationalism create patently false images, affect the perceptions of the common man and in turn influence state policy. Its elite conviction created out of its own false propaganda, that one Pakistani soldier equalled ten Indian jawans, resulted in its launching of the 1965 War. Which in an otherwise rational calculation may not have featured as a feasible policy option and was resisted by the more sane elements even in its military.⁴

The identification with a 'collective destiny' also eluded Pakistan and it could not spell out the 'vision of a common future' based entirely on religion. The assimilation of the Muslims into the Indian mainstream over hundreds of years would not easily allow this. The invalidity of this idea

was finally proved, first by the alienation and later the independence of Bangladesh. Only Israel has been able to form a nation of diverse and disparate peoples primarily through the force of religion. But its case is somewhat special ; it always had a 'common past' and the sense of a 'common destiny'. Persecution and finally the holocaust during the Second World War strengthened its resolve and it received enormous outside support. Even in its case the fact of continuous confrontation with its neighbours is an unfortunate consequence of such a nationalism.

Next is the question of assimilation of the Indian Muslims into Pakistani society or within the Muslim 'homeland'. Unlike in the concept of one Germany, where all Germans wherever they may be living, have the inherent right of abode and are constitutionally provided with every facility to integrate into the Federal Republic, the 3 lakhs of 'Biharis' in Bangladesh who identified themselves with Pakistan are still a people without a home and whom the latter refuses to accept. Even those who have moved into Pakistan decades earlier are referred to as Mohajirs and live a separate existence, who are discriminated against in significant ways and therefore, have now been forced to seek a separate political identity to defend their interests. If this is the current reality in Pakistan, the inadmissibility of the theory of a Muslim 'homeland' stands bitterly exposed undermining the very basis of its nationalism.

It is this which endows the question of Kashmir with special relevance. There is no need to argue the validity of Kashmir's accession to India. Whether legally, morally or as a matter of present international reality, India's case is irrefutable and non-negotiable. The only issue that may be addressed is Pakistan's continued illegal occupation of a portion of that State. But at another level, it is a question of rival nationalism. In a secular India, further division of the nation based on religion cannot be allowed, whereas for Pakistan its distorted view of Kashmir is rooted in the basis of its nationhood. It is as if these two diverse ideologies of nationalisms attempting to exist next to each other were themselves at war. Besides, Pakistan having lost the first round in Bangladesh now finds greater need to justify itself.

It is not as if this state of relationship must always follow a downward spiral and periodically result in conflagration. There are many ways that this slide can be arrested and relations between the nations improved. There are certain pre-conditions for that. First, a resolution of the Kashmir question based on the spirit of the 1972 Shimla Agreement and without greatly altering the existing status quo. Second, serious efforts at removing mutual misperceptions through extensive people to people contacts. Third, addressing questions of economic cooperation and removing other minor irritants that

exist. Fourth, introducing confidence building measures simultaneous with other activities and matching pace with them. Lastly, address reduction of military forces and evolve strategies for mutual security. While some measures for reducing military tensions can be discussed earlier, substantive progress in this area will have to await developments on other issues.

The purpose of this brief survey is to highlight the basic conflictual relationship that will exist between India and Pakistan unless there is a resolution of rival nationalisms. Bangladesh has based its own national identity on a socio-cultural-religious framework, which is both more rational and less conflictual with India's. There is no reason why Pakistan cannot adjust to the realities of the present geo-strategic environment and form a broader basis of its own nationalism based on its shared historic perceptions with India and yet satisfying its own peculiar circumstances.

A point that India would do well to remember is that the adversarial relationship with Pakistan is much deeper than what is the general perception in this country. Hence mutual relations are unlikely to improve short of fundamental changes in Pakistan's outlook. At the same time it needs to be kept in mind that India's own nationalism is not without severe strains and will require many more years to consolidate. But it is based essentially on the right premises and these cannot be compromised by external or internal pressures.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN PAKISTAN

It is an Indian misperception that a civil government in Pakistan will necessarily be friendly. This perhaps reflects its own desires rather than an objective assessment. The many years of strong anti-India propaganda that have been pursued in Pakistan will require decades before it is effectively countered. But a state of mutual stand-off can be achieved between our two nations and in this a civil government in Pakistan, hopefully in tune with the desires of its own people, rather than the aggrandisement of a regime, may be of greater help. This may be one reason why all the wars and skirmishes between the two nations (except the Kashmir War from 1947-48), took place under military rule even though it was ZA Bhutto who propagated a 1000 years war with India and initiated the nuclear weapons programme in that country. It is in this context that it is important to discuss the complex relationship between the civil and the military in Pakistan.

There are four principal reasons for the emergence of praetorianism in Pakistan and consequently the prominence of the military in its internal affairs.⁵ First, is institutional imbalance between the military and political

establishments. Even though the Muslim League can trace its origin to 1906 it did not become a mass party till as late as 1939-40.⁶ Most members actually joined it in the last couple of years. Commenting on Pakistan's political parties, Stephen Cohen says that these "have historically been weak : elections when not avoided altogether, have been preludes to disaster; succession has generally come about through mass agitation... and no ruler-civilian or military - has relinquished power voluntarily".⁷ With the death of Jinnah in 1948 and that of Liaqat Ali Khan in 1951, the Party was left with no leader of eminence and was a fragmented and disjointed organisation. On the other hand, the Army presented an efficient and organised profile, where young men appeared to be purposeful and patriotic and devoted to the cause of the nation. Secondly, the years after 1951 were a period of political decay. Feudalism, rank opportunism and corruption prevailed alongwith political instability. There were six PMs and 7 Cabinets in the seven years between 1951 to 1958, and only one C in C of the Army - Ayub Khan, who received two extensions.⁸

Thirdly, the political degeneration compared adversely in the public eye, with the efficiency, discipline and esprit de corps of the military. Lastly, the nation has suffered from a perpetual insecurity syndrome, because of which the Military always enjoyed high prestige, sufficient funds and considerable latitude.⁹ It is undeniable that the military usually had a high public image for most periods of its history. All the three military coups in 1958, 1969, and in 1977 were bloodless, enjoyed the support of the people, and in its initial stages satisfactorily dealt with the immediate tasks that faced the nation. The chronological sequence of civil and military rule in Pakistan since independence is given below¹⁰ :

<i>Period</i>	<i>Type of Govt.</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
1947-58	Civil	Under the amended Govt of India Act 1935, later replaced by the 1958 Constitution.
1958-62	Martial Law	Under General Ayub Khan
1962-69	Military Rule	Under President Ayub Khan, Presidential system.
1969-72	Martial Law	Under General Yahya Khan.
1972-77	Civil	Prime Minister ZA Bhutto under 1973 Constitution.
1977-85	Martial Law	General Zia-ul-Haq
1985-88	Military Rule	President Zia-ul-Haq under the Amended 1973 Constitution.
1988-90	Civil	Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, under the same constitution The Amendment period was over on 20 March 90.
Note	Military Rule	25 years
	Civil Rule	18 years.

It is interesting in this context to compare the different views of some Pakistani Army Chiefs on democracy. Field Marshal Ayub Khan was initially strongly against Army intervention, but preferred an authoritarian rule ; as he believed that the Pakistani People were not ready for liberal democracy. Zia-ul-Haq again questioned the very tenets of 'western democracy' and found this unsuitable to Pakistani conditions. He wanted an autocracy based on Islam but could not formulate a model even in eleven years. General Beg's position is a departure from Zia, but he has repeatedly been articulating a supra-constitutional role for the armed forces, even while supporting the present basis of democracy.

In the present day Pakistan, the Army looms large in the political firmament of the nation. The political process was allowed to resume after Zia's death not as a matter of course, but was made out to be an act of 'patriotism' by the Army. Even after a year the elected PM of the nation who came to assume that office after passing a dinner interview with the Chief of the Army Staff, had to "salute the spirit of the Armed Forces and also of General Beg at the crucial role they played on August 17 (1988)".¹¹ Therefore even when not in power, it is no wonder that the Army considers itself as the "symbol of national unity and oneness." It also sees itself as the guardian of the nation and the repository of its virtues. This 'praetorian tradition' developed over the years by the Pakistani military justifies its intervention in the affairs of state as not merely a matter of right, but even one of patriotic duty.¹² Therefore, General Beg can assert that the Army "must continue to oversee the democratic process" till it acquires its own "dynamics to correct itself where and when it goes wrong. Until then it won't be failing in its duty in providing the security umbrella".¹³ Finally after Ex "Zerb E Momin", General Beg can almost challenge the government of the country and ask the nation to respond, so that "the political will of the country is in consonance with its military will".¹⁴ Whatever it may be expected to mean, it does not connote well either for the civil government or for the peaceful resolution of problems with its neighbours.

Nothing has basically changed in the dominance of the military in Pakistani society. The Army's image had suffered a severe blow in the late Zia period. It was later claimed that only 289 officers were involved in Martial Law duties.¹⁵ Nevertheless, it was mired deep in the corrupt practices that had become an integral part of the nation, including involvement in the smuggling of drugs. In many ways then, staying away from active involvement in politics, as well as the stage management of "EX Zerb E Momin" was merely an act of refurbishing its image.¹⁶

NEW MILITARY STRATEGY

Two developments in the last couple of years have significantly changed

the strategic scenario for Pakistan. One is the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan which has eliminated the need to cater for a second front.¹⁷ The other is the disengagement of the Armed Forces from military rule following President Zia-ul-Haq's death ; a condition that allowed it to pay more attention to its basic task of soldiering. With this background of a changed strategic environment the Pakistan Army began a fresh look at its military strategy.

Pakistan's military strategy like any other nation's is shaped by its geo-strategic perceptions. The essential ingredients of this are given in brief below :

* A nation is considered more secure, if it has a large territory and short borders. But in the case of Pakistan it has extensive borders both to the East and West (approximately 1750 kms each) and another 800 kms of coastline. It has a communication system that is North-West in alignment and which is fairly close to the Indian border. Therefore, "Pakistan finds itself in (such) a position that its geography forces it to defend almost every inch of its territory".¹⁸

* There are no natural obstacles separating it from India and especially in the desert the area astride the boundary is open.¹⁹

* Its small sea-coast has only one port, i.e., Karachi which can be blocked easily by a hostile navy.

* It has conceived of a theory of the 'heartland' and the 'gateway'. The heartland being the Punjab, as it is said to represent the 'core of the nation' and, therefore, must be defended at all costs. The other provinces are mere "invasion routes" leading to it.²⁰ The dilemma is that the 'heartland' has no depth from India. There is yet another theory, that Pakistan has two 'population cum resource centres' in Karachi and Lahore which are vital for the survival of the State.

* Another reality in Pakistan is that 75% of its military comes from just five districts of the country : 3 in the Punjab (Rawalpindi, Jhelum and Campbellpore) and 2 in the NWFP adjacent to it (Kohat and Mardan)²¹ This in turn has accentuated the Punjab centric nature of both the Military and the State.

It is in this perspective that the strategic policy of Pakistan has been formulated. Though the nation has faced a two front situation in the past, the overwhelming preoccupation of Pakistan has been to counter India. Even with the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Pakistan did not feel unduly threatened

and did not redeploy any of its forces away from the East to oppose it. Pakistan must have appreciated then that a Soviet attack through its territory was unlikely. If a warm water port was the goal of Moscow, a much more lucrative target will be the Persian Gulf through Iran.

The other perception is an inferiority complex vis a vis India. Not just in size, population or overall capability, but even in deployable military strength. Pakistan sees an adverse equation with India. Following from this, its primarily strategic policy has been to seek parity with India. This has been attempted in the following ways :

- * In the earlier days it was attempted through propagating a theory that one Pakistani soldier equalled ten Indian Jawans.

- * Another approach has been through developing extra-regional connections. From independence to 1965 the USA was considered an ally. This relationship was resumed from 1978, when the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan and Pakistan was transformed immediately into a 'frontline state'. But the China link is seen in Pakistan as more enduring and dependable. A beginning was made as far back as 1955 in Bandung, but the relationship deepened in the 1960's.²²

- * The policy to develop nuclear weapons was adopted in January 1972 well before India's own PNE and was the result of a search for the ultimate 'equaliser'.

Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan has now favourably altered the strategic situation for Pakistan. Three concepts are being increasingly referred to in this regard, which are ; strategic consensus, strategic depth and strategic reserve.²³ Strategic consensus was first mentioned by General Beg in his address to the Command and staff College, Quetta, on October 26, 1988. He said then that the "Geo-political environment of the Region calls for a strategic consensus among Pakistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Turkey".²⁴ There has been no clear explanation subsequently of this, instead there is an attempt to talk of it in larger societal terms like the establishment of the concept of the 'Deen'. At the same time Beg has called it "an emerging reality", based on a commonality of objectives and would like to see included in it, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and "anybody else".²⁵

The concept of 'strategic depth' is especially vague, but both Iran and Afghanistan are seen as providing this to Pakistan. What is possibly meant is that in times of crisis and war, some of its strategic weapon systems may be deployed in these countries and thus be safe from Indian attack.

There is also an expectation that the Afghan mujahideen in Peshawar will repay their debt to Pakistan and support as required.²⁶

Last is strategic reserve. With the elimination of any threat from the West, Pakistan considers it will be able to concentrate all its forces for any operation in the East. Not even a single division need now be located in the West. This has provided it a substantial increment of force without having to raise any new formations. General Beg has emphasised that these additional reserves must now be used.

In order to bring out what is 'new' in this doctrine, it is important to briefly recapitulate its earlier doctrine. Stephen Cohen had described Pakistan's strategy as essentially one of "Offensive Defence".²⁷ In strategic terms, 'offensive defence' would mean launching an initial offensive, which would anticipate the enemy attack and hence attempt to pre-empt it. Subsequently, the forces would go into a defensive posture in enemy territory. This makes good sense for Pakistan considering its own perceptions of lack of depth. This is what was attempted in 1965.

The new strategic doctrine as articulated by General Beg since the War Games at the GHQ in Aug 89, has also been called as 'offensive defence'. This was done in the context of his 'glasnost' (openness) in criticising Pakistani military strategies of 1965 and 1971 and in describing these as failures.²⁸ From a study of Ex Zerb E. Momin as well as the comments of Lt Gen Hamid Gul, now General Officer Commanding 2 Corps, and the Chief Controller and Chief Umpire of the Exercise, a clearer picture emerges. He too described the new strategy as 'offensive defence', but his description relates more at the tactical level, as an alternate form of defence. This becomes apparent when he describes the various stages of this new strategy which is also in line with the Beg doctrine.²⁹

According to General Gul, Stage 1 is one of defensive action in which the emphasis is to absorb attrition, then to weaken and finally to halt the enemy attack. Stage 2 is one of regrouping. The third stage is one of 'counter offensive' and the final stage is to achieve a 'favourable decision'. This is hardly original but a departure from its earlier strategy and contains some new elements as well.

First, the emphasis is on a riposte or counter-attack which would be launched at the regrouping stage itself, and is supposed to "enter the situation laterally". It is to "counter-flow" even as the enemy's offensive is "flowing". There are two other ingredients according to General Gul. One is in "seizing a chunk of enemy territory to provide depth". The other point is that it would incorporate "deep interdiction to interfere with the Indian

concentration". This is a new option available to Pakistan in view of the deteriorating law and order situation in the Punjab and Kashmir and countering which must be a high priority for the Indian Armed Forces. Pakistan expects to be able to create serious difficulty through ground and aerial infiltration and by stepping up assistance to terrorists in India.

AN ASSESSMENT OF PAKISTAN'S MILITARY STRATEGY

In assessing Pakistan's military strategy, it is necessary to discuss first its possible military objectives, which may be considered to be the following :

- * Ensuring the accession of Kashmir to Pakistan.
- * Defend its 'heartland'-Punjab.
- * Defend the geographic boundaries of Pakistan and especially the North-South communication system.

Let us consider the three likely aims in their reverse order. Denial of 'every inch' of territory may be a necessary political objective, but the military requirements for it are also very heavy. Where mechanised mobility is easy, the attacker will have an inherent advantage and should be able to capture territory by deliberate means. A military strategy to prevent this and defend the North-South axis will need then to be based on mobility, in line with the Airland Battle concept and territory may be initially surrendered for tactical reasons in order to more effectively defeat the enemy. Main defences for this are likely to be well in depth and the tactics to be followed will be one of mobile defence. The risks are that this will result in loss of territory whose recovery may not be easy. Pakistan may not consider launching major pre-emptive offensives on its own in the desert, because these have fewer advantages for Pakistan and takes away troops from its crucial northern sectors.

Defence in the Punjab sector will obviously need to be based on fixed linear defences close to the Border as in the past. But what is 'new' is that Pakistan will attempt now to provide depth to its part of the Punjab by supporting the terrorists in adjacent India. An escalation of support and overt intervention will then appear to be an attractive option. In any case Pakistan will expect that the conditions in India's Punjab will restrict India's ability to launch any offensive that will threaten its vital interests. This will then make it easier for Pakistan to intervene militarily in Kashmir if required.

Lastly, the question of Kashmir. Pakistan's present strategy of extensive support to the terrorists without as yet getting directly involved, is a low cost, low risk military operation with most of the fighting being entrusted to the local terrorists whom it trains and infiltrates into India. It will, of course, attempt to remotely fine tune the operations and it has much experience of this from Afghanistan. The intensity of terrorism will be allowed to wax and wane depending on the prevailing situation and the political impact desired. It appears that the Pakistani leadership has at last taken heed of Zhou en Lai's advice before the 1965 Operation Gibraltar, when he had strongly advised against this adventure, and emphasized that to achieve success a political base should first be prepared in Kashmir before infiltrating the guerrillas.³¹

Finally Pakistan will always watch for weaknesses in India and attempt to take advantage of this where possible. This is entirely a subjective assessment and quite likely to be totally wrong. To rephrase Cohen slightly, when the folklore of the Officers' mess becomes state policy, misperceptions should surprise no one. Yet perceptions shape policy and encourage adventurous actions by a nation. It was the apparent Indian weakness in the Rann of Kutch in early 1965 that finally convinced Field Marshal Ayub Khan that "one or two lusty blows" in Kashmir were all that was needed to force India to capitulate.³²

CONCLUSION

The transition to a democratic system in 1988 allowed the Pakistan Army to concentrate on its prime task of soldiering. This was urgently required and it has since used the Exercise Zerb E Momin to 'refurbish' its image as well as to consider new approaches to strategy.³³ This is indeed a favourable development if it is to lead to a realistic assessment of the strategic environment and conclude that resort to conflict is not advantageous to either side. This should rationally lead to constructive steps to resolve mutual problems on a bilateral basis as laid down in the Shimla Agreement and which has been endorsed by leading nations in the world. But the reality is that inspite of some rhetorical support to this, Pakistan continues to encourage and actively support terrorist activities in India. Perhaps it does not fully appreciate that the foundations of Indian nationalism are strong and can withstand such pressures though at some cost. But its own nationalism is not such as to be able to resist similar pressures. While diplomacy must continue to be the primary way that the problems between the nations should be addressed, this cannot be done from a position where Pakistan perceives military weaknesses in India. Military preparedness is expensive and must be curtailed where possible : but a war or a continuous

low level counter-insurgency operation is much more so, both in the long and short haul.

NOTES

1. Lawrence Ziring, "Domestic Politics and the Regional Security Perspectives of Pakistan". Strategic Analysis, Jul 1988, Vol xii, no. 4, p. 331.
2. In the elections of 1936-37, preceeding the formation of popular ministries in the provinces, the Muslim League won just one seat in the Punjab and three seats in Sind. In VB Kulkarni's "Pakistan-Its Origin and Relations with India", Sterling Publishers, Bangalore, 1988, pp. xiii-xiv.
3. A A Athale in "Roots of a Security Dilemma". Strategic Analysis, Vol xii, no. 7, Oct. 1988, pp.785-8, has given these and other specific examples both from a study of Pakistani school text books and his own personal experience of a year in the country.
4. General Mohammad Musa, the C in C of Pakistan Army at the time, in his Book "My version" wrote that he opposed the launching of Operation Gibraltar. It may be interesting to conjecture as to what extent Field Marshal Ayub Khan's decision to launch the operation was affected by Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri's short stature and personal humility.
5. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "National Security, Domestic Politics and the Military", Defence Journal, Karachi, Vol xiv, no. 12, 1988, pp 19-20.
6. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Military and Politics in Pakistan- 1947-86" Progressive Publishers, Zaidari Park, Ichhra Lahore, 1987, p. 47. The Muslim League was formed on Dec. 30, 1906 at Dacca, with the Aga Khan as its President till 1912.
7. Stephen P Cohen, The Pakistan Army, Himalayan Books, New Delhi, 1984, p. 116.
8. Hasan Askari Rizvi, "The Breakdown of Constitutional Order and Military Rule in Pakistan", Defence Journal, Vol xiv, no. 12, 1988, p.7.
9. As far back as 1948 Liaqat Ali Khan had stated that, "The defence of the State is our foremost consideration. It dominates all other government activities, no. 5, p. 17 refers.
10. Rizvi, n. 8, pp. 5-6.
11. Ms Benazir Bhutto in an interview to Brig AR Siddiqi (Retd), Ed in Chief, Defence Journal, Karachi, Vol xvi, No. 3, 1990, p.11.
12. Cohen, n. 7, p. 131-2.
13. Brig A R Siddiqi (Retd) "Zerb E Momin : A Preview and an Appreciation", Defence Journal, Vol. xv, no. 9. 1989, p. 6.
14. Ikram Ullah, "Exercise Zerb E Momin : A Miracle". POT, (Pakistan Series). Vol 17, No. 245 Dec. 22, 1989.
15. POT, (Pakistan Series). Vol 17. No. 243, Dec. 19, 1989.
16. n. 11, p.14.
17. This has been repeatedly articulated by Pakistani Generals. See also Abbas Nasir, in the Herald, Karachi, Dec. 1989.
18. As told to Cohen by a senior Pakistani General who was closely associated with strategic planning in that country, n. 1, p. 141-2.
19. Cohen, n.7, p. 142.
20. Ibid, p. 45.

21. Ibid, p. 44.
22. Pakistani Prime Minister Mohamad Ali Bogra assured Zhou en Lai during their private conversation at Bandung in 1955, that his country harboured no ill will against China and that its membership of the security pacts with the USA were not directed against it, but to develop its own defence capability against India.
23. Tariq Husain in *The Herald*, Karachi, Mar 90.
24. Ghani Zafar, *The Muslim*, Islamabad, Sep 18, 1989.
25. Ibid.
26. Abbas Nasir, *The Herald*, Dec. 1989.
27. Cohen, n. 1, p. 145.
28. Nasir, n. 13.
29. Kaleem Omar, *The Muslim*, Islamabad, Dec 15, 1989.
30. Ghani Zafar, *Muslim*, Dec. 28, 1989.
31. Altaf Gauhar, President Ayub Khan's Information Secretary during the 1965 War, said this at a Seminar in Oxford in 1989. *Hindustan Times* Nov. 25, 1989, p. 13.
32. Ibid.
33. n. 13, p. 11.

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The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan - Perspectives

BRIG SUBHASH KAPILA

INTRODUCTION

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989 has taken place after ten years of occupation - a decade marked in Afghanistan's history by political and military turmoil and widespread bloodshed. It could virtually be labelled as a civil war with the official Communist groups in power being aided by the Soviets and the 'Mujahideen' groups operating from Pakistan being provided military and other aid by the USA, Western and West-Asian countries.

Afghanistan has always been at the vortex of major power rivalries for more than a century. Earlier it was Imperial Russia and Imperial Britain who vied for control of this strategically located country and in the twentieth century it created rivalry between the super powers. What is significant is that the Russian factor is constant and will remain so. Also significant is that the present Soviet intervention and occupation of Afghanistan has been the longest in its history. Yet despite this, the Soviet control did not encompass the whole of the country.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan changed the geo-political and strategic environment for the nations on the Eastern and Western flanks of Afghanistan, namely Iran on the West and Pakistan and India on the East. It also in a way affected China which shares a small common border with Afghanistan in the Wakhan strip. Now that the Soviet troops have been pulled out, the geo-political and strategic environment changes again for Iran, Pakistan, India and China, besides far-reaching implications for Afghanistan itself. To examine the implications of the Soviet entry into Afghanistan in December, 1979 and their withdrawal after 10 years in 1989 a countrywide analysis is given below :

PAKISTAN

Pakistan shares a long and leaky border with Afghanistan. The provinces of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan that is the north West Frontier, Baluchistan and Northern Areas (occupied Kashmir) are inhabited by ethnic groups similar to those of the Eastern provinces of Afghanistan. Historically, even the British, with all their Imperial might, could not effectively control the frontier regions militarily. This legacy was inherited by Pakistan, even after creation of Pakistan, the struggle for a separate Pakhtunistan has remained alive.

Historically also, during the struggle between Imperial Britain and Russia, Afghanistan was after some time tacitly left as a buffer state between the Indian sub-continent and the Russian domains. Pakistan thus viewed the Soviet en-masse move into Afghanistan with alarm as in one step the buffer of Afghanistan vanished and Soviet presence directly established on the borders of Pakistan.

Pakistani concern on the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was fuelled by two major factors. It would be recalled that around that time Baluchistan was in turmoil with an on-going insurgency. Pakistan feared that this would be fuelled further with Soviet aid. An international flavour was sought to be given by Pakistan to this factor by projecting that the Soviet move into Afghanistan was prompted by the long term strategic goal of reaching the warm water ports on the Makran Coast. With that eventuality turning into a reality, the Russians would be dominating the eastern flanks of the Hormuz Straits and also interfere with the sea lanes approaching it and thereby threatening the Western world's Gulf oil supplies and those of Japan.

The second factor played up by Pakistan was that it now stood sandwiched between Soviet dominated Afghanistan and, as painted by it, a Soviet friendly India. It was at times even suggested that the Soviet move into Afghanistan was at India's insistence with the common aim of breaking up Pakistan as India has not reconciled to the emergence of that country.

Both these factors were played up adroitly by Pakistan and on both counts Pakistan was successful in getting defined in US strategy and political stances as a 'front line' state standing up to Soviet might on behalf of the western world. The bestowal of 'front line' status made it a beneficiary of unprecedented military aid from the USA and sizeable increase in security-related economic aid from advanced industrial countries allied to USA.

While initially the fears of Pakistan may be conceded due to the presence of a super-power on its borders; however, it should have been clear both to Pakistan, the USA and other supporters that neither the force levels committed by the Soviets nor the nature of the armed conflict that followed in Afghanistan would have enabled the Soviets to drive through the Baluchistan province of Pakistan and on to the Arabian Sea Coast. However, since it suited policy requirements and foreign largesse would have otherwise been terminated, the twin bogeys of the Soviet threat continued to be played right till the very end.

Pakistan was lucky that these foreign policy initiatives coincided with the fall of the Shah of Iran and the initial panic and thereafter an overriding concern of the Reagan Administration in the USA as to how best to protect the Eastern flanks of Hormuz Straits. The closest areas available

to guard the Eastern flanks were only available in Pakistan i.e. Karachi and the Pakistan naval bases on the Makran Coast. In US strategy, therefore, Pakistan was not only confronting the Soviet Union along the Pak-Afghan border but also a useful ally to provide base support for US strategic forces in the Gulf region. The spin-off from this, related to developments in Afghanistan, was the extensive development of port facilities and air bases in Baluchistan by Pakistan with US aid and those from its allies. Baluchistan was a key base support area for the US Central Command and its Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) primarily to cover the Gulf, Iran and if need be the Soviets in Afghanistan.

With the above as a backdrop what are the future prospects and implications for Pakistan with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan? Before discussing this it would be pertinent to record here that an important event in Pakistan preceding the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan was the untimely death of President Zia who was the architect of forcefully getting recognition of Pakistan as a 'front line' state in the Western global strategy. With Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto being in the chair for some time, no major discernible trends are evident that indicate a qualitative change in Pakistani policies towards Afghanistan.

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan removes the *raison d'être* of the 'front line' status of Pakistan. Logically, this should lead to large scale reduction in US & Western military and economic aid to Pakistan. Pakistan under Benazir Bhutto will not like to water-down the 'front-line' status for obvious reasons. Secondly, Pakistan's foreign policy interest will not permit acceptance of a Soviet backed regime in Kabul with the conflict-prone problems of its ethnic groups in the frontier regions of NWFP and Baluchistan. How does Pakistan achieve this? It will be fair to presume that Pakistan would in the future too continue to back the Afghan Mujahideen operations into Afghanistan from their bases around Peshawar. Pakistan would continue to keep stirring the cauldron albeit in a controlled manner never allowing it to cross the threshold where an open rupture or confrontation takes place with the Soviets triggering their return once again.

Pakistan, in my opinion, while professing to improve relation with Iran on the surface would not like to see an improvement in US-Iran relations also as having lost the first contributory factor of 'front line' status due to Soviet withdrawal, it would not like to loose the second contributory factor i.e. its importance in protecting or contributing to the protection of the Eastern flanks of Hormuz Straits on behalf of the Western World.

IRAN

Iran too, like Pakistan, shares a long common frontier with Afghanistan

on its Western flanks. Unlike Pakistan, a geo-political factor which imposed restraint on any Iranian initiatives, interference in the Afghan situation or routing of massive military aid was the common frontier that Iran shared with the Soviet Union. This made it susceptible to direct Soviet pressures. Also, at the time the Afghan crisis took place i.e. the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Iran internally was in turmoil. This was also the time when Iran was in direct conflict with one super-power i.e., the United States following the take-over of the US Embassy in Teheran by Iranian militants. Iran could hardly afford to be in direct conflict with yet another super-power.

If the above was not enough, any further Iranian bravado that could have been possible to be exercised, was severely limited by the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war in September, 1980 which effectively curtailed any significant Iranian intervention in the Afghan crisis.

However, nearly two million Afghan refugees fled into Iran. Despite all the constraints mentioned above and its isolation regionally, Iran provided limited military aid and material support to the Afghan Mujahideen.

After a decade, when the Soviets have now withdrawn from Afghanistan and Khomeini has passed away, the prospects for Iran vis-a-vis Afghanistan are not too bright. With the internal situation in Afghanistan yet to stabilise and with no let up in Mujahideen operations from the Pakistani bases, the two million Afghan refugees in Iran are unlikely to return to their native country. Similarly whatever Skirmishes the Iran-based Afghan Mujahideen are capable of undertaking, Iran would be obliged to support them if for nothing else then for their being members of the larger Islamic brotherhood, and the Kabul government though Muslim but being Russian backed is termed as heretic. Conversely, arguing from the situation facing Iran at the commencement of the Afghan crisis i.e. its conflict with the USA and Iran-Iraq war, now that both are over, Iran under the new regime may water down militancy a prime feature of the Khomeini days. Iran would now have more lee-way in exercising regional initiatives. Whatever it does will be dependent on the intensity with which Pakistan stokes the Afghan domestic situation and without Iran forgetting the pressures the Soviets can apply along their long border with Iran.

INDIA

India has consistently taken a pragmatic stand on the Afghan situation in consonance with its declared position of non-alignment. India does not share any common border with Afghanistan or Russia to be directly influenced or pressurised by events there.

It is in the regional stability sphere that India gets directly concerned,

and more so in the spill-over effects of US, Chinese and Western aid to Pakistan. While in the perceptions of these nations, the massive military aid especially given by the USA was to counter the Soviets by according Pakistan a 'front line' status, historically it cannot be forgotten that two decades back similar massive arming of Pakistan to contain the Soviet Union as part of a regional defence grouping encouraged Pakistan to embark on misadventures against India. The same cannot be ruled out now and for the future. India can, therefore, ill-afford to ignore the massive induction of modern weapons and sophisticated equipment which ostensibly meant to counter the Soviet presence in Afghanistan could be used by Pakistan against India.

India in future too will expectedly play its pragmatic role by attempting to defuse the Afghan situation and assist in the normalisation and reconstruction of Afghanistan. This has been consistently stated by our leaders and Indian spokesmen in world forums.

CHINA

In this assessment, since China looms so much in the affairs of South Asia, its role and stand in the events in Afghanistan following the Soviet move needs pertinent mention. Incidentally, China too has a common border with Afghanistan, approx 60 kms, bordering the Wakhan corridor. For those not well versed with the geography of Afghanistan, the Wakhan corridor is a small narrow strip approximately 300 kms long and 60-70 km wide which juts out from Afghanistan. North of the Wakhan corridor lies USSR, Pakistan to the South and China to the East. The Wakhan Corridor emerged as a result of the Russo-British Settlement of Afghan border in 1895. Its existence could be surmised to act as a buffer between Imperial Russia and British India and is now a legacy for USSR, Pakistan and China.

At the outset of the Afghan crisis, the Chinese used the Wakhan corridor for routing their military aid to Afghan rebels and when Soviet and Afghan troops effectively sealed the borders in the Wakhan Corridor, the Chinese switched it through Pakistan.

However, what has been intriguing strategic analysts is that the Chinese have never reacted to what has been speculated in Western press reports that as per a tacit agreement between the Soviets and the Kabul Government, the Soviets have 'de-facto' taken over the Wakhan corridor and developed strategic roads and other sensitive facilities including those for monitoring of joint Sino-US military facilities in Xinjiang. The assumptions being projected are that firstly the Chinese for security reasons would much rather prefer Soviet troops in this area than the Afghan Mujahideen as with common ties of ethnicity and religion, the Afghan Mujahideen could dis-

affect minorities in Chinese Xinjiang. Secondly, it is argued that the development of roads etc. in the Wakhan Corridor threaten Pakistan more than China.

In terms of future, a likely question that arises is : will China try to supplant USA as a major military donor for Afghanistan rebels, should USA downgrade Pakistan's 'front line' status ? It seems unlikely that China with its current domestic problems and economic status would be able to do so. However, the Chinese Premier is stated to have promised economic aid to Pakistan for Afghan refugees. Aiding Pakistan against Afghanistan is not on the same priority as aiding Pakistan against India. The latter would always retain priority in Chinese policies.

CONCLUSION

While the withdrawal of Soviet presence is a welcome step in the easing of tensions in the region, the Geneva Accords between the concerned nations were incomplete accords, in the sense that, no concrete steps seem to have been spelt out in relation to long term settlements. At best, both super-powers for various policy interests of their own, remain content with the withdrawal of the Soviet military presence. The Afghan Mujahideen have not ceased as an entity nor given up their military operations against the Kabul government of President Najibullah. It is obvious that Mujahideen operations cannot continue unless they are funded and aided by Pakistan and her benefactors. To the dismay of the Mujahideen and their supporters, the Kabul Government has not toppled with Soviet withdrawal, as expected. It would, therefore be fair to assume that the Afghan crisis would be kept alive.

In whose interest out of all the affected parties should the Afghan crisis be kept alive ? The answer on a fair analysis would again be Pakistan. Pakistan, to retain its 'frontline' status in US strategy, and thereby to continue the process of receiving massive US military aid, would do anything to keep the cauldron boiling.

The strategic implications of this for India are that while political and foreign policy initiatives attempt normalisation in the region, the Pak military build-up in terms of sophisticated equipment both qualitatively and quantitatively has to be closely monitored despite passing away of President Zia from the scene. It is notable that while Zia never made threatening statements against India publicly, the present Pakistani Chief of Army Staff, General Aslam Beg threatens to carry the battle deep into 'enemy' (read Indian) territory while talking to the Press and all this, while a democratically elected civil government is in power in Pakistan.

What Ails our Military Medical Services

BRIG N B GRANT (RETD)

Seldom in the realm of Indian medical professional excellence, has this term 'excellence', manifest itself, as it did with the officer of the Indian medical Service (IMS). Although basically he was an army officer, his medical reputation was so high that, in those days, when even the poorest civilian was dying, his family collected money to consult an IMS doctor, as then, the man died in peace, knowing that he had received the most excellent medical advice available in the country. Those were the days, when it was a rare privilege, if a civilian could get admission in a military hospital. This then was the status, the stature, and the high esteem, in which the military doctor, his medical service, and his hospitals were held in the country.

Today, outside Bharat, the military hospitals continue to enjoy their prestigious position in almost all countries, except India, where its reputation has now plummeted, and is on the downward curve. Take the USA as an example. In that country, even the President of the Union, his cabinet colleagues and ambassadors of friendly countries, are admitted to the world famous Walter Reed military hospital in Washington DC, for serious ailments. The position in India is just the opposite, in that, leave alone a civilian wanting to get admission in a military hospital like it once was, but even a serving officer, if he could afford it, would rather be treated in a civil hospital for any serious ailment. In many cases he is only compelled to do so. A classic example of this is our Cardiac Thoracic Centre (CTC) at Pune. This institution, which at one time was to have become, leave alone the best cardiac centre in the country, but the best in Asia, has no facilities even today to carry out heart bye-pass operations, which more than a dozen civilian hospitals in India do it daily. As if this was not bad enough, the CTC has not even got the basic minimum diagnostic equipment for heart ailments, viz angiogram.

However, the saddest blow to our military hospital's reputation is the fact that, the President of India, who is also the Supreme Commander of the armed forces, prefers to be admitted to a civil hospital when he is sick, in preference to his own military hospital. The latest case of Wg Cmdr Rakesh Sharma, India's first astronaut, having to be admitted to a civil hospital in Pune for a leg injury, as our best orthopaedic hospital in MH Kirkee, did not have modern facilities to treat him, is not only an eye opener, but one which should make our military medical services hide their heads in shame. When the last COAS, Gen Sundarji, was trying to project an

image of a highly sophisticated, modern and a computerised army, I doubt whether he had taken the medical services in his calculations. To take just one example, in the matter of drugs in our MI Rooms, we still prescribe APC and medicines associated with the colours of the rainbow - violet for wounds, blue for stomach pains and red for colds and fever. As late as three months back ; there was no Vitamin 'B' tablets available in any MH in Pune, a station where is located the Central Medical Stores.

There are several reasons for this state of affairs, however, I am sure that, lack of knowledge is not one of them. As a non medical man, but one who is a student of management, I cannot help feeling that, the root causes of this are two, viz. (a) continuous and frequent turn round of the DGAFMS, and (b) our obsession with rank and status. Regarding the former, for over two decades now, there has not been a DG, who has served his full tenure, and in many cases, not even for one year. The result is that, he could never muster the required experience, motivation, stature and clout, to thump the table and tell the government, and more so the Service chiefs, that, unless his medical resources are increased and hospitals are made modern, he would not take responsibility for giving the medical cover needed to maintain the morale of the troops. As things stand, the medicals get last priority in the military budget, for which the DGAFMS must take the major share of responsibility. In connection with the second reason, namely, hankering for ranks, the existing policy, forcing expert medical specialists to become generalists for getting higher ranks, has resulted in the Medical Corps, losing first rate professionals, and in the bargain getting indifferent administrators, more interested in the advancement of their ranks than in the enhancement of their profession.

If the above state of affairs reflects the kind of medical facilities catering for the serving soldier, one can well imagine what it is like for the retired ex-serviceman. To begin with, unlike that existing in other countries, in India, the ex-serviceman is not entitled to medical cover as a right, but only as an obligation and favour, if there is spare capacity available in the authorised establishment for troops. When such some facilities were extended to the retired personnel from the existing resources, no separate long term planning appears to have been done, but it was assumed that, in peace time atleast, there would be sufficient spare capacity to cater for ex-servicemen. This is so unlike the system in other countries like the USA and UK, where separate veteran hospitals have been instituted, which are staffed and equipped as good as any regular military hospital. In India, as the medical facilities rendered to retired personnel is still done as a favour on an ad-hoc basis, it can be withdrawn at any time during operations or in an emergency.

What however is worse still that, as per the present rules, the ex-Serviceman is not entitled to medical treatment in military hospitals for diseases like, cancer, heart, pulmonary tuberculosis, kidney replacement, hip joint replacement, even if such facilities do exist. It is not appreciated that, all such ailments occur mostly in old age after retirement. The modern treatment for these diseases is so very expensive that, it is next to impossible for any ex-Serviceman to avail of them in civil hospitals from his meagre pension. In contrast, the retired civilian government employee and his family (to include parents), is entitled to free treatment for all such diseases, including heart bye-pass and kidney transplant, through the Central Government Health Scheme (CGHS).

It is not for a moment being advocated that, these facilities should not be given to retired civilian employees - far from it. However, to deny the same to ex-Servicemen, is a tragic reflection on the nation's tribute to the soldier. How our Service Chiefs have accepted this for so long, is yet another question. In any other country, the veteran is always given a special status, and his privileges and benefits far exceed that of his retired civilian counterpart. India must be the only country where it is the reverse.

If the government feels that, it has not got the necessary resources to give medical facilities to the ex-Servicemen from within the present Defence estimate, we may think of building up a special fund for this purpose, on the same lines as the Army Group Insurance Scheme, while a man is still serving. In the interim period, however, some way must be found for existing ex-servicemen to be treated through a special budget to be provided for this purpose. It is a pitiable state, when what happened only three months ago, that, an ex-Army Commander and an ex-COAS, had to go to a civil hospital in Bombay at their own cost for an operation of the aneurism of the aorta. The fact that both of them are located in Pune, the station having the maximum of military medical facilities in the Country, does not speak well for itself. These officers could afford it, but what would have been the fate of a jawan, or for that matter, even a Major, suffering from that ailment ? The saying goes that, old soldiers never die, they just fade away.' In India it is, 'old soldiers don't just fade away ; they die of neglect.'

Ever since Gen Montgomery enunciated his ten new principles of war in World War II, he had always placed the morale factors at the very top. Amongst the various factors determining 'Morale' military history shows that, no single factor has dominated it, than the soldier's faith that, when sick or wounded, he and his family would receive the best of medical treatment, and that the same would continue even when he retires. All other factors

like pay, promotion, status etc., have, in the long run, taken a lower priority than this signal morale winning factor of medical care. Unfortunately, our government and our Service Chiefs have not appreciated this, and have not given the medical services the priority it deserves. Perhaps, the Medical Corps itself is partially responsible for this. From now onwards, it must force itself to be heard at the highest level of decision making forums. But more than that, it must once again raise itself to the professional excellence of the old IMS - then alone, not only will it be heard, but it will be able to demand its due share of our defence budget and resources, to be able to give the kind of medical cover which the soldier expects as his right to receive.

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India's Role in the Context of Indian Ocean Security*

CAPTAIN H. DHARMARAJAN

The Indian Ocean region (IOR) has always been a region of political instability, beset with complex ethnic and political cleavages and volatile with a violence of an endemic nature. With the ingress of extra regional powers cultivating interests of a varied nature, the security scenario is indeed complex. However, with the recent return of democracy in Pakistan, the democratic transfer of power in Sri Lanka, the end of a leadership crisis in Burma, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, the thaw in super power relations, together with India's predominance in aborting the coup in Maldives, the active peace keeping in Sri Lanka, and the mediatory role in the peaceful resolution of the Gulf crisis, India's role in the context of Indian Ocean security needs to be seen in a new light.

Before touching upon the predicament of security itself, it would help in analysing the geographic constants and the economic dimensions that have generated such a great deal of interest in the region.

GEOGRAPHIC CONSTANTS

In the Indian Ocean, the North - Western sector alone, encompassing the Middle East, accounts for more than 60 per cent of the world's proven hydrocarbon reserves.

The Ocean being rich in fish and marine life is now being exploited immensely not only by the littoral states but also by several extraregional nations too - the prominent ones being South Korea, Japan and the USSR. From the two Eastern and Western areas of the Indian Ocean, more than 3,362,200 tonnes of fish catch are being obtained per annum.

Besides, new technology has promised to make the Ocean an infinitely more important economic resource than ever before, making the IOR a source of power and dispute. With the increasing discoveries of vast untapped rare - metal resources in the off shore zones, deep sea and the illusory limitless commercial value of the continent of Antarctica, there has been a remarkable change in the jurisdiction over maritime zones in a very short

* This essay won the second prize in group 'B' of the USI Gold Medal Essay Competition 1988-89.

time. During the past decade alone about 35% of the waters previously recognized as high seas have been enclosed as national zones. Even territorial sea claims by various countries are still non-uniform in the IOR. So much so that the IOR is regarded not only as a future source of food, but also of energy, minerals, chemicals and even space for the sustenance of several countries.

ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS

There is a gross lack of economic compatibility in the IOR. In the production profiles of individual states there is a prevalence of surplus production of one or two primary commodities. Such goods carry a limited or a specialised overseas market in the industrialized world with much less prospect in other developing countries. Hence the markets for the Gulf oil, the South Asian textiles, tea and jute, the East African coffee etc lie outside these particular areas and usually outside the IOR as well. The West, Japan and the Soviet Bloc promise the most lucrative markets for the Indian Ocean countries.

With the deepening of the Suez canal, traffic has been redirected through the Mediterranean - Red Sea route. Even otherwise, a number of large loaded tankers continue to traverse the Indian Ocean after passing around the Cape of Good Hope. A large percentage of the world's shipping concentrates on the Bab el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz and the Cape of Good Hope in the West, and the straits of Malacca, Singapore and Lombok in the East. Hormuz being the chief oil route assumes unfathomable importance with two-thirds of the world's sea borne crude passing through it. A look at the map showing the Inter Area Flow of Commodities - principal amongst them being oil, coal, iron ore, grain and the principal container routes will illustrate the proximity of the Indian peninsula to all of these. The peninsula is indeed the hub around which the bulk of the world's sea borne trade flows.

Recently, to solve the problems of disposal of nuclear wastes and other toxic industrial wastes some extra regional countries have begun looking towards the IOR. In fact, toxic ash from the incinerators of Philadelphia was taken by the ship "Felicia" and after failing to dump the same in many countries of Africa and Europe since Aug 1986, the vessel recently released its undesirable cargo off Bangladesh in the Bay of Bengal.

Thus, it is not just the protection of shipping fleets and off shore installations from foreign interference but also the protection and preservation of the marine environment, and the conservation of the living resources

amongst other predicaments that require consideration on an economic dimension.

SUPER POWER PRESENCE IN THE INDIAN OCEAN

The two super powers are physically remote from one another except in their virtually uninhabited peripheries. The friction and threatening proximities of great power confrontations hence occur elsewhere, like in the IOR. Besides, with the absolute increase in the volume of sea borne cargo due to the accelerating pace of economic activity, it has become increasingly essential for them to maintain a permanent presence in the IOR to further their strategic interests.

After the escalation of the Gulf Crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the military presence of the super powers which had earlier been sporadic, fitful, and temporary, has now become a permanent feature of the IOR, despite the abating of both the crises. The main interest has been to command the vital strategic choke points of Hormuz, Bab el Mandeb, Malacca and Lombok. Both the powers being vulnerable to attack from the sea and the lines of communication, have deployed sophisticated undersea surveillance systems to monitor threats, especially to the perilous sea routes for their oil supplies from the Gulf. They are now further looking for island bases amongst the several archipelagoes - Chagos, Comoros, Seychelles, Mauritius, Maldives, etc - that exist in the IOR. Warm water ports of Trincomalee in Sri Lanka, Chittagong in Bangladesh, and Gwadar on the Makran coast in Pakistan are also being vied at.

Both the super powers have a substantial presence in the IOR in the form of fleets and bases. The Soviet Indian Ocean Naval Squadron has more than 25 ships including submarines and Minsk class aircraft carriers. The presence increased to a peak during the Gulf crises. Temporary increases are closely linked with the increases in US naval deployments. Though they are structured largely for anti-ship operations they have a formidable strike capability for amphibious landings too.

Socotra island of the PDYR (South Yemen) has Soviet monitoring equipment installed that covers the entire Indian Ocean. Aden is the major Soviet naval base in the region since Somalia ousted the Russians out of Berbera during the 1977 conflict with Ethiopia. The Red Sea ports of Massawa and Assab in Ethiopia are also vital to the Soviets. However the US has not been much affected by these bases as the volume of NATO's maritime traffic in the Red Sea has gone down considerably and the Saudis have turned pro-West too. Moreover, the US now has several bases in the Indian Ocean to neutralise this Soviet presence.

In 1971, the UN General Assembly had passed a resolution declaring the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace (IOZP), free from military competition. However in 1974, just to "seek nothing more than an ability to stage forces in the area similar to the ability the Soviets had using the port facilities at Aden and Berbera (then) plus the anchorages off Socotra", Diego Garcia was expanded setting off an arms race in this new area. And the US presence began.

Diego Garcia, approximately 11500 miles from New York as well as from San Francisco, is a low small flat atoll having facilities for ship and aircraft maintenance, bunkering, aircraft staging, improved communications, anti - sub warfare operations, fuel storage capacity, deepened lagoon for anchorage, an extended runway and a large airfield parking area. It is now the rear area base for the US Rapid Deployment Force under the USCENTCOM (US Central Command). The base has one aircraft carrier battle group with USS Carl Vinson CVN-70, one amphibious ready group having three amphibious ships and one amphibious assault ship, three tactical fighter wings each with 72 aircraft, two marine amphibious forces each with a ground combat division, a tactical fighter wing and sustained support, and two army combat divisions. Thirteen Maritime Prepositioning ships are located at Diego Garcia for outfitting the RDF marine amphibious brigades (can sustain three brigades for 30 days).

The other bases of the US in the Ocean are -

- (a) Djibouti - for naval port calls and patrol aircraft
- (b) Mombasa - with access to the Moi airport
- (c) Oman -
 - (i) Al Khasab - near the Gulf of Hormuz
 - (ii) Masirah
 - (iii) Thumrait
 - (iv) Seebprovides air cover for operations in the Gulf
- (d) Mogadishu - airport facilities
- (e) Berbera - port facilities

While the area of concern for the US RDF is mainly the Middle East, it is interesting to note that this area of concern also includes Pakistan. This will be dealt with later.

PRESENCE OF OTHER EXTRA REGIONAL POWERS

The French Maritime force in the IOR is a fairly large permanent fleet with a small temporary reinforcement. The fleet in particular includes

minesweepers which were used lately in the Gulf crisis. The French have an FAAR - a Rapid Action and Assistance Force of more than 47,000 troops which include armour, para and infantry elements, for contingencies. Their major base is at Le Port (Rodriguez), which is an island south west of Diego Garcia.

The British force in the IOR is smaller and less capable than the French force but could provide valuable augmentation to the US forces. Even the carrier HMS Invincible had been deployed in the region a few years ago. The British too have one air portable infantry brigade as a contingency force.

The developing Chinese interests in the region will soon demand an active military presence. However, with its limited capability for projecting power, it is being cautious to prevent being condemned for replicating the kind of super power conduct in the IOR. Other Western European states and Japan too are showing considerable interest in the region.

However, in spite of the presence of all these outside powers, with the development of longer range missiles now, there has surfaced no need for the super powers to deploy missile submarines in the IOR. It is also unlikely therefore, that such a requirement will arise at a later date.

The extra-regional powers could destabilise the region by means such as mere psychological assurances to friendly littoral countries which alone can serve notice to potential enemies, or the other extreme of the physical outbreak of war. Military activity will continue definitely as an instrument of policy. Modern technology has made weapon systems so flexible and far - ranging in their effects that power exercised in the ocean need not necessarily be naval in the sense of being exercised from vessels moving in or upon the water. The principal value of a navy is its enormous capability for geographical flexibility and of increasing or reducing in a relatively short time, the scale of military presence in distant regions. Major maritime powers always demand maximum freedom of the seas. While remaining militarily uncommitted when brought close to the foreign coasts on high seas they can pose a threat to intervention or punishment. This is much stronger than diplomacy but less dangerous than use of force. Such gunboat diplomacy in the form of blockades is very effective; on a smaller scale it could just be a warship visit as a visible presence of support or coercion to keep peace.

INCIDENTS OF THE PAST

There have been several incidents related to India and otherwise in the Indian Ocean with the involvement of the super powers. The Horn of

Africa in particular, has called for a substantial presence by super powers on several occasions. For India the first major incident was during the 1971 Indo Pak War.

Alarmed by the imminent defeat of Pakistan in 1971 the US assembled Enterprise task force entered the Bay of Bengal to protect American interests. India had blockaded Bangladesh then and in the ensuing fighting a Liberian freighter MV Venus Challenger, was accidentally sunk with no survivors. The Soviet task force soon caught up with the US fleet bringing about a quick end to the gunboat diplomacy.

In 1973, the Egyptian blockade of Bab el Mandeb brought many warships into the IOR. In 1977, eighteen French warships including two aircraft carriers deployed off Djibouti to evacuate French nationals if the requirement arose. A year later, exercises off the Horn of Africa by the NATO nations provoked protests by Ethiopia and USSR. After the American hostages crisis in Iran in the year 1980, USS Nimitz, Kittyhawk and Midway all loomed large in the Arabian Sea. Even the US carrier Constellation had been sent earlier to reassure the Saudis. The same year, as many as sixty warships from US, France, Britain, and Australia positioned themselves in the Gulf to ensure the freedom of navigation.

In 1981, India figures again with a dispute, involving a deployment of naval vessels, over the island of New Moore in the estuary of River Hariabhanga. South Talpatty, as the Bangladeshis called the island, was believed to have been formed by a 1970 cyclone and was claimed by India in 1971 and by Bangladesh in 1978. Super powers did not directly interfere in the issue.

The Sri Lankan blockade of the Jaffna peninsula in the year 1987 was to ensure its own internal security. Their navy even turned back a flotilla of supplies sent by the Indian Red Cross to help the starved Tamils. This was prior to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord.

Thus the presence of powerful navies in the IOR can serve a variety of purposes. The legal aspect of the strategic use of the sea relating to the function of warships as laid down by the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS-UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) is as follows -

- (a) To establish and maintain naval blockades as a part of gunboat diplomacy,
- (b) Naval surveillance activities,
- (c) Protection of sea bed exploitation operations,
- (d) Blockades by way of self defence.

Besides the presence helps in sorting out problems of territorial disputes, violations of territorial waters, power politics in crisis, fishing disputes, protection of own nationals, and freedom of navigation. Some of the actions resorted to, have ranged from naval presence, blockades, evacuation, harassment, boarding of ships, seizing of cargo, sinking of ships, and even to full fledged attacks.

INDIA'S POSITION AS A REGIONAL POWER

With a 2759 nautical mile coast line and an EEZ of more than two million sq km India has an intimate relation in the context of Indian Ocean security. India is vastly different in size, wealth and population from its South Asian neighbours and is the core country of the region. Constituting 72 percent of the South Asian region by area, 77 percent by way of population, 78 per cent of the GNP and possessing the most advanced industrial and technological base, India has now established its regional primacy as a dominant political and military force. Being self sufficient in military programmes with an indigenous armament industry that is largest amongst the non-communist Third World in value, volume, diversity of manufacture and research and development facilities, India has enhanced its status as a regional and a potential global power. Today India has the fourth largest army, fifth largest air-force, and the eighth largest navy in the world to counter the regional and the extra regional threats. India's navy is the largest amongst the littoral navies of the Indian Ocean. India's defence plants turn out an extensive range of conventional weapons. The other South Asian states including Pakistan lag far behind India in arms production and rely on arms imports for a broad range of their defensive requirements.

The elemental premise of India's strategic policies has been to seek to deny any intermediary role to extra regional powers in the affairs of the Indian Ocean states. India has often had to resort to diplomatic as well as military means to insulate the subcontinent from external intrusion and to ensure its own independence of action. Since only the two super powers possess the sizable conventional military forces and the incentive to undertake any sustained military intervention in the IOR, only they pose a threat to the regional preeminence that India seeks to achieve. Hence the primary concern has been to render the waters and the islands around the Indian subcontinent inviolable to the large surface naval flotillas of the super powers in the IOR.

Consequent to the Afghanistan and the Gulf crises, the super power activity in the IOR emerged in purely military naval terms. With little scope left for diplomacy now, Indian responses too need to be couched in the

same terms. The looming threat of Pakistan seeking to align itself with the super powers still exists despite the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. Even the return of democracy in the nation, after several years of military dictatorship, has not ended the relentless arming of Pakistan's forces by the US on the pretext that the Afghan regime is receiving military aid from the Soviets. This has exposed the South Asian region to super power interference in a manner that has never occurred before. Hence the Indian stand on the IOZP proposal is now a shade different from what the Sri Lankans originally put forth. While the South Asian nations around India not only want to limit the potential for East-West confrontation in the IOR but also to limit the potential military threat from India, India itself seeks only to limit-and if possible remove-the military presence of non Indian Ocean states in general, and the super powers in particular. The Sri Lankans have called for a reduction in the size of all navies including India's in the IOR.

The Indian peninsula jutting two thousand kilometers into the sea is indeed the most prominent land feature in the IOR. This physical configuration brings approximately 50 percent of the Indian Ocean within a thousand mile arc ascribed from Indian territory. It implies that with the appropriate weapon systems, land based military power can be projected from and integrated with India's sea-based capability over a wide swathe of the Indian Ocean. However, on the other hand, the country, now, with its 200 nm EEZ, has many more economic assets to patrol and protect from physical ingress along its long coastline.

THE SUPER POWER RIVALRY AND INDIAN OCEAN SECURITY

Considering the North-Western quadrant of the IOR to be crucial to the future of the worlds free market economies, the West has declared that it will defend by all means, including force against any aggressor, the region stretching from Egypt to Pakistan. To emphasise the rapid and massive application of American military power in the region the US RDF can now introduce more than 200,000 troops with full ground, marine and air support in the IOR. It has been assessed by classical geopolitical theories that the next phase of the struggle of the super powers would be the Indian Ocean littoral-now of incalculable and permanent importance. Therefore, befitting the need, one or the other state is likely to be invited or coerced into collaborative, antagonistic postures by the two superpowers.

The inclusion of Pakistan in the US CENT COM area of concern affirms the US confrontation objectives. The overriding reality is that the massiveness and permanence of the deployments in the IOR can only

increase, not decrease, in the future. The current level of forward deployments is only the beginning for the global confrontation that the US has chosen to project in the IOR. To counter the land based Soviet power, the West will soon find their Diego Garcia base insufficient for their burgeoning needs. Further island bases will be sought and eventually major military bases on the littoral itself will be preferred. Thus the Indian Ocean states will soon have to face the pressures, interventionism and blandishments from the super powers.

Pakistan has evinced mixed interest in the American policies. With the recent return of democracy, though still not stable, and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the US is proceeding very cautiously with its security relationship. Besides, by broadening Pakistan's tactical military options in the short run, the strategic options in the long run have been narrowed. Not only is India acquiring capabilities to neutralize Pakistan's new armament, but Pakistan has also to contend with Soviet reactions to its rearmament. At the same time Pakistan cannot wholeheartedly receive American support. In such a tight situation, Pakistan cannot but help going nuclear. The nuclearization would further entangle the vicious circle with destabilization threats from the next - door Soviets, hostile Israelis and the closely watching Indians.

It is quite possible too that the superpowers in the near future will target some of the Indian Ocean states with nuclear warheads considering the importance of the region. With the slightest hint of escalation of confrontation in the region both super powers would in all probability threaten nuclear intervention against both allies and adversaries as a more forthright policy.

Despite the land-based supremacy, the Soviets have only a few anchorages in the Indian Ocean which are grossly insufficient to counter the fortification of Diego Garcia. In search of a major island base, the Soviets could well resort to intervention, military coups, bribes, coercion and/or mercenaries to procure bases in the islands of Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Comoros, the Malagasy Republic or even the islands of Lakshadweep, Amindivi, Minicoy or the Andaman - Nicobar islands. These unprotected island territories are indeed of great geostrategic concern to India. Meanwhile the US too could resort to such tactics to deny the same to the Soviets.

With all the cultural diversity and the dissidence smouldering in the IOR, it is in fact, very likely that a super power will be invited to rationalize a situation to one's advantage. With the adversaries running to the other super power, local conflicts will be exacerbated provocatively. The US, in

1987, not wanting to get embroiled in another insurgency, fortunately refused to intervene in Sri Lanka to prevent India from resolving the problem of the disenchanted Tamil minority. Despite an attractive prize in the form of the port of Trincomalee, the US on this occasion did not involve itself in such a unfavourable gamble across the globe.

INDIA'S OBJECTIVES FOR ACHIEVING INDIAN OCEAN SECURITY

The several aspects discussed, on the objectives India has, in the context of Indian Ocean security can now be crystallized as follows:

- (a) India's economic development, political stability and independence of action should not, in any way, be affected by the possible super power actions in the IOR.
- (b) India should aim to preclude or neutralize the impact of any whimsical or wayward action against it by the super powers.
- (c) Prevent super power rivalry in any part of the sub-continent. Despite Pakistan's pro-US stance and its inclusion in the US CENT COM area, it is still a non aligned nation. And India aims to keep it so.
- (d) To acquire such military capability so as to inordinately raise the threshold of any super power military intervention in the South Asian Indian Ocean littoral.
- (e) Acquisition and deployment of Indian forces on island possessions to safe guard from ownership disputes and/or hostile take-overs.
- (f) To help defend if requested the island republics in the western IOR against mercenary or commando style invasion.
- (g) Prevent encroachment upon and protect assets of the large EEZ in the IOR. These assets will cover the off shore oil deposits and the oil rigs, sea bed rare minerals, coastal monazite sands, fishery resources etc.
- (h) Ensure the right to peaceful passage for naval units and the mercantile fleet in the IOR.
- (j) Ensure the safe passage to the scientific bases on the continent of Antarctica and at a later stage provide for the security of the base itself. With already the two permanently staffed bases of Dakshin Gangotri and Maitri, and the extensive satellite communication, weather charting and research facilities, India is already an accepted member of the Antarctic Treaty Parties Counsultative Group.
- (k) Protect commercial and economic assets even beyond the EEZ limits - such as the 150,000 sq mile area demarcated in the IOR for

India to commence sea bed mining operations as a "pioneer investor". India is one of the only six nations in the world and the first in the Third World to have acquired this capability.

CAPABILITIES TO ACHIEVE ITS OBJECTIVES

The Indian maritime force is formidable and even numerically larger than the super power fleets in the IOR. However there is no doubt that the latter are in a different class by themselves. The Indian blue water navy, in its recent review by the President of India, did display its awesome strength and firepower. With the induction of the second aircraft carrier, a nuclear powered submarine, Nanuchka class corvettes, helicopter embarked Godavari class frigates, Veer class missile boats, and the new maritime reconnaissance aircraft TU-142, India is also going in for sophisticated ECM and ECCM equipment. The recent dedication of the Indira radar and the surface to surface Prithvi missile provides for an all round development. Speedier indigenisation apart from the procurement of equipment from abroad is also on, alongside the expansion of the support infrastructure. Port Blair in the Andamans and a similar location in the Lakshadweep are being developed to protect the Indian island possessions and also to help the littoral island republics in the IOR. Besides covering a larger part of the IOR as a radio navigational warning area, India also monitors underwater submarines at longer ranges from its Project Skylark in Tamil Nadu. With a large number of research and development programmes in all the fields, including space, the already available home based infrastructure of communications, surveillance, replenishment and repair facilities together with a sizable submarine command and a developing aircraft carrier battle group promise bright prospects for India in the future. India is fairly well prepared to achieve its objectives both in a tactical and a strategic perspective.

This has been proved beyond doubt in the recent operations in Sri Lanka as well in the Maldives. India has always sought to restrict the involvement of the island republics with outside powers. However, both the mentioned states had always encouraged a substantial foreign presence to provide greater flexibility in the conduct of its relations with its larger neighbours : India in the case of Sri Lanka and Sri Lanka in the case of Maldives. However in order not to antagonize India, both republics were careful not to let their involvement include a security relationship.

THE TWO ISLAND REPUBLICS

Prior to the Indo-Sri Lankan accord of 1987, Sri Lanka maintained traditionally close ties with China. The US too with its military supplies of Bell helicopters, and other weapons had improved their relations with

the Lankans. To add to India's concern, the Sri Lankan government even advocated an ASEAN membership, which however did not materialize. On the economic front too, to limit Indian influence and to protect its nascent industries from Indian competition, Sri Lanka tended to look towards the West and to China for trading partners. This lack of political effort to exploit a real potential for cooperation was basically a strategy devised to deal with India's economic superiority. The intra regional trade even today in the subcontinent amounts to only 5 per cent of the total trade. Sri Lanka earlier also had another economic arrangement of keeping the harbour facilities at Trincomalee open to all navies, purely for their harbour, bunker and victualling fees.

After the accord, India has had an easy going at least as far as the security on the Indian Ocean front in the respect of Sri Lanka is concerned. The harbour and the installations in the port of Trincomalee are now jointly to be developed by both Sri Lanka and India. The accord also ensures that no foreigners hostile to India in any way would be allowed on the island. However, India has had to pay in the form of the IPKF which has got involved in counter - insurgency operations. Despite this, India has proved beyond doubt that it has the capability to sustain a large force with ground, air and naval support for an indefinite period of time. India has turned out absolutely successful in keeping outside powers away from its Indian Ocean frontier.

Maldives, being strategically located needs to be seen from a different angle. It is exceedingly important to its neighbours and external powers. After Britain withdrew from the Gan air base in 1976 as a part of its "east of Suez" policy, USSR made an attempt to rent the same base for \$1 million a year, ostensibly for rest - and - recreation facilities for its Indian Ocean fishing fleet. However Male has been sensible to reject all such bidders who possess a potential military stake on Gan. Seeking to reduce its dependence on Sri Lanka, Maldives has adopted an "Open to all" policy for development, taking on contributions from several states all over the world. Notwithstanding the open courtship with the Islamic states of West Asia and North Africa (Libya in particular) purely for economic objectives, the people of Maldives are not inclined to become an Islamic fundamentalist outpost off the subcontinent.

The incredible lightning operation that India executed to capture Luthfi and his band of invaders in Maldives has a great significance on India's position in the IOR. Despite the proximity of the major US RDF base at Diego Garcia, the Maldives head of state chose to call for Indian assistance across the vast expanse of the Arabian Sea. The prompt response in the

form of land, sea and air forces has indeed bolstered the image of India, reassuring the littoral states of unfailing assistance in the time of crisis. Besides the quick deinduction of the force on the completion of the task has also to a large extent increased the credibility of India's intentions.

India does not require its refurbished blue water navy to deal with any of its close or distant neighbours, not even Pakistan which is still far behind. The naval build up has been occasioned by the sole objective of contending with the threats direct or indirect, perceived to arise from the ingress of the super power navies into the IOR. It is only to indicate an active definition and assertion of national interests and to deny the total command of the IOR by default-in-absence to the super power navies.

The smaller South Asian states are militarily too weak in comparison to India. Only Pakistan has the means to forge any credible deterrent to India; and its relatively large arms spending and modest nuclear programme are only intended to serve as a deterrent to Indian superiority. The increased regional interaction in the form of SAARC has gained support to reduce chances of being drawn into East-West controversies. The formulation of regional solutions to economic and technological problems has built up greater trust among the South Asian nations. With the emergence of this forum, Pakistan no more looks for a West Asian identity, Sri Lanka no more for an ASEAN membership, nor Maldives as an Islamic Republic.

CONCLUSION

India's strategy to prevent encroachment on its security interests in the IOR is working out favourably. Playing an active role in this context, the recent developments have had a predominance of Indian participation.

Welcoming the new democracy in Pakistan and progressing on further normalization talks, assisting the natural-calamity prone Bangladesh in the form of flood relief, brokering peace talks in Sri Lanka for the Government with the Tamil insurgents and rescuing the Maldivian Government from a blood thirsty coup, have all given a chance for India to provide greater stability in the IOR. With responses varying between accommodation and belligerency, depending on the circumstances, the fragile nature of the reapproachment with the Indian Ocean states is now a thing of the past.

The super power recourse to military interaction in the IOR is an irreversible one, entirely against India's preferences. Strategic confrontation plans of these powers include portions-and may include still more of the Indian subcontinent. Fortunately, the major modernization programmes for

the Indian Armed Forces have been in perfect timing with the super power militarization of the IOR. Mr. Gorbachev's unilateral efforts to defuse the cold war brought President Bush to promptly freeze the US defence budget. Contemporaneously, New Delhi too has frozen its defence budget for the year 1989-90. Though the extra regional powers may mount their confrontation strategies in the IOR, India's new position with its enhanced capabilities is now a shade persuasive to such powers to avoid clashing with India's security interests.

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Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia

PRASHANT AGARWAL*

Since the partition of the Indian subcontinent the relations between India and Pakistan have never been cordial. Pakistan apprehended and doubted "whether an Islamic State and secular (Hindu) can co-exist in relative peace".¹ The distrust between the two countries developed due to 'the ineradicable hatred of the Hindu for the Muslim. This has brought into existence a reciprocating hatred in Pakistan, so that here is now a vicious spiral of hatreds'.² Pakistan also evinced a strong psychological impulse to seek an independent identity in international forums. In pursuit of this aim it was logical for it 'to maintain the bitterness caused by the partition till such time as the separateness of the two countries had been moulded into perpetuity by the birth of a generation that had never known harmony of the earlier union or its strain'.³

The politico-military leadership of Pakistan was always keen to equate her military capability with that of India. This resulted in the loss of independent National identity as Pakistan had to align herself with Power blocs.⁴ Pakistan as a member of various military agreements could receive sophisticated military hardwares without any significant strain.

In the early years of Independence the Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru once stated that "we intend cooperating with the United States of America and we intend cooperating fully with the Soviet Union" in order to advantageously manipulate the country's relation between the two competing power blocs of the international system⁶ to achieve various interests of the new born country.

In order to divert the attention of the people from most internal and external failures the Pakistani bogey is always exploited by the Indian Policy makers⁷. Similarly in Pakistan, the Indian bogey has always been exploited to get enormous quantities of armaments especially from United States and China.

This attitude of both the countries has generated a kind of 'mutually reactive arms race' in the sub continent. Similarly, on the nuclear issue, the policy of Pakistan has been reactive to that of India.

India's nuclear programme was started immediately after the independence. Within 12 days of getting freedom, a meeting of the Atomic

* UGC, Senior Research Fellow, Department of Defence Studies, University of Allahabad.

Energy Research Board was held and the Atomic Energy Commission was formed on 10th August, 1948 under the Atomic Energy Act of 1948⁸. With the creation of Department of Atomic Energy in 1954 the country had started a small but a moderate nuclear programme. Indian Scientists attempted to develop indigenous strategy for a wide range of nuclear capabilities for providing infrastructural facility to the future nuclear developments. For achieving self-sufficiency nuclear research and development has been considered as a fundamental and integral part of nuclear strategy.

Although, the Indian nuclear programme in the initial stages was mainly designed for the development of the generation of electricity and also for use in agriculture, medicine, biotechnology, industry and engineering, but policy makers in India also visualised the importance of nuclear energy for the future security requirements⁹. It can be said that "India's nuclear option was implicit in India's peaceful nuclear programme of the 1950s, its disarmament strategy and also implicit in its opposition to international safeguards"¹⁰.

Similarly in Pakistan, mainly due to its reactive attitude, nuclear programme began in the 1950s with the creation of Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) under the Chairmanship of Dr. Nazir Ahmad. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was the key architect of the Pakistani nuclear programme. He developed the nuclear programme from almost scratch to a viable deterrent capability¹¹. He firmly believed that India, in future, will certainly opt for a nuclear deterrent, and that if Pakistan failed to react, India would resort to nuclear blackmail¹². He was aware of the important potential contribution which nuclear energy could make towards the country's defence and development needs. Therefore, he wanted to create a firm infrastructure with the help of civilian nuclear research and development programme, similar to that of India.

The Sino-Indian Conflict of 1962 and the first Chinese nuclear explosion in 1964 generated a strong desire⁷ in India to achieve nuclear weapon capability. After the death of Nehru, the new Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, on 16th Oct. 1964, while reacting on Chinese explosion said "the Chinese blast was a shock and danger to the maintenance of World Peace"¹³. Few weeks later, Shastri said in Parliament in much diluted language "I cannot say that our present nuclear policy would not be changed but we will keep our option open"¹⁴. Pressure on the Prime Minister from Parliament, the press and the elites to develop nuclear weapons was also intensified and it appears clearly that some change in conventional policy will be inevitable. Thus, it was the Chinese factor that initially supplied the rationale for India's nuclear decision making.

Chinese nuclear development also motivated Bhabha to prepare a secret plan to conduct nuclear explosions and he had proposed to Prime Minister Shastri in Nov 1965-India's own subterranean Nuclear Explosion Project (SNEP), approved in 1965 by the Prime Minister. His approval was "to sanction research upto point where, once the go ahead signal was given it would take three months to have an explosion"¹⁵.

After India's debacle in NEFA and Ladakh against China in 1962, China and Pakistan had signed a border agreement in 1963. Since then the relations between them had gradually improved, which brought India and Pakistan to a cross-road. This Sino-Pak linkage has been a matter of serious concern to India. Indo-Pakistan tensions also mounted as India following its humiliating defeat in 1962, undertook a massive modernization of its defence forces. In this period the quantum and quality of military equipment supplied to Pakistan by the United States was carefully limited so as not to enable Pakistan to achieve military parity with India¹⁶. According to a well authoritative study based on personal research and interview by a former Pakistani Cabinet Minister, Prof. G.W. Choudhary, it was during this period that Pakistan began thinking about nuclear weapon programme.¹⁷

The disintegration of Pakistan in 1971 followed by Indian nuclear explosion in 1974 characterized the emergence of India as a dominant force in South Asia and had a far reaching impact on the Pakistani nuclear programme. In 1972 Bhutto had convened a meeting of some important scientists at Multan and the decision to develop atomic weapons is reported to have been announced¹⁸. Three weeks after the Indian PNE, Bhutto, while speaking in the National Assembly on June 7, 1974 characterized it as a fateful and a grave and serious event that had yet taken place in the history of Pakistan. The Indian explosion forced Pakistan to reassess its nuclear policy; Bhutto had gone even to the extent of saying that "If India built a bomb we will eat grass or leaves but we will get our own"¹⁹. Pakistan's apprehensions of India's nuclear technological advancement made her feel that she would have to live under the shadow of a hostile and powerful nuclear neighbour unless she possessed a nuclear deterrent²⁰. Pakistan had always felt that atomic weapons will preserve her integrity and enhance her prestige internationally, particularly in the Muslim world²¹. To them it appears that the acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability by India is not just a symbol of prestige but if necessary to play its destined role as a military power in the region²². Thus, nuclear option for India and Pakistan were helplessly interlocked, limiting manoeuvrability of decision making in either country²³.

One significant factor which has aggravated the apprehensions between the neighbours is the interest and role of external powers in the region.

The Soviet military presence in Afghanistan which lasted almost 10 years has once again generated the US interest in South Asia. Pakistan has been taken as an ally to the US to deal with any Soviet expansionist design in the region²⁴. This phenomenon has not only been responsible for the arms race in the sub-continent but also for the nuclear proliferation in South Asia. The changes in India's strategic environment of varying degrees and importance at the global, regional and nuclear levels have attracted world wide attention and interest among the strategic studies community. At the global level, the triangular relationships among the United States, China and the Soviet Union underwent significant changes in early 1985. The first major economic and cultural agreement between the Soviet Union and China since the Sino-Soviet rift was followed immediately by an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to renew arms control negotiations.²⁵

Thus, although relations between Washington and Beijing continue to remain cordial and co-operative on a wide array of diplomatic, economic and military related areas, the implications of closer ties between Beijing and Moscow for Sino-American relations remain to be seen. One has to wait and watch the possibilities of a closer Indo-American ties and the revival of the thaw in Indo-Pakistani Relations. Reagan administration's decision was to continue to supply advance weapons systems including AWACS to Pakistan and to use Pakistan as a major link in the US Central Command's operational chain created to deal with the situation in West Asia.

From the Pakistani perspective, there are fears of Indo-Soviet joint collusion to wipe out Pakistan's existence from the region. They also fear that the USSR would like to convert 'Baluchistan' and 'Pakhtunistan' as Soviet satellites in order to consolidate its control over Afghanistan and to gain access to warm water ports on the Arabian Sea. Indians perceive Pakistan's attempt to create Khalistan and continued claims over Kashmir as a deliberate attempt to keep tension in the region alive. It will also justify Pakistanis demand for more weapons from the USA. Some Pakistanis perceive that in response to Pakistan's encouragement to Khalistanis and Kashmiris to revolt, India may attempt to re-absorb Sind and Pakistani Punjab in its framework for greater India. It appears that all these varied perceptions have complicated the strategic scene in the region of Indian subcontinent and Pakistan is developing a nuclear deterrent.

Just as these countries' apprehensions, suspicions and provocation led them to look for external support, so also their location made them of great interest to the major powers as cold war tension grew. The Super Powers on their part have common interest in promoting their security against other external powers. Recent developments in South Asia have further intensified

the game of military aid and a new arms race has been going on. This arms race is more risk prone because large number of countries are either economically dependent on foreign aid or desire military assistance to settle their score with their neighbours.

However, India is deeply concerned by reports including from the US Sources that Pakistan desires to acquire nuclear weapons capability by any means. The present government in Pakistan is confident that it can go on expanding the frontiers of its nuclear weapons programme without putting at risk the US Military assistance and political support as long as it refrains from actually detonating a nuclear device.

The Soviet Union particularly voiced her deep concern over Pakistan's clandestine efforts to achieve nuclear weapons capability and recently, warned Pakistan that it will not tolerate a Pakistani nuclear bomb. In giving this warning, Soviets have gone far ahead of India. The Soviet Union would have to be especially concerned about the possibility of increased nuclear cooperation between Pakistan and other Islamic states, one of which, Libya, has grown increasingly disenchanted with the level of Soviet nuclear assistance to its peaceful nuclear energy programme.²⁶ The fact is that an 'Islamic Bomb' would pose a threat not only to the United States and its allies but also to the Soviet interests.²⁷

The Soviet Union has refrained from encouraging any country even within its own block to nurse aspirations to acquire nuclear weapons. One of the main reasons for the Sino-Soviet rift in the late 1950s was the Soviet refusal to transfer nuclear weapons technology to China.²⁸ The Soviet Union does not allow any spent fuel to be reprocessed in Eastern Europe but insists that it is sent back to the Soviet Union for reprocessing.²⁹

After the cut-off of US and Canadian supplies of heavy water and other nuclear materials to India - as a reaction to its 1974 peaceful nuclear explosion - Soviet nuclear trade with India is rather restrictive. Although, the Soviet Union agreed to provide New Delhi with 200 tons of heavy water but the safeguards ultimately insisted upon by Moscow as a condition for the sale were more stringent than any previously in effect.³⁰

Initially, Soviet offers of light water nuclear power reactors with stringent safeguards were strongly resisted by the Indian policy makers who are wary of becoming dependent upon external supplies of enriched uranium fuel³¹. But, recently, India has expressed willingness to import two 1000 MW. units from Soviet Union which will be installed at Koodankulam near Kanyakumari in Tamil Nadu.³²

However, the Soviet Union is likely to cooperate on non-proliferation, but if Pakistan should choose to go nuclear there may be some selective weakening of the Soviet restraint vis-a-vis the Indian nuclear programme³³. But, the Soviets are very apprehensive about a joint US-Pakistan-China approach against Soviet interests in the region and will oppose any nuclear weapon development programme on Pakistani soil³⁴.

Reports from the US and other western sources have clearly indicated that the nuclear cooperation between China and Pakistan has assumed new dimensions. The United States believes that China is providing technical knowhow to Pakistan in centrifuge uranium enrichment technology.³⁵ Further, it is well known that India's relations with China continue to cause anxiety not only because of the border dispute but also because of Sino-Pak collusion against Indian interests.

Today, China has motivated India to acquire nuclear weapon in two ways. On the one hand, it poses a threat to India with a possible nuclear dimension. On the Other, it appears to have encouraged Islamabad to maintain its security independently by acquiring nuclear arms.³⁶

One Senior Reagan administration official said that Pakistan could assemble a bomb within two weeks and Pakistan is only 'two screw driver turns' away from having a fully assembled bomb.³⁷ Despite these clear evidences from reliable US and Western intelligence reports President Reagan certified to Congress that Pakistan currently does not possess a nuclear explosive device. Although Pakistan's engagement in nuclear activities are 'found troubling to US but it takes its peaceful intent seriously.'³⁸ This administration wouldn't come down on Pakistan if we found a bomb in Zia's basement³⁹ said one Senior Reagan administration official. However, India is deeply concerned by the reports that Pakistan desires to acquire nuclear weapon capability by any means. The present government in Pakistan is confident that it can go on expanding the frontiers of its nuclear weapon programme without putting at risk the US military and economic assistance (appropriately \$ 600 million a year) and also political support as long as it refrains from actually detonating a nuclear device.

It is agreed by the policy makers both in India and Pakistan that nuclear cooperation between India and Pakistan would not only be in their own interest but also in the interest of the region.⁴⁰ However, there are strong lobbies in both the countries favouring a nuclear bomb. As India's nuclear weapon programme was a response to military defeat at the hands of China, Pakistan's nuclear programme was a response to a humiliating military defeat by India. A large number of Pakistani analysts and military

officers believe that 'it is better for both India and Pakistan to have nuclear weapons than for only India to have them.'⁴¹

But, Pakistan cannot hope to win a nuclear war with India because Pakistan presently lacks the technical base needed for a quick build up of survivable launch and delivery system.⁴² The only value for Pakistan in having nuclear weapons is to deter India from starting another war or from using nuclear weapons of its own.⁴³ India would not be able to attack a nuclear weapons capable Pakistan as it had done in the 1971 Indo-Pak war.⁴⁴

For India, there is little to fear from a conventionally armed Pakistan; a nuclear-armed Pakistan could inflict major damage, although it probably cannot produce sufficient weapons in the foreseeable future to completely destroy India.⁴⁵ On the other hand, India is likely to successfully develop nuclear-capable ballistic missiles with a 1500 mile range by the end of this decade and its satellites will develop its command and control capability.⁴⁶ It is estimated that India will be able to build up nearly three times more warheads than Pakistan.⁴⁷

Currently, it appears that both India and Pakistan have the capability to manufacture atomic weapons. Both countries also have several means to deliver nuclear weapons on targets in the other country. But, there is no definite information that either country has begun to militarize its nuclear potential by deploying even a limited force.⁴⁸

As K. Subrahmanyam puts it 'nuclear weapons can be deterred only by nuclear weapons.'⁴⁹ The characteristics of nuclear proliferation in South Asia may indeed follow this pattern. Advocates of nuclear weapons in Pakistan justify their demands for the acquisition of Nuclear weapons on the basis of the possible nuclearization of India. In India also advocates of nuclear weapons justify their demands on the basis of their deterrence value against both China and Pakistan. According to Subrahmanyam, the nuclearization of India would not only pre-empt the Pakistani bomb development programme but would also make "the United States realize that they cannot ignore a nation of 700 million people with nuclear weapons..... It will enable us to deal with China on an equal basis"⁵⁰ It is now clear that the nuclear capabilities of India and Pakistan have a deterrent value 'which neither country is currently ready to relinquish unilaterally.'

But, the successful maintenance of a credible deterrence posture by the two countries for a long period would be a complex matter because the number of weapons available to Pakistan for the next several years will

be much less than its powerful all-time enemy India. According to latest Carnegie Endowment study, "by 1991, Pakistan could have as many as 15 Hiroshima - Size devices, while India might have produced more than 100."⁵¹ If by any chance, in the near future, there happens to be a nuclear arms race and the two countries choose to use nuclear weapon in armed conflict Pakistan will be at a distinct disadvantage as it has less potential and also has no depth compared to India. A former Pakistani Ambassador has very rightly pointed out that "We cannot hope to deter India unless we acquire a credible capability. We cannot hope to project a deterrent credibility when we ourselves are still in the dark on this issue."⁵²

Recently, Pakistan has made various efforts to seek security through a false sense of equation with India based on nuclear ambiguity. But, if Pakistan does not indulge in having them, then one can hope that a certain amount of intellectual resistance can be built up in India for not producing them. If Pakistan needs to have atom bomb at this juncture of history, it is more for the satisfaction of a psychological need for being an equal. It has arisen as an ego problem. Unfortunately, an ego problem has no simple solution.

Because, Pakistan's policy towards India is mainly reactive, therefore, India has the primary responsibility, like a big brother, for choosing which policy both countries now follow in the nuclear field, that of parity, distrust and likelihood of confrontation or that of mutual cooperation, friendly understanding and economic development.

Unfortunately, a large part of resources, energy, and diplomatic efforts of both the countries are devoted towards hostility and mutual distrust. Mutual cooperation between the two countries will be the only way out of this dilemma. India should behave like a big brother and in such a manner that "all its neighbours in South Asia, will realise that India with its great size, population, military power economic development and natural resources is an asset of each neighbour and not a source of fear or danger".⁵³ In this context, if we examine the nuclear issue between India and Pakistan, to contain nuclear proliferation in this region, the starting point must be for India, as the larger power to behave constructively and positively rather than uncooperative and negative attitude towards establishing better understanding and cooperation with its comparatively much younger and smaller neighbour Pakistan. However, at present, there is no sign of relief despite several positive efforts taken by both the countries.

In the last several years both Pakistan and India have proposed to each other several measures to ease tension in the Sub-continent. There

are proposal for a nuclear weapons free zone (NWFZ), mutual inspections, safeguards of nuclear installations and a no-war pact. Most of these have not received a positive response from either country, although it is in the interest of both the countries to work out as early as possible a mutually acceptable, reciprocal and non-discriminatory balanced agreement.

In the Indian sub-continent a mutually acceptable solution would not only prevent nuclear proliferation in the region but would also open various fronts on which they can collaborate with each other for their economic development. Inspite of various constraints now India and Pakistan have favourably discussed a proposal of not attacking each other's nuclear facilities which is a great step forward for future Indo-Pakistan relations.⁵⁴

An eminent former Pakistani High Commissioner to India, Mr. Sajjad Hyder has very rightly remarked, "why should India have to turn to the United States and France for enriched fuel for Tarapur when Pakistan might be able one day to supply this need? In the same way, India's experience in fuel reprocessing and heavy water production would be of great value to Pakistan.⁵⁵ Now a fresh positive attitude towards each other by the leadership of both the countries is essential for creating an atmosphere in which better cooperation between the two countries will be established and peace can be restored.

There appears to be no doubt that both India and Pakistan are within reach of assembling modest sized weapons⁵⁶ but neither of them is ready to reach a definite point in the near future. Therefore, it is often argued that 'the development of the nuclear option by both countries could in itself be a stabilising factor⁵⁷, just as the nuclear arsenals of the superpowers have brought forty years of peace in Europe.⁵⁸

While both India and Pakistan are fully justified in pursuing their nuclear programmes and not to allow themselves to be black-mailed, it is in the interests of both the countries that they remove their mutual distrust and hostility and come to definite, unambiguous and fail safe understanding regarding the proliferation or non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in the sub-continent.

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A Conceptual Approach to C³I

MAJ GEN YASHWANT DEVA

The acronym, C³I is made up of four discrete terms, Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence, each independently profound in meaning and scope. It would be relevant to understand the sense and import of each term, before attempting to comprehend the concept of C³I.

Command is perhaps the most elusive and least understood constituent of C³I. Neither the Glossary of Military Terms, nor the Joint services Glossary, gives a proper definition of command. To some, command is synonymous with leadership; to others, with administration; some define it as an executive jurisdiction over subordinates to give orders and directions; others give it a legal connotation, i.e., power to reward and punish. While there may be a plethora of definitions and lack of consensus on what command stands for, there is unanimity on what a commander does. He takes decisions. Decision-making is the *sine qua non* of command. Military command is hierarchical, following the principles of unity of command and span of control. These principles were practised by the military from the time immemorial. It is in later years that these were adopted in management parlance by authorities, like Taylor and Herbert Simon.

Whatever a commander or, for that matter, a manager does, he does it by making decisions. A good decision is that, which is made after proper analysis and deliberations. Decision-making process involves certain activities or steps, performed in a logical sequence. Leading authorities have variedly identified and described these steps, although underlying methodology is the same. Herbert Simon, for instance, divided the process into intelligence activity, design activity and choice activity. We, in the Army, talk of factors, deductions and courses open.

With increasing complexity and scope of decisions, two trends are significant, viz., corporate decision-making and advent of automated decision support systems. This has led to proliferation of decision centres, structured, both, vertically and horizontally in the military hierarchy. Identification of these decision centres, as we shall see later, is the first step in design of a C³I system.

The next term in the acronym C³I, is control. There is much ambiguity in understanding the difference between command and control. Command is a recognised point of authority, whereas control implies jurisdiction over resources by a designated authority. A gunner appropriately distinguishes the two terms; to him "command relates to guns, whereas control relates to shells".

Control is an essential part of any system ; others being input, output and the processor. Military systems of control are complex. Whereas structure of command is linear, that of control defies a pattern. The level, at which control is exercised, is also variable ; in some cases, centralised, in others, delegated.

The term communications has wider connotation than generally understood. As a management term, it means exchange of ideas, opinions and information, conveyed either personally or impersonally, as a spoken word or as written word, in the form of symbols or signs. Its purpose is to attain objectives of the organisation. To the Defence Services, its scope is limited to conveyance of information, orders and instructions through electronic means. Communications inter-link various components of a system or organisation. It is the most vulnerable constituent. Therefore, integration and survivability, *inter alia*, are the two absolutely desirable attributes of communications.

Being input to decision-making, intelligence is the stock-in-trade of C³I. Intelligence is used in its generic context ; not necessarily confined to that pertaining to the enemy. Besides knowledge of enemy's force level, weapons dispositions, battlefield management and logistic system, similar knowledge about own troops, which are under command, other two Defence Services and friendly forces are all part of intelligence.

Intelligence is derived from source data. Data, when processed, becomes information and when noise is removed from information, it becomes intelligence. It is significant that beside sources, data-processing and data-transmission are vital constituents of intelligence.

The operative part, that underscores the concept of C³I, is the term "system". Dictionary meaning of system is "a complex unity, formed of many diverse parts, subject to a common plan or a common purpose". System also refers to an arrangement, a sequential relationship or a logic.

The expression, systems approach is derived from the term system. It suggests that an organisation or a problem should not be viewed as an amorphous collection of individuals or discrete functions, but as an aggregate or a whole and should be so approached or tackled. Merit of systems approach is, in its attribute of taking into account all factors, linkages and associations, relevant to the system. The underlying idea of C³I is to unite the assets of command, control, communications and intelligence and deal with the aggregate as a single entity, in its inter and intra relationship.

CONCEPTIONS AND MISCONCEPTIONS

MIS and C³I. MIS has been defined as "a system of collecting, sorting, storing, analysing and interpreting data to provide information for decision making and control". In our Army, we have drawn a distinction between MIS and C³I, and have decided to field separate systems. The logic of treating the two as mutually exclusive is not understood. To my mind, the two terms are synonymous ; one adopted by the man in civies, the other by the man in uniform. The end-purpose of MIS is the same as that of C³I, viz., to take decisions ; a manager is no different from a commander ; control is an integral and vital component of MIS, as that of C³I ; there can be no system without communications ; and information and intelligence have identical, if not the same, meaning. There is no wisdom in trying to discern differences where none exist. That one is applicable to the field force and the other to static establishments and non-field force ; that one has more critical response time than the other ; that one needs ruggedised hardware and the other can do with commercially available hardware ; or that one is concerned with administrative and logistic functions during peace time and the other with war time activities, are vague and arbitrary differences which do not stand the test of objective analysis and substantiality. Fielding of separate systems will be expensive, besides, it is fraught with the danger of incompatibility and inoperability which are bound to surface at a later date. Functional and architectural commonality between MIS and C³I also suggests effective employment of telecommunication services of the DOT (Department of Telecommunication), and, adoption of commercial technologies and a common set of protocols. These would be more cost effective and efficient than developing exclusive defence standards and norms. Specific requirements, like security and robustness, can be specifically incorporated in the design of discrete equipment and networks that are deployed closer to the frontline.

Military Nervous System. Another glaring misconception that exists in our defence forces is with regard to computerisation. It is generally believed that acquisition of a computer is an end in itself and that it would usher in an era of 'systems'. Proliferation of personal computers in our offices, depots, workshops and units, which are only used for briefing of senior officers, bears testimony to the above statement. We hear of an acronym C³I, an inference of a misplaced notion that computerisation is a separate functional area. A computer is only a processor and a storage device. Its usefulness as a discrete entity is marginal and its acquisition cost-wise, questionable ; but when wed-locked with communications, it forms a network of men and machines and this network is a potent force-multiplier. The architecture of this network cannot be different from the human nervous

system, with its widely dispersed, multi-tiered sensors ; responsive, survivable and multi-media communications ; comprehensive, integrated and yet distributed data-bases ; and above all the versatile man-in-the loop, who commands.

Decentralised Decision Making and Distributed Data Processing. The fact that there has been a gradual erosion of powers of commanders at lower rungs of the ladder and there is a visible tendency towards centralisation of decision-making is often bemoaned. Structural rigidity and advent of multi-access digital communications and data-processing, have inter alia, contributed to centralisation. The earlier concept of computerisation was manifest in high capacity big main frames with dumb terminals. This led to a marked proclivity towards concentration of decision-making. Introduction of small-size personal computer and realisation of the concept of distributed data processing through networking has changed the managerial culture. Distributed data processing *per se*, is decentralised decision-making, compatible with our democratic ethos. The C³I architecture, that we opt for, should be based on the principle of distributed data processing and networking. It should help in decentralisation of tactical decision-making and enable speedy information-transfer for strategic decision-making.

Approach to Architectural Design. In designing a C³I system, some lay stress on information, others on computerisation and still others on communications, but none on decision-making. Whereas the point of focus ought to be a decision-maker or a decision centre, it invariably shifts to information processing or information transfer. The decision-making in the armed forces covers a broad spectrum of activity. The decision may be deliberate, i.e., adoption of a course of action by commander, after carrying out a military appreciation, or an instantaneous response, e.g., firing of a weapon or activation of a jammer. In a future battlefield, the advantage will go to the side that is best equipped to capture, sift, store and analyse a massive quantum of data for taking effective and timely decisions. In pursuance of this objective, the approach for designing a C³I system should be according to the following sequential steps :

- * Identification and location of decision centres.
- * Perception of information required by each decision centre.
- * Identification and location of point of capture of data.
- * Sources and sensors required to capture data.
- * Identification and location of information-processing centres.
- * Quantum and pattern of flow of data, information and intelligence.

- * Desired response time on each link.
- * Speed of processing and transmission of data.
- * Media connectivity, bearer services, access channels and, user-network interfaces.
- * Choice of hardware and software.
- * Operation and maintenance characteristics viz., protocols, formats and display systems.

CONCLUSION

We are starting with a clean state and have yet to define, let alone, develop C³I systems. It is not necessary for us to follow the path other countries have taken. Their compulsions were different. Let us show 'grass is greener' syndrome and instead focus on uncertainties which have plagued NATO and Warsaw Pact countries. By aping others, we would be saddled with systems that do not suit us. We need not go through the trauma of inoperability, incompatibility and high replacement costs of systems that USA, for instance, is undergoing. Undeniably, we should draw on the experience of others, but our concepts of C³I should be in tune with our ethos, its hardware commercially available and its software indigenously developed.

We have to start now in order to reap benefits in another ten years or so. Therefore, it is time we defined our approach to C³I at policy-making, strategic and tactical levels, so that the scientific community can get down to the task of developing systems.

The Thirty One Days War

(Part I)

SAHDEV VOHRA, ICS

BACKGROUND

In January 1950, the Chinese Communist Government proclaimed the 'liberation' of Tibet during 1950 as one of the 'Basic tasks' of PLA (the army). On 6 January, Nehru told pressmen in Delhi "I do not suppose that the Chinese Communist Government wanted to or could deprive Tibet of local autonomy". In October 1950, Tibet was invaded by China and in June next year signed a treaty with China. Peking Radio announced (in June 1951) that Tibet agreed to allow China to station troops on the frontiers of Burma, Pakistan and India. In February 1951, in reply to India's protest about Chinese maps published after the Communists came into power and showing China's boundary upto the Brahmaputra, the Chinese Government had assured Government of India that these maps "are not official maps", but were the old maps prepared during the regime of Chiang Kai Shek.¹

Despite China's attitude to Tibet and to India as thus revealed, India signed an agreement with China in 1954 abrogating India's trading posts and the telegraphic lines set up in Tibet, and other rights, and recognising Tibet as part of China. China refused to discuss the border question much less include it in the agreement. This deliberate exclusion of the border question during the negotiations should have warned India about China's intentions. It is the irony of the situation that neither of the hopes were to be fulfilled. Tibet's autonomy was not respected, and the claims of China on India's border lands were proclaimed with increasing vehemence. Having acquired China as a neighbour in Tibet, India reviewed the security of her border regions. A Committee of officials was appointed in 1950 to report on the measures to be taken and the overall policy decided upon was to accelerate the opening up of border regions, to develop them and for that purpose to increase the administration in these areas. Secondly, stress was placed on communications in and to these inaccessible regions. It was also decided that the intelligence and security requirements should be met and open border posts on the various routes from Tibet.

The Chinese first raised the border issue in a note of 17 July 1954. This was within a few weeks of signing the agreement with India. They complained that Indian troops had crossed the Niti Pass into Tibet at Wuje in the Hoti plain south-east of the pass. Subsequent exchange of notes showed that the Chinese were not clear about the location of Wuje. Bara Hoti was a pasture ground south of the pass and in 1890, there had been a local dispute between

Tibetans and Indian officials about grazing. China had now revived this old local dispute. In Oct. 1954 Nehru made a good-will visit to China and during his visit raised the question of Chinese maps which showed territories of India as part of China. Chou-En-Lai parried the issue by stating that "current Chinese maps were based on old maps and that the Government of the People's Republic of China had no time to correct them"². The Chinese version of this interview was given after the 1962 war. According to them, Nehru stated that "no boundary question existed between India and China" and the Chinese Premier "clearly expressed his disagreement to any unilateral revision of maps" and made it clear that "the Sino-Indian boundary was yet to be delimited".

In April 1955, China joined the nonaligned countries of Asia and Africa at the Bandung Conference. There Chou-En-Lai established contact with the Prime Minister of Pakistan. The Prime Minister of Pakistan was informed by Chou-En-Lai that while India and China may not continue their current good relations, there was no reason why China and Pakistan should not develop good relations as there were no points of dispute between them.³ Khrushchev and Bulganin visited India in the same year and the visit laid the foundation of Indo-Soviet friendship. Khrushchev made a public statement in favour of India's case in Kashmir and offered aid for setting up a million ton steel plant. As a counter to this visit, China invited the Prime Minister of Pakistan to visit Peking, a visit that took place in October 1956.

Border intrusions occurred in the middle sector, that is, the area between Ladakh and Nepal. In April 1956, Chinese troops crossed over the Nilang pass and in September they crossed over the Shipki pass. These passes, Niti which the Chinese crossed in 1954 and Nilang and Shipki, now, were mentioned in the agreement of 1954 as among the six routes over which trade, etc., was to pass between India and Tibet. There was no question of any misunderstanding. What was taking place was a deliberate testing of the ground in this less sensitive middle sector and the points of intrusion chosen were those where there had been local disputes earlier.

In November 1956 during an 'In-transit' visit to India, Chou-En-Lai informed Nehru that the Government of China had accepted the formalisation of the McMahon Line boundary in the case of Burma, and proposed to recognise it in the case of India also. According to a Chinese publication⁴ published after the war in 1962 the Chinese had "from March 1956 to October 1957" built a motor road from Yarkand to Gartok, "of which a section of 180 kms. runs through this area", i.e. of Aksai Chin area in Ladakh. Chou-En-Lai's offer of recognition in respect of the eastern sector of the border was being made keeping in view the Chinese road being constructed in the Aksai Chin

area of Ladakh. In the north-eastern corner of Ladakh, this road entered Indian territory at Haji Langar from Sinkiang and cutting across Aksai Chin, crossed into Tibet at Sarigh Jilgnang. Although the construction of this road was known to Indian authorities from intelligence reports, it was not till 1958 that two Indian patrol parties were sent to survey the road built by the Chinese. One of the two patrol parties sent to the Aksai Chin area was captured by the Chinese. Further, Chinese inroads were thereafter accelerated. In Ladakh, Chinese troops crossed into Indian territory along the Pangong Lake in July 1958 at Khurnak Fort. This was a place where there had been a local dispute in 1924 when the Tibetans had accepted that Khurnak Fort was outside their territory. In the middle sector, they occupied Bara Hoti (Wuje) mentioned earlier. Crossing the Balcha Dhura pass, they also occupied Laphthal and Sancha Malla as soon as the Indian personnel had vacated these places for the winter.

The Chinese intrusions in the border areas were reinforced by the first official publication by the Communist regime of a map showing 50,000 square miles by Indian territory as Chinese. This was in a magazine 'China Pictorial'. In July 1958 Nehru wrote to Chou-En-Lai protesting against this claim which Nehru firmly rejected. The reply of Chou-En-Lai dated 23rd January 1959 hinted at the possibility of a political settlement of the boundary question stating that the Chinese Government "on the one hand finds it necessary to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line and on the other hand, cannot but act with prudence and needs time to deal with the matter". He then made a claim in Ladakh in respect of the "Sinkiang-Tibet-Highway" passing through Aksai Chin.

However, Indian patrol parties reported that the Chinese were extending their intrusions further west of Aksai Chin road "to a depth of upto 70 miles within Indian territory south of Haji Langar and west of Lanakla"⁵. It became apparent that they were surveying a route from Haji Langar to Shamul-lungpa and join Lanakla. Despite the advancing Chinese occupation of territory further west in an active and vigorous way, India still thought of a political settlement and took no action to militarily hold back the Chinese advance.

In March 1959 the Dalai Lama took refuge in India and all chances of a political settlement faded in the face of violent Chinese propaganda against India for giving shelter to the Dalai Lama. Accusations were made that the revolt in Tibet and the flight of the Dalai Lama had been organised and engineered in India and that Kalimpong where Tibetan refugees had collected was the centre of anti-Chinese activities in Tibet. The Kham guerrilla warfare had been a spontaneous and widespread protest of a warlike

part of Tibet. The revolt had spread to Lhasa and other parts of Tibet along with the fleeing refugees from Kham and Amdo. China's propaganda was intended only to deter India from giving shelter to the Dalai Lama. The Indian people were however in full sympathy with the people of Tibet in their plight and welcomed the Tibetan refugees.

The tempo of Chinese advance in Ladakh continued to gain momentum. In July 1959, the Chinese advanced near Pangong Lake where they had occupied Khurnak fort in the previous summer. They captured an Indian party near Spanggur and established a camp. In reply to the Indian protest, they asserted that both Khurnak fort and Spanggur were within Chinese territory. In August, they established themselves on a hill overlooking an Indian checkpoint at Chushul further south on the border, and near an Indian supply airfield.

The Chinese also extended their probe of the border to Arunachal Pradesh area. On 7th August 1959, 200 armed Chinese violated the border at Khinzemane, but they were careful to claim that they had not violated the McMahon Line. An Indian post at Longju near Migyitun was attacked by a strong Chinese detachment on 25th August which killed three men of the Assam Rifles. They surrounded the Longju post claiming it to be north of the McMahon line. After a time, they withdrew to Migyitun. The Chinese action had for the first time resulted in casualties of Indian personnel and the Indian public received a rude shock when this incident became public. Earlier the public and the Parliament had not been informed of the Chinese advance at various points of the border. The Prime Minister now had to bring the facts about Aksai Chin road in Ladakh to the notice of Parliament and was bitterly attacked for withholding information even though he had kept back the information hitherto in the hope of a settlement.

Soon after the Longju incident in NEFA a serious Chinese attack took place in Ladakh, where the Chinese road building activity had been intensified. A second road south-west of the one through Aksai Chin had been built. Along it China sent troops to Chang Chenmo valley which divides Ladakh north and south. South of the Chang Chenmo range, at Kongka pass an Indian patrol from the newly opened posts at Tsogatsalu and at Hot Springs were ambushed near the banks of the Chang Chenmo river on October 21 and nine of them were killed, including their leader Karam Singh, and ten were captured. The place of incident was 40-50 miles west of the traditional boundary but the Chinese asserted that the Indians had "unlawfully intruded into Sinkiang territory south of Kongka pass". This incident awakened the Indian Public to the reality of the Chinese threat.

The Chinese Premier proposed on 7th November 1959 that armed

forces of both sides withdraw from the line of actual control as on that date but the Indian side objected that this would be to accept the Chinese encroachments not only in respect of the road through Aksai Chin but further advances west and south into Ladakh at Khurnak, Spanggur, Kongka pass, etc. Moreover, the line of actual control that was claimed by them was not defined and was later found to be flexible enough to cover even their substantial advance into Ladakh from 1959-62. According to Prime Minister Nehru, within three years they had "constructed a large network of military roads and posts west of Aksai Chin road. Beginning with posts opposite Daulat Beg Oldi near Karakoram pass, along the Chip Chap river and across the Galwan river, these posts and road descended south to Pongong Lake and Spanggur Lake area. At certain points the network of military posts were more than 100 miles west of the Chinese positions in 1959"⁶.

Simultaneously, with confrontation on the border the letters exchanged between the two Prime Ministers amounted to a confrontation. In March 1959, Nehru had given a detailed historical account of the treaties, etc., on which the border was based but Chou-En-Lai gave no reply till September by which time the situation on the ground had been settled to his satisfaction. His reply of 8 September 1959 talked of a fundamental difference between the positions of the two Governments. He laid claim to about 40,000 square miles of territory and for the first time claimed that the map of 1956 represented the Chinese position. Chou-En-Lai followed this up with a proposal on November 7 1956 that both sides should withdraw from the line of actual control, thus seeking to legitimise all Chinese advance upto that date. China later claimed that it had unilaterally honoured this withdrawal but in fact continued its advance in Ladakh in subsequent two years also.

The Chinese Prime Minister visited India in April 1960. He offered that China was prepared to accommodate the Indian point of view in the eastern sector and asked that India should accommodate China in the western sector. He laid down in a press conference six points as basis for agreement on the border dispute. The significant point was the claim made by the Chinese to the Karakoram mountains. The Chinese Premier said that a settlement should take into account the national feelings of the two people towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram mountains. In private conversations with Indian leaders, he repeated the offer to accommodate the Indian point of view on the eastern sector, if India should accommodate China on the western sector. Taken together, it could only mean that India should recede to the Karakoram mountains. As stated by China in their Note dated 26th December 1959 to Government of India regarding the area of 33,000 square kms. claimed in the western sector, "this area is the only traffic artery linking Sinkiang and Western Tibet because to its north east lies the great Gobi desert through which direct traffic is

practically impossible". This was the reason why China wanted to retain this area. Nehru proposed that officials from the two sides should meet to exchange evidence regarding their respective claims. This was agreed to but Chou-En-Lai left in a huff, and in order to play up his country's role he went on to Nepal and signed an agreement of friendship with her.

In 1960, Chou-En-Lai concluded a boundary treaty with Burma based on the McMahon Line. At the same time, China made further incursions into Ladakh and new check posts were established in 1961 and 1962 west of Sumdo in Karakash region, in Chip Chap river region, Chang Chenmo Valley and Spanggur region. The Indian army had been asked to take over the defence of the border in October 1959 and embarked on a policy of increasing the number of advance positions to prevent further Chinese incursion. The result was that at a number of points Indian and Chinese posts were "encircling" each other. The Indian side had not however, been able to build up adequate military support for their advance posts both in regard to communications and with regard to supplies and it had to keep them supplied in a number of cases by para-drops from helicopters.

The internal position of China had been developing adversely since 1958. The "great leap forward" movement launched by Mao Tse-tung had ended in failure. The Russians had not supported the Chinese case in the border dispute with India. They, in fact, had withdrawn all Russian technicians from China following differences over the boundary between China and Russia. In 1961, a serious famine had occurred in China. These increasing difficulties had only strengthened the resolve of the Chinese leaders to "teach a lesson to India (as they were to put it later) and to defy Russia into the bargain. "In the Chinese view, India's regime had become ideologically distasteful and a potential rival for influence in the Third World". Thus, the causes of the conflict between India and China were not wholly related to the dispute about the border.

In November 1960, the officers of the two Governments concluded in Rangoon the task of exchanging evidence regarding their border claims. The Chinese submitted for the first time a map showing the boundary alignment which went further west of the line in the map of 1956 which Chou-En-Lai had earlier said was the correct one. The two sides made progress only in further widening the gap between their positions, and perhaps it was naive to expect that the exercise would lead to better understanding. On the contrary, it only succeeded in hardening the position.

A foretaste of the coming conflict was provided on July 10, 1962 in Ladakh when some 400 Chinese troops encircled an Indian post established a few days before which lay astride the supply line to a forward Chinese post

in the Galwan valley. They, however, withdrew when the Indian personnel stood their ground. In the Chip Chap river valley, however, the Chinese advance on an Indian post in September led to firing by the Indian Post. "Several Chinese were killed, their bodies being left outside the Indian perimeter".⁸ The two sides had been exchanging notes to prevent border clashes but to no purpose.

The scene shifted to the eastern sector where on 4 June the Assam Rifles had set up a post at Dhola near the tri-junction of India, Bhutan and Tibet. The Chinese objected in September that the Indians had constructed "barracks and defence works" at Che Dong north of the McMahon Line. On 20th September, the Chinese made a surprise attack on the Dhola post and "settled into positions near and dominating the post".⁹

The Chinese quickly built up their position, and the Indian side also made preparations to stick to their position. It became increasingly evident that a show down was building up and neither side offered to climb down. The build up of forces on the Chinese side was accompanied by a propaganda war along the NEFA border. The Indians decided to wait before they could take action against the Chinese who had laid siege to Dhola post. They began building up of a brigade strength at Namka Chu.

A new Corps was formed under Lt. General B.N. Kaul to deal with the situation. On October 9, the Indian troops took up a position across the river Namka Chu and on October 10, the Chinese attacked the position. Lt. General Kaul who was present at the post, left for Delhi to report on the situation. He was of the view that though the position on other side of the river should be held, no offensive action to oust the Chinese need be taken. This was untenable as the Chinese had been moving further reinforcements across the Thagla ridge. The Indian Government decided nevertheless that there should be no withdrawal and on October 12, when the Prime Minister was leaving for Colombo, he said, "Our instructions are to free our territory"¹⁰.

While the Chinese were building up for a massive attack, the Indian Chief of Army Staff reached Tezpur, the headquarters of Lt. General Kaul and the latter was hospitalised and evacuated on the 18th afternoon. On 20th early morning, the Chinese struck with their full force at the weak Indian position on Dhola Ridge. There was a great gap between the Indian objective and the preparation made for achieving it, and it was going to show up now.

THE MILITARY SITUATION ON THE EVE OF THE CONFLICT

The Indian Government had inherited an army of 250,000 from its British predecessors and the circumstances of their departure and the resul-

tant partition of the country had left a legacy of bitter dispute between India and Pakistan. The army was kept directed to face the task of a military threat from Pakistan of which the invasion of Kashmir in 1947 was the prelude. The Chinese threat across the northern borders of the Himalaya was not visualised as a possibility till it became too late to plan and prepare adequately for it. The Indian army did not have a directive to prepare for a threat from across Tibet. The border regions consisted of a bleak upland plateau in Ladakh in the west to which access was difficult. The Zoji La pass was snow-bound for a large part of the year and a motorable road from Srinagar had yet to be completed. In the east, the Himalayan foothills of Assam received the full force of the monsoons and were covered with thick jungles through which roads were cut with difficulty. This difficulty was enhanced by the fact that due to its geological formation, the Himalayas were easily eroded by heavy rains. Landslides were all too liable to block and damage the roads being constructed. On the other hand, the Chinese army of 2.5 million soldiers was toughened by years of civil war since the long march of 1934 and had fought and won wars in mountainous regions of Western China. The People's Liberation Army, as it was called, was given as its first task after the communists came into power, the 'liberation' of Tibet in 1949 and since then had been engaged actively in gaining control over Tibet and had familiarised itself with its border regions adjoining India. The Chinese army was engaged moreover in building a net work of roads in Tibet and to connect Tibet with mainland China via Szachwan (Sikang) and Chamdo and from the north east via Tsinghai. These were difficult to build and took time but the road from Sinkiang via Aksai Chin to Gartok was improved in 1957. Within Tibet the local population was put on road construction programme connecting Lhasa with Gartok in the west and with Shigatse and Yatung in the South towards India via the Chumbi valley. Roads along the other main routes to India, to Rima, to Tawang border and to Taklakot, etc., were also completed.

The Indian army was given the task of defending the border in 1959 after the Kongka incident of 20 October 1959. If there was a proper definition of the task allotted to the army at that time it was not reflected in the manpower that would be required for carrying out the task or in their training and their deployment. The defence of the border involved the possibility of a clash in view of the continued Chinese advance into Indian territory. In 1960, however, the army formations earmarked for defence of the northern borders were inadequate even for the task of defending the border posts that were established. The military directive of opening new posts to stop Chinese advance was also complied with but without a network of communications to back up these posts in case of clash. The supply arrangements were exiguous and supplies had to be flown to the new posts and dropped from the air.

In the north east, the defence of the border was entrusted to the 4th Infantry Division with Headquarters at Tezpur. The Division was not more than a skeleton formation and was brought upto strength hastily only in 1962 when the Chinese attacked the post at Dhola in July. Till then, the Assam Rifles carried on the duties of manning the posts at the border when the army opened additional posts.

In 1961, the Chinese had been building up their strength along the border and it was facilitated by the road system which they had built. They had concentrated four Infantry Divisions of 40,000 strength along Arunachal Pradesh border and three Infantry Divisions of 30,000 along Ladakh border. In addition, a smaller force was deployed along the border in the middle sector. On the Indian side, the 4th Infantry Division in Arunachal Pradesh was built up in 1962 with three battalions of the 7th Brigade for defence of Tawang and it had No. 5 Infantry Brigade for the defence of the rest of NEFA. In Ladakh No. 114 Brigade at Leh was dispersed in small detachments at the border posts from Daulat Beg Oldi to Demchok. Till 1962 it had one army battalion and two battalions of the J&K Militia. In the summer of 1962 the Jat Battalion was added to it.

The disparity in the strength of the two sides was accentuated by the superiority of equipment that the Chinese possessed. The Chinese had good roads and were bringing supplies in trucks whereas the Indians had no roads leading to the front and had to trek on foot. The Chinese soldiers had full support of artillery, mortar and MMG fire, and were equipped with the automatic rifle. The Indian supporting fire power was limited to 3" mortars and the soldier had the .303 Enfield rifles. The Chinese command had a monolithic control and had a task for which it had been preparing and training.

In July 1962, the Chinese took over Thag La ridge opposite Dhola post at the trijunction of Tibet, Bhutan and India. It was clear that the Chinese were prepared for a full scale onslaught. The Indian army had been asked to defend the border, a task which, it was not appreciated, meant repelling a heavy Chinese attack. For this task, it was not equipped or prepared, nor had its power been adequately deployed. Nevertheless, the army formation was ordered to eject the Chinese from Thagla ridge.

Major General Prasad states, "on October 10, 9 AM we saw Chinese field guns being hauled into the open out of their camouflaged shelters. When they attacked (the Indian post across the river), they suffered heavy casualties. By their own declaration they had 100 killed. They were probably exaggerating to use the incident as a *casus belli*!" At Bumla, says Major General Prasad, across the border, "I clearly saw Chinese posts dolled about

on the vast plain stretching northward on the Tibetan plateau. In the distance we could observe vehicle movement towards Le"¹¹. This was on the direct route to Tawang. The main mule track goes up the Nyamjang Chu Valley from Tawang to Khunzemane to Dongkar Dzong and Tsona Dzong across the border. The Chinese had started renewed digging on the Thag-la ridge "which presaged a Chinese offensive across the Namka Chu".

CHINESE INVASION

The China's attack on October 20, 1962 near the trijunction of India, Bhutan and Tibet was not a matter of contesting the location of a post on the border. It was part of a full scale operation on India's northern border both in the North East, as well as in Ladakh in the western sector and involved seven divisions of the Chinese army. China had secured the territory she claimed in Ladakh and announced that she would not cross the McMo-han Line. She had, therefore, no unsatisfied territorial claims and could have narrowed down the conflict by sitting tight on Thagla Ridge. Instead, she launched massive attacks not only at this point but also in the north-east corner near Burma, and in Ladakh. Clearly, China had prepared for a major offensive for achieving objectives larger than holding on the border territories she had occupied.

China had never adhered to the Panchsheel-five principles of peaceful co-existence-in her relations with India. But the attack of 1962 was an attempt to discredit India by a decisive military victory. The threatening Soviet build-up in Cuba, as it happened, was proceeding parallel with the final stages of Chinese build up on India's frontier, and both events came to a crisis point simultaneously. Whereas China went ahead with its attack on India, Russia chose the path of conciliation with the USA. China thus proclaimed herself as the leader of a more militant communism.

At 4 A.M. on October 20 the Chinese launched three brigades on the Indian position at Dhola where the Indian 7th Brigade had been hastily assembled. After heavy bombardment, two Chinese brigades took the small outpost at Tsangle on the north of the small local stream Namka Chu flowing west to east into the Nyamjang river. They next moved round south eastward towards Tsangdhar. The Rajput Battalion gave them a stiff resistance but were overtaken after having lost 280 killed, 93 wounded and 30 taken prisoner by 8 A.M. Unfortunately, the brigade headquarters had lost touch with the units owing to a direct hit on its transmitter, and no coordination of the Indian defence took place. The Gurkha Battalion at Tsangdhar was also over-powered after a fight. Simultaneously, with the attack on the western flank, a Chinese brigade attacked the eastern flank of the Indian brigade at

a bridge on the Namka Chu and after two hours of battle with a battalion of the Grenadiers, took the bridge and turned round to take the border post of Khinzemane held by the Assam Rifles.

From Tsangdhar the western prong of the Chinese attack turned east towards Karpola and reached Zirkhim on 21st October. The eastern prong overpowered the Punjab battalion and the same evening the two Chinese forces joined and divided themselves into two, a smaller prong to take Lumpu, the brigade headquarters, and the bigger one crossing the Nyamjang river to proceed along its left bank to Tawang. Another Chinese brigade group came down the Bum La and also centred on Tawang. On 23rd October, both the Chinese forces, the one from Thagla and the other from Bum La arrived near Tawang, which had been designed as the 'vital defence ground' for the 4th Indian Division. But the plan to defend Tawang was given up. The Chinese forces coming from Bum La were halted by the Sikh battalion who gave a good account of themselves and when they had to withdraw on the 24th, did so in an orderly manner. Tawang was taken by the Chinese on 24th October. After that the Chinese halted on the north bank of the Tawang Chu.

Thus ended the first phase of the Chinese attack on this part of the border. The Indian units fought bravely but as individual units were heavily outnumbered by the Chinese whose attack was well coordinated. The Indian higher command was not able to execute any defence plan. The Chinese had the advantage not only of numbers, but of superior weaponry. The Chinese attack from the higher positions on Thagla ridge on the Indian formations in the 'bowl' of the Namka Chu valley caught the Indian 7th brigade at a disadvantage, and at Tawang the 4th Indian division decided not to put up resistance.

The Tawang area is a huge massif which starts at about 7500 feet near the river Tawang Chu in the south and climbs all the way up to about 15,000 feet at Bumla and 18 miles to the north of Tawang.

Further south at Se La, the natural configuration offered a suitable defence position, and moreover the Indian division had a breathing space for preparation since the Chinese did not launch the attack till November 15. But the Indian command did not show itself able to take advantage of the position. There were too many changes of the army commanders, and the units being moved up for defence had to be sent up hurriedly without any previous knowledge of the terrain or training in the difficult high altitude areas. The 62nd Brigade was hurriedly organised for defence of Se La. In these *ad hoc* conditions, they were not organised in any well coordinated defence plan. The Chinese launched a three pronged attack, for in addition to the forces

from Thag La and Bum La, a third force came down along the little known route from Tulung La. On 17th November, the Indian high command agreed to the withdrawal of the 62nd brigade from Se La. The order to withdraw was given at short notice, and the withdrawal took place at night. All this led to confusion and as a victim of this sudden change of plans, the brigade suffered badly, and its commander, Brigadier Hoshiar Singh was among those killed in the retreat. Se La fell to the Chinese on 18th November.

The headquarters of 4th Indian Division was at Dirang Dzong. The Chinese moved from Se La in more than Division strength. Isolated detachments of the 62nd Indian brigade had reached Dirang Dzong, but they had been demoralised by the ill-planned withdrawal. At Dirang Dzong again, the Indian units fought bravely but as isolated formations. No higher direction made its impact, for the Divisional Commander had left on the morning of 18th November. The retreating Indian formations were followed to Bomdi La which the Chinese reached on November 21 when the 'cease-fire' was announced.

In the north east corner of NEFA, the Chinese attacked the Indian positions south of Rima on October 21. The Indian battalion of Kumaonis met the attack and inflicted heavy casualties, killing about a hundred Chinese. The 11th Indian brigade had been organised hurriedly for defence of Walong under Brigadier Rawley. The Chinese now launched a major attack on the Indian positions north of Walong and the Indian troops, Kumaonis, Sikhs and Gurkhas, held up the attacks. On November 15, the Chinese attacked Walong and suffered heavy casualties. The Indian troops were, however, outnumbered and in subsequent attacks they suffered heavy casualties and had to withdraw from Walong. The Chinese had also launched attacks at other points in NEFA and advanced along the Siang river and near Longju.

Simultaneously, with the attacks in NEFA, the Chinese launched their offensive in Ladakh on October 20, 1962. They followed different tactics here because unlike in NEFA where they had to march through thick jungles over steep hills and valleys, in Ladakh they had to march across a bare wind-swept plateau. They attacked individual border posts to the north of Pangong lake and they over-ran several of them after severe fighting. The Chinese superiority in ammunition and their continuous bombardment of Indian positions prior to attack told in their favour. The J & K Militia and the Gurkha troops who held these positions fought till most of them were killed and the rest escaped south. On 27th October, the Chinese attacked Indian posts in the southern sector around Demchok and over-ran Demchok. The Indian defence was organised around Chushul in the central sector. The Chinese did not attack till November 18 when they were faced with a brigade strength under Brigadier Raina for defence of the Indian positions at Renzang La,

Gurung, etc., These positions were defended stubbornly despite use of tanks, and heavy guns against them. Certain outlying positions were taken by the Chinese but the Chinese were not able to advance further west of their positions, as they had done in the north and also around Demchok. Personnel of the Thirteenth Field Regiment (Artillery) showed great gallantry during the battle of Chushul from November 18 to 20. Major Goswamy despite being wounded kept on directing the artillery fire on the Chinese. Five soldiers of the Indian artillery were killed but the Chinese left 500 dead. Unlike in the NEFA where there were too many quick changes in higher command, in Ladakh the army command had been allowed freedom of action and had built up its strength by withdrawing formations from along the Pakistan cease-fire line and concentrated on defence of Chushul which blocked the road to Leh.

The war ended by unilateral declaration of cease-fire by the Chinese on November 21. The losses on the Indian side amounted to 7048 including 1383 killed, 1969 missing and the rest taken prisoners. The Chinese losses were not declared but from the estimates made of their casualties as reported by the Indian units involved in the fighting, their casualties may have been higher. The Chinese, however, took particular care that none of their soldiers should be taken prisoners, and to retrieve the dead bodies and the wounded among their troops.

(To be concluded)

NOTES

1. India's Foreign Policy : The Nehru Years, ed. B.R. Nanda Vikas, New Delhi , 1976.
2. Note given by the Ministry of External Affairs to the Counsellor of China in India on 21 August 1958 - para 2 of note at p. 46 of Notes, Memorande etc. between India and China 1954-9-White Paper of Govt. of India.
3. See Rushbrook Williams - "The State of Pakistan" London (1964).
4. "The Sino-Indian Boundary Question" - Peking Nov. 1962.
5. B.N. Mullik, "The Chinese Betrayal", p. 200.
6. Vide Annexure to a letter from Prime Minister Nehru to Prime Minister Chou-En-Lai dated 14th November, 1962.
7. Alan Lawrence, "China's Foreign Relations Since 1949".
8. Neville Maxwell, "India's China War". page 253
9. Ibid, p. 298
10. N Maxwell, "India's China War", p. 32
11. "The Fall of Tawang 1962" - By Major General N. Prasad.



THE MAGNIFICENT MARATHAS

Awed and inspired by Shivaji the Great
Are the mighty magnificent Marathas
A pious race with a wily trait
They hail from Konkan and Maharashtra.

1768 saw Native Levies arise
To Bombay Sepoys it reformed,
As Native Infantry it kept its ties
Until Maratha Regiment was formed.

The 'Jangi Paltan' was the first to conceive,
famed 'Kali Panchwin' did follow,
It fought at KAHUN, was the first to receive
Light Infantry's title haloed.

The regiment fought and earned much fame
At SEEDASEER and SERINGAPATNAM,
MAGDALA and CTESIPON brought acclaim
As at KEREN, ADEN and AFGHANISTAN.

Under Rawlingson's Review of 1922
It came 5th in Infantry heirarchy,
In world War II it fought at Pegu
Mid East, North Africa and Italy.

Through Ghadge's grit and Jadhav's wit,
Many Germans in Italy perished,
As recepients of the Victoria Cross
Their names will always be cherished.

After partition too the Marathas dared
to keep the Chinese at bay.
Hyderabad and Goa they smoothly cleared
And drove the Paki's away.

KOLHAPUR Forces joined in addition,

To BARODA and HYDERABAD Infantry.
These famous units with their traditions
Brought in their pride and chivalry.

General Mayne did guide, while Brar took pride,
Handerson Brooks and D'Souza refined.
Kulkarni and Bachittar did further guide,
Now Zaki gives shape divine.

The Marathas can fight through jaws of hell
On a blood-curdling cry they dwell.
". . . Shivaji Maharaj Ki Jai" they yell
Their tradition has just no parallel.

They march to SINGARH with dug in heels,
A horn as badge they adorn ;
Enclosed are swords and Shivaji's shield
And a hackle red-green is worn.

An Ashoka was awarded to Tucker,
While Laxman won Olympics Gold.
With scores of Maha and Vir Chakras
Marathas bring glory untold.

Come flood or drought, riot or 'strife,
The Marathas are always called in.
From Port Blair's tide to Siachin's ice
They excel in every region.

The Magnificent Marathas have earned a name
Through COURAGE, HONOUR AND DUTY,
They always have and will bring more fame
To this land of mighty Shivaji.

Maj Anil Shorey
(The Punjab Regt)

The Last of the Mughals

LT GEN SL MENEZES PVSM SC (RETD)

The last Mughal Emperor, Muhammad Bahadur Shah, was brought to trial on 27 January 1858 before an European Military Commission composed of one lieutenant Colonel, three majors and one captain, at the Diwan - i - Khas of the Red Fort, Delhi, by order of Major General Nicholas Penny, Commanding the Meerut Division, pursuant to instructions from Sir John Lawrence, Chief Commissioner of the Punjab, on the charges averred :

"1st - being a pensioner of the British Government in India, did at Delhi, between the 10th of May and 1st of October 1857, encourage, aid and abet, Muhammad Bakhat Khan, Subedar of the Regiment of Artillery of the Bengal Army, and diverse others, of the East India Company's Army, in the crimes of Mutiny and Rebellion against the State.

2nd - at various times between the 10th of May and 1st of October 1857, encouraged, aided and abetted Mirza Moghal, his own son, a subject of the British Government in India, and others unknown, also subjects of the said British Government, to rebel and wage war against the State.

3rd - being a subject to the British Government in India, and not regarding the duty of his allegiance, did, at Delhi, on the 11th May 1857, or thereabouts, as a false traitor against the State, proclaim and declare himself the reigning King and Sovereign of India, and did then and there traitorously seize and take unlawful possession of the City of Delhi, and did moreover, at various times between the 10th of May and 1st of October 1857, treasonably conspire, consult, and agree with Mirza Moghal, his own son, and with Muhammad Bakht Khan, Subedar of the Regiment of Artillery, and diverse other false traitors unknown, to raise levy, and make insurrection, rebellion, and war, against the State, and further to fulfil and perfect his treasonable design of overthrowing and destroying the British Government in India, did assemble armed forces at Delhi, and send them forth to fight and wage war against the said British Government.

4th - on the 16th of May 1857, or thereabouts, did, within the precincts of the Palace at Delhi, feloniously cause, and become accessory to the murder of 49 persons, chiefly women and children of European and mixed European descent : and did, moreover, between the 10th

of May and 1st of October 1857, encourage and abet diverse Soldiers and others in murdering European Officers, and other English subjects, including women and children, both by giving and promising such murderers service, advancement, and distinctions and further, that he issued orders to different Native Rulers having local authority in India, to slay and murder Christians and English people, whenever and wherever found on their Territories ; the whole or any part of such conduct being heinous offences under Act XIV of 1857, of the Legislative Council in India."

Emperor Bahadur Shah's defence, published in 1859 in the proceedings of his trial by the Orders of the House of Commons (reprinted in 1980 in "Delhi in 1857 - Volume I - The Trial of Bahadur Shah", Editor, K.C. Yadav), was briefly, "I had no intelligence on the subject previously to the day of the attack. About 8 O'clock a.m., the mutinous troopers suddenly arrived and set up a noisy clamour under the windows I immediately had the gates under the Palace windows closed, and sent intelligence to the (British) Commandant of the Palace Guards (Captain Douglas).... On receiving the message, he came personally, and wishing to go out where the troopers were collected, requested that the gate might be opened. I kept him from his purpose, however, and when I would not allow the gate to be opened, he walked up to the balustrade and said something to the troopers, who then went away. Very shortly after, Mr. Fraser (the Magistrate at Delhi) sent a message for two guns, and the Commandant another for two palanquins, saying that two ladies were staying with him, and requesting that I would have them taken to and concealed in my private female apartments. I sent the palanquins immediately, and gave orders at the same time that the gun should also be taken. Very soon after this, I heard that before the palanquins could reach them, Mr. Fraser, the Commandant of the Palace Guards, and the ladies had all been killed. Not long after this the soldiery rushed into the hall of Special Audience, crowding into the courtyard, the Hall of Special Audience itself and the Hall of Devotion ; surrounding me completely and placing sentries on all sides. I asked them what their object was, and begged of them to go away. In reply they told me to remain a quiet spectator, saying that they had staked their lives, and would now do all that might be in their power. Fearing that I should be killed, I kept quiet and went to my own private apartments. Near evening, they brought as prisoners some European men and women whom they had found in the Magazine, and resolved on killing them. I had recourse to persuasion, and succeeded in getting their lives spared for the time. The soldiers, however, kept them prisoners in their own custody. Subsequently, on two occasions, they again determined on killing these Europeans, when I again restrained them from their purpose by entreaty and persuasion, and

saved the lives of the prisoners. However on this last occasion, though I again did all in my power to reason with the soldiery they would not heed me, and carried out their purpose of slaying these poor people. I have no orders for this slaughter...

"As regards the orders under my seal, and under my signature, the real state of the case is, that from the day the soldiery came and killed the European Officers, and made me a prisoner, I remained in their power as such. All papers they thought fit, they caused to be prepared, and, bringing them to me, compelled me to affix my seal. Sometimes they brought the rough drafts of orders, and had fair copies of them made by my secretary. At other times they brought the original letters intended for despatch, and left copies of them in the office. Hence several rough drafts in diversity of hands have been filed in the proceedings. Frequently they had the seal impressed on the outside of empty unaddressed envelopes. There is no knowing what papers they sent in these or to whom they sent them ...

"After this, they placed others of my servants in arrest, for instance Shamshir-ud-dowlat, the father of the queen Zinat Mahal. They even declared they would depose me, and make Mirza Moghal king. It is a matter for patient and just consideration then, what power in any way did I possess, or what reason had I to be satisfied with them ? The officers of the army went even so far as to require that I should make over the queen Zinat Mahal to them that they might keep her a prisoner, saying she maintained friendly relations with the English....

I was in their power, what could I do ? They came suddenly and made me a prisoner. I was helpless, and constrained by my fears, I did whatever they required, otherwise they would immediately have killed me. This is universally known. I found myself in such a predicament that I was weary of my life, while my officials had no hopes of theirs being spared. In this state of things, I resolved to accept poverty, and adopted the garb, coloured with red earth, of a religious mendicant, intending to go first to the shrine of the Kutab Sahib, thence to Ajmer, and from Ajmer eventually to Mecca; but the army would not allow me....

"They, one day, went to the house of the queen Zinat Mahal, intending to plunder it, but did not succeed in breaking open the door. It should accordingly be considered if they were subservient to my authority, or had I been in league with them, how would these things have occurred ? In addition to all this, it is worthy of consideration that no person demands the wife of the poorest man, saying 'Give her to me, I will make her a prisoner'....

"It may be stated that they never saluted me even, or showed me any other mark of respect. They used to walk into the Hall of Special Audience and the Hall of Devotion with their shoes on. They made me a prisoner, and tyrannized over me, keeping me on in order to make use of my name as a sanction for their acts. Seeing that these troops killed their own officers, men of high authority and power, how was I without an army, without treasure, without stores of ammunition, without artillery, to have resisted them, or make arrangements against them ? But I never gave them aid in any shape. When the mutinous troopers first arrived, the gateway under the palace windows being in my power, I had it closed

"I did not go out in procession of my own free will. I was in the power of their soldiery ; and they forcibly did what they pleased....

"When these troops prepared to abscond, finding an opportunity I got away secretly under the palace windows, and went and stayed in Humayun's Mausoleum. From this place I was summoned with a guarantee that my life should be spared, and I at once placed myself under the protection of the Government."

Despite his defence Emperor Bahadur Shah was found guilty on 9 March 1858, "The Court, on the evidence before them, are of opinion that the Prisoner Muhammed Bahadur Shah, Ex-King of Delhi, is guilty of all and every part of the charges preferred against him." The trial proceedings were confirmed by Major General N. Penny, the convening officer, on 2 April 1858. Emperor Bahadur Shah was thereafter exiled to Burma. Colonel Ommaney, later Commissioner Peshawar Division, who in 1857 as a lieutenant had been the Emperor's escort at Delhi and later to Rangoon, recounts, as quoted by H.C. Fanshawe in 'Shah Jahan's Delhi : Past and Present' (1902), "The ex king was about 85 years old, and must have been a striking man in his prime ; his face was of an aristocratic type.... He must have been a powerful man too... he had a pleasant expression and a sense of humour....I should say he was too old to have initiated or taken any active part in the horrors of those days, and was the tool of the bolder and more truculent spirits, male and female, about him."

It would appear that Emperor Bahadur Shah was a figurehead in 1857, the centenary year of Plassey (1757). As he says, he had no army, nor weapons, nor money. Sir Jadunath Sarkar said that the erstwhile ruling class had made "the simple folk (the sepoys) their cat's paw in a gamble for recovering their territories." "The truth is in fact just the opposite," according to K.C. Yadav, "the simple folk made Bahadur Shah their cat's paw". His "empire" was limited to the Red Fort by the East India Company.

F.W. Buckler in 1922 had asserted that it was the East India Company that had "rebelled" against the Emperor. (Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 4th Series, Volume V). Warfare had never been his forte. Poetry was. In "Twilight of the Mughals" (1951), the late Percival Spear wrote, "The plaintive ghazals of the king proved more effective weapons against the British than all the guns of the mutineers."

Illustrious poets graced Emperor Bahadur Shah's court : Zauq, Ghalib, Azurdah, Momin, Ehsan, Shefta, Sehbai, Dagh, Betab, Bismil. The Emperor wrote poetry under the name of Zafar, Percival Spear adds : "Though not quite in the same rank as Ghalib and Zauq, he (Zafar) has his niche in the Urdu pantheon and his merit cannot be denied. It is this gift, much more than his crown, which gave him his place in the life of Delhi.... As a philosophic prince he would have adorned any court. He would have made a dignified ruler of a minor German state under the empire or an excellent constitutional king. Delhi in his time was an Indian Weimar, with Ghalib for its Goethe. His interest and tastes were primarily literary and aesthetic. He loved poetry and philosophy, gardens and nature in all its guises. Nearly every day of his life he went for excursions across the Jamuna morning and evening ; every monsoon found him established at Mehrauli where he built himself a country palace whose main archway may still be seen." He possessed much culture and sensitivity as his verses show. The following are from a selection by K.N. Sud.

Jab koe baat dard-e-muhabat ki chal padi
Aansu ki boond aankh se apni nikal padi

(Whenever the pain of love is mentioned,
A tear fell from my eyes.)

Ye chaman yunhi rahega aur hazaaron jaanwar
Apni apni bolian sab bolkar ud jaenge

(Thousands of living beings will play their part and depart,
but this world will continue as before.)

After his exile to Burma, the old Emperor laments -

Na kisi ki ank ka noor hun na kisi ke dil ka qarar hun
Jo kisi ke kaam na aasaka main wo ek mushte ghubar hun

(No eye shines on seeing me ; I give solace to no heart ;
I am that handful of dust that serves no purpose.)

Umre-e-draz maang ke laae the chaar din
Do arzoo men kat gaye do intezaar men

(My long span of life had four days ;
Two went in wishing and two in waiting.)

He is plunged in despair at the refusal to bury him in India. He was buried in Rangoon.

Hai kitna badnaseeb Zafar dafan ke liye
Do gaz zamin bhi mil na saki koo-e-yaar men
(How ill-fated is Zafar that for his burial
He couldn't get two yards of earth in the beloved's lane.)

His grave bore no vestiges of his royal status, recorded the officer in charge of the jail, Captain Davies, as quoted by K.N. Sud, "he was buried at 4 p.m. on the same day in the rear of the main guard, in a grave covered over with turf, level with the ground. A bamboo fence surrounded the grave for some considerable distance. By the time the fence is worn out, the grass will have again covered the spot and no vestige will remain to distinguish where the last of the great mughals rests."

As a result the grave became indistinct and remained unknown for many years. According to Appendix O of "Bahadur Shah II" by Mehandi Husan (1987)"... in 1903 some of his Indian devotees arrived in Rangoon with the object of invoking blessings on his soul and performing 'Fatihakhwani' at his grave, they could not find it... through local guidance they tentatively fixed upon a space under a withered lotus tree as the site of the much sought for grave. There the Fatihakhwani was performed, and subsequently attempts were made to raise a magnificent mausoleum there. To this effect an entreaty appeal was made... and a plan was drawn up of the proposed mausoleum."

The British then disapproved of the proposed mausoleum. In 1934, however, his tomb was eventually built on a humble scale and goes under the name of "Dargah Bahadur Shah". It was renovated in 1942 under orders of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose. When he was the Emperor, Bahadur Shah had built a grave at a spot in Mehrauli. The proposal to bring his remains from Rangoon after Independence, and intern them there in Mehrauli was rejected on religious grounds.

And what of Muhammad Bakht mentioned in the 1st charge, and Mirza Moghal mentioned in the 2nd charge ? According to K.C. Yadav, Muhammed Bakht was a Rohilla from Sultanpur, U.P. He was a highly intelligent Subedar who played a leading role in the uprising, assumed the rank of Brigadier and was appointed Commander-in-Chief. He died "a fugitive, unwept and unsung." Mirza Moghal alias Muhammad Zahiruddin was the fourth son of Bahadur Shah. He commanded the Delhi force till Bakht Khan's arrival, and, as is well-known, was killed alongwith his brother by Hodson at the Delhi Gate on 22 September 1857.

Letters to the Editor

**Letters are invited on subjects which have been dealt in the journal, or which are of general interest to the services.*

I

THE AIRCRAFT CARRIER OBSESSION A 'PONGO' REPLIES

Sir,

Reference a reply to my article (Jul-Sep 89) published by 'Sage' in the Jan-Mar '90 issue of the Journal, I seek your permission to give a rejoinder, which I hope you will publish.

To begin with, I would have appreciated it, if the reply was published under the officer's own name instead of hiding under the nom-de-plume 'Sage'. So what even if he is a senior serving officer, as long as he does not transgress security or gives a view contrary to the policy of his Service? If any thing, in this case, he is defending the Navy's policy. But then, the Navy has always been secretive, as is reflected in the way they salute with the palm hidden, and not open as is the case with the Army.

Secondly, 'Sage' has adopted in his reply an old legal technique which says that, when you have no logic or a factual case to stand on, then attack your opponent's personality and character, by calling him names (to quote from his own article), such as, 'paper tiger', 'pongo', 'a complicated mind' 'chairborne naval analyst', 'land-lubber' etc.

Thirdly, all that 'Sage' has done is, to pick holes in my article, on totally irrelevant matters like, "Ashley Tellis has never been in a ship, and Admiral Rickover is only a submarine high priest"; or, "even Nehru said that, to be secure on land we must be supreme at sea"; and "even our railways employ 1,00,000 constables to protect transportation of goods, so we must do so also on the seas"; etc. etc. Again, whereas I had stated that, "the last real battle of sea in which aircraft carriers were involved was in the closing months of the World War II in the vicinity of Okinawa" his comments are "as if nothing else happened at sea before that". However, in his entire article, he has not put forward a single positive para, a sentence, a line, or even a word, justifying the need of an aircraft carrier in the Indian context. He has gone into great lengths to describe India's maritime trade and the need for a larger navy to protect this; in fact, 75% of his article only harps on this theme. I have never denied this, if anything, I have advocated a considerable increase in our naval strength, to quote from my article, "In the prevailing super-charged geopolitical scenario of the South Asian land mass and the islands of the Indian ocean, there is no denying that the Indian Navy has a very significant role to play - in conjunction

with the Indian army and airforce. Our navy certainly needs much more teeth and advanced weapon systems in the form of guided - missile vessels, long-range ocean-surveillance aircraft and helicopters, and above all hunter-killer submarines", unquote. My point is that, the aircraft carrier does not fit or contribute anything towards all this, for the various reasons stated in my article, which I do not wish to repeat here again.

Fourthly, apart from grandiose conceptions of a three ocean blue water navy etc, it appears that, one of the reasons for the navy wanting an aircraft carrier is, that they have no faith in the Air Force giving them the necessary air cover at sea. To give a latest example of this, while delivering a lecture on 'National Security' at the inaugural function of the spring lecture series in Pune on 21 Apr '90, Admiral B S Soman (Retd), ex-chief of the Naval Staff, based the case for yet another aircraft carrier on the plea that, quote "on the high seas, the navy requires air support immediately, as it cannot wait for the Air Force to come to the navy's rescue from the shore" unquote. What the Admiral does not realise is that, we are today, in a position to give more than adequate air cover with land based aircraft, and with both land and sea based missiles, to our ships anywhere around our sea borders, and even across these if the need so arises. With modern communication systems, the response time is almost immediate.

Lastly, if anything, for a poor country like ours, the aircraft carrier is a liability, as it has to be closely guarded not only by a number of escort vessels, but by utilising two-thirds of the aircraft on board for this role alone. The fact that, this world's most expensive weapon system, is being discarded even by far richer countries with long coast lines like Japan, Australia, China, Canada and Germany, speaks for itself.

To conclude, I would even go so far as to state that, by frittering away our scarce resources, by sticking to an outdated and prohibitively expensive weapon system of doubtful utility, we are not only denying ourselves the need to spend money on the really effective defence acquisitions, but, we are, in fact, jeopardising our National Security. Will some Air Force Officer now like to take cudgels on this issue through this Journal, specially so, when an ex-CONS has made a statement that "he cannot wait for the Air Force to come to the navy's rescue"?

— Brig NB Grant AVSM (Retd)

II

IN AID OF CIVIL AUTHORITY

Sir,

I take this opportunity to compliment Maj General Afsir Karim, for his thought-provoking article "In Aid to Civil Authority : A Case Study of an Episode in Gujarat-1985" published in Jan-Mar 1990 issues of the Journal.

The article has appealed to me the most as I was one of his Battalion Commanders deployed with my Unit in Shahpur-Jamalpur, Khadia area of the walled city that witnessed one of the worst riots in recent times. Also, the traditional annual Sri Jagan Nath Rath Yatra commenced from my area and finally ended in the evening criss-crossing through Kalupur-Daryapur and other areas peacefully as the Temple was located in our area of responsibility.

Like spate of communal riots that plague our country, more due to short political gains and media-sensationalism, rumours and gossips; numerous articles appeared in the present about anti-reservation-cum Communal riots that erupted in the walled city of Ahmedabad in 1985. Most of these articles had not been fair and impartial as they were written by journalists and ex-police officials who were in no way involved in controlling the riots in the walled city. Some of these articles some how advocated that it was Mr. Ribeiro, who was appointed Director General of Police Gujarat, by his magical arrival controlled the situation in the walled city, thus, indirectly, with vested interest prove irrelevance of the Army in defusing the delicate and volatile situation aggravated due to police inefficiency and political mishandling of the situation.

Being a professionally committed soldier who was deployed with his Unit in the riot torn walled city for over 3 months and with least disrespect to Mr Ribeiro whose competence is wellknown, I would like to submit that he came on the scene when the law and order situation had already been restored by the Army in the walled city and that Army was exclusively responsible for controlling the riots in the Walled City of Ahmedabad and local police had nothing to do with it. Army's efforts in restoring confidence in Hindus and Muslims and it's total impartiality and fair play restored confidence in the people and change in political leadership brought anti-reservation-cum-Communal riots under control. However, Mr Ribeiro gets credit for raising the sagging morale and credibility of the police force and taking over the diffused situation from the Army and thereafter controlling it once the Army was withdrawn from the walled city.

The article by Maj Gen Afsir Karim, would have been more timely had it been published a few years earlier, highlighting the impartial and fair role of the Army in tackling an unpleasant task in aid of civil authority. In the end, I once again compliment him for the correct perspective highlighted in his article. Much of the share of the compliment should also go to the local population for their support, respect, and trust shown towards all ranks who were deployed in the walled city to protect their lives and property. I consider myself honoured to hear even today, from some of the best friends that I made from both the communities during those fateful days of 1985 riots in the walled city of Ahmedabad.

-- Col NN Bhatia

The Assam Rifles Training Centre

Military Power Today *

LT GEN PE MENON PVSM (RETD)

The Book considers the changing relevance of military power in modern world political environment. Asserting that military power has traditionally played a decisive role in international relations from earliest recorded history, the author avers that the evolution of warfare through the ages witnessed a relentless increase in the lethal power of the weapons employed in war. Starting with the sword, lance and the bow and arrows of the middle ages, weapons have evolved through gun-powder, the musket and the cannon of the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries, to increasingly powerful artillery, mines and warships employed two centuries later, followed by machine guns, tanks, submarines and aircraft in the First World War and culminating in guided weapons of unprecedented destructive power and the atomic bomb, a mere twenty years later. There has been a simultaneous and progressive increase in the size of the armies employed and the casualties suffered; concurrently, the number of states involved and the geographic extent of the conflicts have assumed global dimensions. But the advent of the nuclear weapon has brought about a significant change.

What is this change? It is not that war as an instrument of state policy has found less favour. Indeed the opposite is true! Between 1945 and 1986, as many as 120 significant wars have been fought involving around 30 million casualties. Most of these have been characterised by great ferocity and utter insensitivity to casualties and suffering. Even now, as many as twenty wars are being fought in different parts of the world. What is significant is that no wars as envisaged in 1945 - an all out war between major powers of the world-has taken place for the last four decades. In fact, the threat of a war in the developed world is receding rapidly. Wars now take place almost without exception, among the countries of the developing world. Factors like centralisation of power, stability of governments and resistance to change, higher standards of living and populations less inclined to accept the hardships and privations of a revolutionary struggle, render wars unattractive in countries of the developed world. Such conditions are generally lacking in the developing countries. But the developed states do get heavily involved in some of the wars; equally, the wars are usually local, are neither small nor insignificant.

Claiming that the traditional causes of war that obtained in the old

* The Blunteds word: The Erosion of Military Power in Modern World Politics By Evan Luard, Published by IB Tauris & Co. (London), 1988. Pages 196. price £ 16.95.

days - competitions to succession, right to a throne elsewhere, territorial objectives and propagation of religious faith - no longer applied, the author avers that the essential reasons for a conflict today are political. Another strong motive among colonial and ex-colonial peoples is the desire for independence. Most of the recent wars are therefore attributable to the process of decolonisation and internal ideological disputes. The author goes on to assert that the essential change in the relevance of military power has thus been brought by two factors :

(a) The external powers are in a position to use only a portion of their total power in conflicts of this nature; their total power remains irrelevant.

(b) The outcome of civil wars is not dependent on military factors at all, whether conventional or nonconventional. If it were true, USA would have won in Vietnam and USSR in Afghanistan. Such conflicts are mainly dependent on political factors: effectiveness and popularity of governments, attractiveness of rival political creeds or parties, capacity to mobilise popular support, standard of living of the population, dependence of either side on external forces, national sentiment and so on.

Almost all political conflicts fought to-day are not struggles to win territory, but to win political influence, to maintain a government in Vietnam, in Afghanistan, Angola, EL Salvador, Nicaragua, Chad, Cambodia and so on. Power to-day is the capacity to prevail in this type of conflict. Thus the type of military power which will prove effective is quite different from military power as commonly perceived i.e. on the number and speed of aircraft and tanks, war ships or submarines, degree of sophistication of electronics and even less so on nuclear weapons and delivery systems. There is thus a wide gap between apparent and real power, potential and usable force. Highlighting the irrelevance of nuclear weapons in this type of war, the author shows that nuclear stalemate had not lead to deterrence, but rather to a nullification of deterrence through double-deterrence. No side can, in one sweep, destroy all nuclear weapons of its antagonists. The only alternative to a threat of retaliation is to improve one's counter missile defences to such an extent as to ensure one's safety whilst retaining the capability for retaliation. This is the apparent rationale for America's Strategic Defence Initiative programme.

Altogether, a well researched work, the book draws on a wealth of examples from recent history. Examining the causes for conflicts, it suggests steps that could be taken by the super powers and the affluent countries of Western Europe to reduce threats of regional conflicts, as also how the UN could play a more positive role in ensuring world peace.

United States and The Third World *

COL R RAMA RAO

This volume is a compendium of analyses by knowledgeable writers on five important topics namely, "US Macro-Economic Policy and Developing Countries" by Paul R. Krugman; 'International Finance and Investment: A Surging Public Sector' by Richard E. Feinberg; 'Trade with Developing Countries: The Reagan Record and Prospects' by Steve Lande and Craig Van Grassek; 'US Foreign Aid in the 1980s; Reordering of Priorities' by John W. Sewell and Christine E. Contee; and 'Wrestling with Third World Radical Regimes: Theory and Practice' by Anthony Lake.

The book opens with an excellent overview and a summary of the facts and main arguments elaborated in the five chapters that form the hard core of the volume and the recommendations contained therein.

Besides this, the volume also contains statistical annexes - a total of fifty four which cover a wide field extending from 'US Federal Debt and Deficits', through 'Foreign loans of US Commercial Banks', 'Real Value of US Exports', 'Net Official Development Assistance' to 'Economic and Social Indicators of Development' and 'Average Daily Caloric Intake Per Person'.

All these articles and statistical data make this volume a useful 'Year Book' which students of current affairs would do well to study.

The Indian Public will note that the US 'toughness' may by no means be confined to the 'more advanced' developing countries; that India has been subjected to a good deal of pressure on the issue of Patents (i.e. 'Intellectual Property Rights') is no secret. Lande and Van Grassek suggest (p. 91) that "US position in any upcoming trade negotiations should be based more on offers of mutual concessions than on threats of unilateral retaliation". The author also notes that the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP) in trade which was meant to facilitate the process of development of the poorer countries should be used constructively, offering carrots rather than brandishing the stick. This approach, it need hardly be stressed, would be as much in US interests as it would be in that of the less developed countries.

* U.S. Foreign Policy and The Third World : Agenda 1985-86 Edited by : John W. Sewell, Richard E. Feinberg and Valesiana Kallab
Published by Transaction Books, Rutgers-the State University, New Brunswick, NJ 08903, 1985.
Pages 238, Price \$ 19.95.

In matters pertaining to quotas from developing countries for entry into the US market, India has been facing several hurdles especially in regard to the export of textiles, manufactures and other items. But a lesson we have to learn is that we must first put our own house in order by upgrading our industry and raising the efficiency and productivity of our manufacturing sector before we can expect fair terms of trade from USA or other advanced countries.

In the case of US trade and other relations with third world countries, political and security considerations far outweigh other factors. Within the subcontinent, US-Pakistan relations are almost wholly governed by USA's perceived strategic interests in the region and of its confidence that Pakistan will be a willing instrument for executing US policies in the Gulf region and in the Indian subcontinent.

The authors suggest that "US should be far more selective in providing financial support for particular regimes (in the developing world), on political grounds" (p. 103).

Being 'tough toward developing countries which do not tow the US line' is the other side of the coin. The authors cite USA's attack on Libyan forces in the Gulf of Sidra in 1981 as a case in point. In plain language US forces were the aggressors in this instance; but they got away with it thanks to the apathy of other Islamic countries. Had the latter been tough and united, it is not unlikely that US forces may have merely staged a demonstration at the Gulf of Sidra and not actually attacked Libya.

This appraisal of American policy, its successes and failures during the early Reagan years is useful, not least because it draws attention to the limits of coercive power and the advantages to all of a policy of 'give and take' on the part of a super power in its dealings with developing countries.

BOOK REVIEWS

Political Ethics and Public Office

By Dennis F. Thompson

Published by Harvard University Press, Cambridge, England, 1987, Pages 263, Price £ 25.00.

This is a deeply researched book for the serious student of political science. The layman would suppose that ethics and politics are poles apart; the former as a realm of pure principle, ruled by moral directives, the latter a realm of pure power, ruled by expediency. Such a view may have had some justification in the days of autocratic and totalitarian rule; latter day democracy suggests that there can be a degree of co-existence between these two extremes of view. Today, citizens can and do criticise politicians for violating moral principles. Politicians, in turn, criticise each other and defend themselves by appealing to the same principles.

The author defines political ethics as the practice of making ethical judgements about political action. He feels that a political ethics of public office is necessary because "so much of modern politics is a mediated politics". Most citizens spend most of their political time choosing and calling to account others who act on their behalf. Some principles are needed to judge delegated authority. Political ethics help to inform such judgements. A leading theme of this book is the mutual dependency of ethics and democracy.

A study such as this cannot proceed without examples. These are drawn mostly from American public life of the past several decades. Amongst those cited are the Cuban missile crisis, President Carter's plan to rescue Americans held hostage in Iran, the war in Vietnam and Watergate. Speaking of democratic dirty hands - the political leader who for the sake of public purposes violates moral principles - the author says that it would not necessarily be desirable to try to make such persons aware of the wrongs they commit, by confronting them more directly with the harms they cause. He quotes the example of McGeorge Bundy, President Johnson's national security assistant, who went to Vietnam in February 1965, to review the military situation in person. Prior to his departure, he had seemed to officials in Vietnam sympathetic, but cool, to their assessment of the war situation. Whilst he was there, the Vietcong attacked the base at Pleiku, killing eight Americans and destroying several aircraft. He immediately ordered a retaliatory strike. General Westmoreland, the American commander in Vietnam recorded this change of attitude thus: "Like numbers of civilians in position of some governmental authority, once (Bundy) smelled a little gunpowder, he developed a field marshal psychosis".

This is a work of great scholarship which needs to be digested slowly, chapter by chapter. The scale of research has been prodigious - the notes and references in the text themselves cover fifty pages. Professor Thompson has begun a field of inquiry for which there has been a long felt need. Countries other than the United States, professing open government, should welcome such investigation. Political scientists, policy analysts, sociologists and other professionals interested in this field will gain immensely from Professor Thompson's study.

-- Lt Gen M L Thapan PVSM

The Search for Security: Controlling Conflict & Terrorism

By Lt Gen E A Vas,

Published by Natraj Publishers, Dehradun. 1989, Pages 307, Price Rs. 195.00.

The present day world is undergoing traumatic changes involving violence and conflict. Political and social thinkers are of the view that man, by nature is peace-loving. It is the social grouping with its vested interests which compel him to use force. This book provides a deep insight on the subject of violence and war, strategy and tactics, diplomacy and international relations.

This volume, the third in the series by Gen. Vas, examines in the first two chapters the Indian social and religious ethos of the past leading to the present day insurgent and separatist situations which may even put our national survival at stake. Such a scenario needs a responsible government and an active parliament to give due thought to national security.

The next four chapters are devoted to India's internal problems and relations with its neighbours. An historical analysis throws light on the insurgent movements in the North East, which had their beginnings during the colonial days. The author suggests modernisation of the region without losing its ethnic or cultural identity. A viable and dynamic defence policy to deal with our internal problems and hostile neighbours is discussed. The author's statement, euphoric though it may be, that "the strategic balance is so much in India's favour now, that India has nothing to fear from Pakistan", seems a bit too cosy for comfort. He has given an insight of higher defence planning and suggests that it should be an intellectual rather than an emotional process. The next two chapters are an attempt to clear doubts on separatist movements in the country.

Gen. Vas has given a fine exposition on the nuclear options for India - whether we go militarily nuclear or should only harness the energy

for peaceful purposes. The third option, he suggests, is the utilisation of the vast potential of non-conventional energy sources. Due to its strategic location, the author feels that India can become a maritime power to reckon with. He also analyses terms like "strategy" and "grand strategy" in the Indian context and suggests reasons why we went wrong in some cases and achieved success in others. The last chapter is on some thoughts on the political and developmental fronts.

The book is interesting reading. The printers should have taken more care in the final output. An example - for "All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad" the print reads "All Assam Ganga Sangam Parishad".

-- Colonel Valmiki Katju (Retd)

Marketing Warfare

By Al Rics and Jack Trout

Published by McGraw-Hill Book Company, Singapore, Available from Tata McGraw-Hill Co. Ltd. 4/12 Asaf Ali Road, New Delhi - 110002. 1986, Pages 216, Price \$ 5.00.

The authors have likened marketing to military operations of war. They demolish some well established marketing tenets through examples to show how results have belied theory.

The book commences with a cursory review of some of the classic battles of last two thousand four hundred years and it analyses the major lesson that emerged during these battles.

The succeeding chapters deal with various principles of war and their application to marketing.

The authors acknowledge that success goes to bigger armies but argue smaller companies can also thrive provided 'their leaders think like field Commanders.'

The book also contains a chapter on the principles of guerrilla warfare. In this chapter the authors suggest how small companies should tailor their marketing strategy to survive big companies onslaught. An example quoted is of the Rolls-Royce cars which dominate the small high-priced car market. It says 'Nobody thinks of competing with Rolls Royce because (1) the existing market is small and (2) Rolls Royce, at least initially, would have an enormous advantage'. Amongst various principles advocated for a guerrilla, the authors offer sound advice like "No matter how successful you become,

never act like a leader", "Be prepared to bug out at a moments notice" and so on.

The authors cite examples from American Industry's performance to support their arguments and suggestions.

A thought provoking and a very readable book.

-- Maj Gen Surinder Nath

Main Battle Tanks : Developments in Design Since 1945

By Rolf Hilmes

Published by Brassey's Defence Publishers, 24 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8 HR-U.K., 1987, Pages 130, Price £ 25.00.

Rolf Hilmes is a German expert on tank technology. Along with Israel's General Tal, he is rated among the West's leading tank designers. The book, published in the latter half of 1987 is upto date. It has an abundance of photographs and intricate design drawings.

There are five chapters, not lengthy, yet every conceivable detail is covered. These Chapters contain review of tank development (in all tank manufacturing countries, advances in sub system technologies, technical problems of particular stages of development, assessment of the various development philosophies, and scope and limit of future tank development.

A tank expert, Richard E Simpkin, in his Foreword to the book summarises that foresight suggests a need to switch resources from heavy armour into helicopters and may be fast tracks and whether tank technology has a future; but still he gives the tank another 40 or 50 years.

This book is a MUST for all establishments who have anything to do with the tank.

-- Maj Gen RL Chopra, PVSM (Retd)

SuperPowers in Crisis: Implications of Domestic Discord

By Richard J. Krickus

Pub. by Pergamon-Brassey's International Defence Pub., Inc. 8000 Westpark Drive, fourth floor, Mclean, Virginia 22102, U.S.A., 1987, Pages 236, Price not given.

The Super Powers in crisis is a well reasoned enunciation of serious predicaments and 'Societal crisis' which Super Powers face. The author has added a new dimension to the concept of National Security by what he

calls a 'second front', involving political, economic, social-cultural problems affecting America and the Soviets. According to the author internal turmoils and predicament of the Super Powers can lead to a nuclear confrontation between the two.

In a chilling sequence in the book, an upheaval in Europe supported by Western nations leads to a nuclear confrontation with no one really sure who fired the first nuclear weapon.

In this adroitly narrated, objective and a highly readable book, Richard J. Krickus presents a convincing analysis of the future course of East and West relations and dangers, which internal turmoils can pose to the world peace.

-- Maj Gen Afsir Karim AVSM (Retd)

Iran scam: The Official Senate Intelligence Committee Report on the Iran Arms Sale (Iran-Contra Series, No I)

Published by Diane Publishing Co., 600 Upland Ave., Upland, Pa, 19015, 1987, Pages 56, Price \$ 17.95.

The Select Committee on Intelligence of the US Senate carried out a limited investigation into the sale of arms to Iran and possible diversion of funds to the contras of the Nicaraguan Opposition. This report dated 29 January, 1987 was for the two limited aims of gathering information useful in the future functions of intelligence oversight and preserving evidence of use to the investigations on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Contras.

Time has overtaken the report, and much has happened since its issue. However it still makes fascinating reading in Section I, where the narrative describes the international links and private parties which arranged export of arms by the USA to Iran, feeding of intelligence useful against Iraq, and diversion of funds to the contras of Nicaragua, all clandestine and against the policies of the Senate. The Cover ups, actions by President Reagan and others in the administration demonstrate how policy and laws can be violated by a few persons for their personal beliefs and profit, irrespective of national interest as seen by the majority. All this in as large and as open a democracy as the USA. The story once again demonstrates the amoral nature of international relationships and human affairs, both well known facts from past history.

What is more frightening is to see how easily a few people can get around complex administrative and government systems to do what they like against their own laws and (almost) get away with it. The unresolved

questions and issues speak for themselves; several are likely to remain unresolved, becoming themes for modern mystery - thriller writers who seem to be getting close to what could be fatal reality.

-- 'Tindi'

Vietnam : A History

By Stanley Karnow

*Published by Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England,
U.K., 1984, Pages 752, Price \$ 12.95.*

If you get carried away by the frontpiece, where a group of GIs are shown bereft on the battle scarred Vietnamese bush, you should turn to page 427 straight away and read on about the much celebrated American debacle in South East Asia. In chapters titled 'LBJ' goes to war; 'Escalation', 'Debate', 'Diplomacy and Doubt', 'Tet', 'Nixon's War; and the 'The Peace that Never was', Stanley Karnow clarifies, analyses and demystifies this traumatic American experience in 226 pages of high brow prose. Devoid of political slantings or any patriotic fervour, he constructs the Vietnam War from first hand interviews and revelations from classified documents. He brings out the gross error in judgement at the macro level where successive US Presidents saw only the facade of communism but missed the Vietnamese nationalism behind it. The deceit, divisiveness and deviousness of Presidents Johnson and Nixon are exposed in lucid style. Even those who have known it earlier, would be shocked to know that Nixon once quipped 'If you can't lie, you will never get anywhere!' Watergate, on the home front and a fiasco on the war front, was no surprise to many, no wonder.

Though a magnum-ops of a book, it is immensely enjoyable - it reads like a novel. Attention is held right throughout its 670 pages. The author has deterously used eyecatching and suitably captioned photographs in the beginning of each chapter. For those short of time, it would suffice only to browse through these to get the impact of war in Vietnam over the years.

Karnow has indeed produced a masterpiece. Should be fascinating for even those who think they know something about Vietnam at war.

-- Lt Col A K Sharma

USSR Foreign Policies after Detente (Revised Edition)

By Richard F. Staar,

*Published by Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, Standford,
California - 94305, U.S.A., 1987, Pages 308, Price \$ 13.95.*

In this revised edition, Richard Staar gives an updated version of the Russian foreign policy. The book is reasonably complete in its examination

of the subject and follows easily comprehensible chronology. The arrangement of material follows a textbook style organised in three parts containing a total of 12 chapters. The subjects are compartmentalised and the discussion evolves from a historical perspective. The formulation of this historical perspective takes into account almost a century of American-Soviet relations in military, economic and diplomatic fields but is influenced, to a greater degree, by the interaction since 1917 and more pointedly since World War II.

The first edition of the book was printed in 1985 and the revised edition in 1987. The present edition mentions emergence of Mr. Gorbachev as the leader of the Soviet Union but does not touch on the ushering in of the 'Gorbachev era'. The initiatives of Gorbachev have been so dramatic that they have changed the foreign policy posture of USSR significantly. Majority of ills will remain for some time and so would majority of forces in USSR opposed to sudden changes. Yet the direction that the top man wishes to take is quite clear and unambiguous. The energy with which he is pursuing the changes is phenomenal and the changes are themselves well ahead of times. Looked in that context the book appears dated.

A very readable book for understanding the basics of Russian structure as also for gaining a sound knowledge base from which the dynamics of future Russian policy can be more completely understood.

-- Lt Gen SPM Tripathi, AVSM

Main Front: Soviet Leaders Look Back on World War II

Foreword By Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Sokolov, Commentary by Prof. John Erickson.

Published by Brassey's Defence Publishers, 24 Gray's Inn Road, London WC1X 8HR, 1987, Pages 330, Price £ 27.50.

Main Front is a compilation of extracts from the Official War memoirs and other war literature produced by well known Soviet generals and other military writers on some of the more important and decisive battles and campaigns fought by the Soviet Union against Germany, and later against Japan in World War II which the Russians call the "Great Patriotic War".

The German failure to capture Moscow, shattered their dream for world-domination. The Soviets seized the initiative in July 1943 and never lost it till the final collapse of Nazi fascism and Japanese militarism.

This is a book by the Russians for the Russians, extolling the Leadership of Marshal Stalin, the farsightedness and resoluteness of the

Soviet Communist Party, the generalship of the armed forces and the unparalleled heroic deeds, in battle, of the Russian soldiers.

While the opening of the Second Front (Operation OVERLORD) in June 1944, hastened the defeat of Germany, the lightning Russian Campaign in the East and dropping of the atom bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6th and 9th August, 1945 brought about the end of Japanese final resistance.

Hitler was defeated at the gates of Moscow in the winter of 1941-42, just as Napoleon Bonaparte had met a similar fate in the winter of 1812 - an example of history repeating itself.

An excellent commentary, in the last chapter, by the book's editor, Mr John Erickson, supplemented by statistics is worth reading.

-- Brig Rai Singh, MVC, VSM (Retd)

The Old Army : A Portrait of the American Army in Peace Time 1784-1898

By Edward M. Coffman

Published by Oxford University Press, 200 Madison Avenue, NY 10016 New York, 1986, Pages 514, Price \$ 35.00.

The period between the American War of Independence (1775-1783) and the Spanish American War in the Caribbean and the Philippines in 1898 saw the rise of the Old Army of America. This book, refreshingly, is not a history of those wars but of what garrison life was like for officers and the rank and file and their wives and children, during intervals of peace.

The book deals first with the origin of the regular army in America in the period 1784-1812. Army was generally despised and feared in those days. It was a succession of wars with the American Indians and rumours of invasion threats in the wake of the French Revolution, which kept it up and also led to increase in its strength and prestige. As a national institution, the old army drew men from all the constituent regions of America. It was, however, those on the bottom rung of the society, the unemployed, the naked, the adventurous, and those who hoped to hit on untapped riches in wars, who enlisted.

A notable feature of the book is its comprehensive documentation. There is also towards the end of the book an "Essay on Sources" which is extremely valuable. It is edifying to know from it that stacks in the National

Archives (of America) are filled with thousands and thousands of relevant documents and that collections of personal papers abound in libraries scattered over the country.

The author, Edward M. Coffman, is a noted Professor of History at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. Needless to say that the book is from the pen of a great historian and writer, and is written in an extremely charming and readable style.

-- Dr K M L Saxena

The Men of Company K : The Autobiography of a World War II Rifle Company

By Harold P. Leinbaugh and John D. Campbell

Published by William Morrow and Company, Inc, 105 Madison Ave, New York, N.Y 10016, 1985, Pages 318, Price \$ 18.95.

This book is about the Second World War as viewed from the subunit level. What makes it difficult from most others of its genre is the fact that it has been written forty years later. One may assume that what may have been lost through blurring the memory has been compensated for by subjectivity in presentation. The authors, both ex-officers of the company have presented an interesting account of the activities of their company, based mainly on the reminiscences of the survivors. The narrative is well supported by maps and sketches.

To a non-American, the book provides an interesting insight into American attitudes towards their own Army and the hierarchy. One senses an attitude scornful of authority, of extreme cynicism, even despair which is difficult to understand. The senior officers were probably West Pointers traditionally credited with a reputation for courage, and military excellence; the men were all young, only about twenty years old, well fed, tough and fit, all white, except for just a few negroes; the cream of the most privileged society in the world and were given the best preparation for war that the genius of America could devise, yet when it came to battle there appears to have been a lack of will to fight, a lack of moral fibre specifically demonstrated by the number of self inflicted wounds, an activity not looked up or well favoured, in any Army. What makes the mental attitude even more inexplicable is the fact that this company was in action only at the very end of the war in Europe for a period just a shade over three months, and was committed to battle against a Germany almost at its last gasp after about five years of war.

-- Col R R Chatterji

Gunner at Large : The Diary of James Wood R.A. 1746-1765

Edited by Rex Whitworth

Published by Leo Cooper, Michelin House, 81, Fulham Road, London SW 36RB, 1988, Pages 162, Price £ 17.50.

The fascinating book is based on the personal diary of James Wood, a gunner in the mid eighteenth century. The diary gives a day to day account of his life during the Seven Year War in France and the Low countries. It goes on to record a long march of his unit from Woolich to Scotland and back and ends up with an account of service in India from 1755 to 1765 which is of more than routine interest to us.

The author has introduced each portion of the diary with a narrative giving the overall military background for a better understanding of the events mentioned in the diary. The diarist has given a factual record of the routine existence of a member of the Royal Artillery of those days in peace and war. It is a blind record of events with some illustrative incidents and anecdotes which bring out the atmosphere and attitudes of the soldiers of that period. It is of interest to note that he has hardly uttered a grumble, complaint or criticism of a colleague or superior. It is obvious from the entries in the diary that James Wood was well informed about the military situation around him. This was perhaps due to his position close to the headquarters as a member of the specialist arm. He was also sufficiently informed about the performance of the British army in other parts of the world based on the information brought by visiting ships.

The diary brings out the intimate close cooperation between the Army and the Navy in the days of the sails. During the landings on the Coast of France, the marines hauled the guns into battle positions. During the operations in Gheria and Surat, he writes about the bombardment of the enemy forts by naval guns; while the field guns participated in bombardment from specially designed boats.

The book has a special value for antiquarians with interest in the performance of the sails and guns in the mid eighteenth century. The accompanying maps are good.

-- Maj Gen LS Lehl PVSM, Vr.C

Clean Sweep

By Rear Adm. Roy M. Davenport, U.S. Navy (Retd),

Published by Vantage Press, Inc. 516 West 34th Street, New York, N.Y. 10001 (USA), 1986, Pages 243, Price \$ 14.95

Clean Sweep is the story of Rear Admiral Roy M. Devenport US Navy (Retd) written by himself. He was the executive officer of the

submarine USS Silverside and later commanded the other two submarines Haddock and Trepang.

He narrates in detail the patrols he carried out in the above submarines in the Pacific. He had to his credit sinking of twenty two Japanese ships and damaging five others including a battle ship. He is the only US Naval officer who has been awarded Navy Cross - the highest US Naval Combat Decoration five times.

Admiral Devenport was a true Christian who had full faith in God. In his book he states that the good thought people have for us are also very helpful; for I too know that we are going to be successful. It is right with God that we will win the war. He further states that there was a definite desire from a large percentage of his crew to have a weekly religious service. Knowing the help and comfort these services provided, he recommended that all submarines give due consideration of having a religious service of one form or another each Sunday.

Another very interesting point which the author has brought out is that when you go out to sea on patrol, you do not know whether you will be successful or you will return. But when you are actually on patrol, you are confident that you will be successful. Perhaps there is that inner strength with the full faith in God and the will to attack at every available opportunity. The book clearly brings out that only those who dare can win.

Although the book gives a true day to day and minute by minute details of the events which took place during the various patrols with interesting anecdotes, it would have been useful if the author had analysed some of his actions and brought out the lessons learnt. This perhaps would have been more beneficial to the submariners.

On the whole an interesting book which should find a place in all naval libraries.

-- Captain R P Khanna AVSM
Indian Navy (Retd)

The Seeds of Disaster : The Development of French Army Doctrine 1919-1939

By Robert Alan Doughty

Published by Archon Books, Hamden, Connecticut 06514, 1985, Pages 232, Price \$ 27.50.

In the aftermath of World War I, France emerged as the leading victorious power of the Continent, and Germany, her traditional enemy, as a ruined vanquished and truncated nation. During the intervening decades

till the 2nd World War, French political or military thinking never underplayed the German factor. Yet, in the spring of 1940, when the Nazi Panzers swung about towards the West, and rambled into France through the SEDAN gap, French armies did not offer even a semblance of organised resistance. By the end of June France had fallen, and her staunch ally beat a hasty and ignominious retreat through Dunkirk. Not only the doctrine and much proclaimed strategy - inherent in the Maginot Line had failed the acid test, but even the High Command had no response to the German concept of mobile warfare as demonstrated since September 1939. Even after 10 January 1940, when the German plans for offensive in the west fell in Allied hands, the French High Command did not react.

The author Lt Col Robert Allan Doughty has described in lucid detail the gradual emergence of the doctrine and the shape of the French army that took the field in 1940, and the extensive debate trials and politico-economic projections in France during the crucial decades between the two Wars.

-- Maj Gen S K Talwar

Last Days of the Reich - The Collapse of Nazi Germany, May 1945

By James Lucas

Published by Arms and Armour Press Limited, 2-6 Hampstead High Street, London, NW 3 1QQ, Pages 255, Price £ 12.95.

The book deals with the closing phase of the war when it was clear to all, except to Hitler and a few inmates of the underground shelter in Berlin, that the war was already lost. However, oblivious of this fact, Hitler continued to send out commands ordering his armies to fight and it says much for the valour and discipline of the German Army that they did carry out those orders though the Commanders knew well that the situation was hopeless and they were, by ordering continued resistance, condemning their men to needless death. Most books on wars deal with the strategies of opposing commanders, their strength, the sweep of the armies, their success and set backs and, of course, the courage and heroism of the troops. This book is different. The course of battle of the last week is depicted only as a background to the fate of the civilian population. It is about the retribution meted out to the vanquished and their sufferings that the book is written. This is an aspect of war which is seldom depicted in books and in writing about them James Lucas has done a great service and their tale of woe will undoubtedly open the eyes of many people.

-- Lt Gen K P Candeth PVSM (Retd)

The Falklands Aftermath : Picking up the Pieces

By Major General Edward Fursdon CB, MBE, D Litt

Published by Leo Cooper Ltd. 10 Upper Governor Street, London, W1X9PA, 1988, Pages 205, Price £ 12.95

The author an ex-Sapper, joined the Daily Telegraph as a Defence Correspondent on retiring from the army in July 1980. In covering the "Aftermath", of the Falkland War, he has made full use of his experience and understanding of the various problems that face the islands, in the aftermath. To send a task force 8000 miles away from the home waters would normally have been considered crazy, but it was successfully done, the author tells us how.

The book is well illustrated by a large number of photographs and contains maps of all the islands. It also gives us names of the units of the army, with the names of their commanding officers, ships of all categories with their Captains and the Royal Air Force Squadrons, operating from 14 June to 1 Sep '82, enhancing the historical value of the book. During his stay on the Islands, the author met a large number of all ranks of all services who had served during the Campaign, making his study detailed and authentic.

In spite of a few repetitions the book is an excellent sequel to "The Royal Navy and the Falkland War by David Brown". Finally, is the Falkland War over? The Argentinians who are 400 miles away, have not yet accepted cessation of hostilities. Are the British adequately prepared to meet another Argentinian invasion, a matter which is left in doubt by the author?

Altogether a well researched and interesting book; useful for all our readers, specially the military planners.

-- Brig Y P Dev (Retd)

Negotiating with the Chinese 1846-1987 : Problems and perspectives

By Parshotam Mehra

Pub. by Reliance Publishing House, 3026/7H, Ranjit Nagar, New Delhi-110008, 1989, Pages 316, Price Rs. 250/-.

While negotiating with the Chinese one fact has always to be taken into account that the world as viewed from Beijing is different to what it looks like from New Delhi. This factor has not always been seriously considered by us. Mao's China (1949) soon came into its own and has since displayed a remarkable continuity with the past. The Chinese never let go their moorings and have been consistent in their negotiations with the Americans, Russians and Indians.

The Chinese policy, foreign encroachments into the 'cocoon', aggressions and after they were able to assert themselves from time to time, the long and tragic saga of unequal treaties are some of the issues requiring close look. In spite of these handicaps it was observed by our erstwhile rulers that the Chinese were difficult, stubborn and tough negotiators, valiantly holding on to the vaguest claims. Their claims to parts of Ladakh in Kashmir, Sikkim and the entire north east region along the 'infamous' McMahon line are evidence enough.

Tibet which the British maintained as a buffer zone lost that prominent position with the Chinese establishing sovereignty as opposed to suzerainty. Post-independent India maintained that Tibet enjoyed a measure of autonomy which entitled it to manage its own affairs. The change was of great strategic concern to us but we left matters at that and have repeated our stand off and on! The December 1988 *communiqué* after high level talks in Beijing was the most recent occasion for this to be reiterated. This was accompanied by an affirmation that "anti-China political activity by Tibetan elements are not permitted on Indian soil". How do both these stand together? There is also need to consider - have the Chinese accepted our position in Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh?

The book under review is the result of three lectures which Prof. Parshotam Mehra, a distinguished historian and specialist on Central Asian affairs, delivered at the North Eastern Hill University, Shillong. This scholastic study covers (1) China and its World Order, (2) The Raj and the Chinese 1846-1947, and (3) Independent India, Mao's China and Beyond. The author has thankfully brought the study more or less up to date with an 'Epilogue' covering Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in December 1988. The three agreements followed by the projected high level talks by the 'Joint Working Group' on the boundary question have definitely been 'path breaking'.

The present work is a welcome addition to literature on the subject and a must for administrators and policy makers. The price is on the higher side and beyond the reach of the average reader.

-- Lt Col Gautam Sharma

Pakistan : Transition from Military to Civilian Rule

By Golam W Choudhury

Published by Scorpion Publishing Ltd, Victoria House, Victoria Road, Buckhurst Hill, Essex, England, 1988 Pages 256, Price not given.

Among the many vicissitudes that Pakistan has faced as an emerging polity, it is indeed the martial law administrations that do stand out as major

markers. From the title of the book one wondered which transition from military to civilian rule did the author have in mind since there were several interludes of the latter. One is surprised to discover that it was General Zia's Nizam-i-Mustafa that, in the author's view represented the most authentic graduation. He regards Zia's success in peaceful transfer of power to an elected representative government "as a most significant event in history".

Obviously, a great admirer of the General, Choudhary opines that Zia, a dedicated professional soldier, had no special hunger for power. According to him, Zia was forced to impose martial law because Bhutto had become a civilian dictator and operated a parliamentary system where all powers were concentrated in him. Bhutto's rule from 1972-77, he records, was even more undemocratic and oppressive than earlier martial law regimes, and where the country reached brink of civil war, the economy stood ruined and the honour and dignity of womenfolk was violated. In his view, Zia's turned out to be the longest martial law regime because it gave the greatest economic, social and political stability to the country. His evaluation of partyless elections is that these led to decentralisation and delegation of powers which enabled Zia nominated legislators to "perform significantly when seen in terms of airing of public grievance and the response given by ministers."

The author by some strange logic concludes that Islamic Pakistan is not a theocratic state and has only given Islamic ideology a dynamic interpretation by highlighting its principles. So though Muslims must enjoy ruling power in such a state yet in his understanding there is no discrimination. The author also suggests that a Presidential form of government is closer to an Islamic state and ends by saying that "the great experiment of blending Islam and democracy in Pakistan is of great significance and importance to the entire world, particularly the world of Islam".

The book was written prior to Zia's demise and the author's forecast was that Benazir was not in a position to carry a successful anti-Zia movement because in a conservative society like Pakistan, people were not prepared to accept a Western educated lady as the head of an Islamic state. In this context he has been proved wrong and my feeling is that several of his other formulations may also not be able to stand the test of critical scrutiny and time.

Golam Choudhary was Director General (Research) Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan from 1967-69 and member of the Pakistan Cabinet from 1969 to 1971. Though he reverted to Bangladesh after 1971,

he undoubtedly was eminently equipped to write the book. That he still has a strong yearning for Pakistan is also understandable.

-- Air Marshal K D Chadha, PVSM, AVSM (Retd)

Sri Lanka : Ethnic Fratricide and the Dismantling of Democracy

By S J Tambiah

Published by I.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 3 Henreitta Street, Covent Garden, London WC2E 8 PW, 1986, Pages 198; Price not given.

The author of this essay is professor of anthropology at Harvard university. He is a distinguished scholar from Sri Lanka, of Tamil origin. This publication pre-dates induction of an Indian Peace Keeping Force in the North East of the Island. The Island has been described as a small one, about 270 miles long and 150 across. Total population of the country in 1981 census was 1,48,50,000. Major ethnic groups are, Sinhalese: 74%; Tamil 18.2%, of which 12.6 are Sri Lankan Tamils; Muslims 7.4% and others 0.4%. The violent conflicts which have wracked the Island ever since independence in 1948 are ethnic in nature, between the majority Sinhalese Buddhists and the minority Tamils. This violence reached unprecedented level every since massive rioting erupted in July 1983.

The factors that emerge from his learned analysis are not peculiar to Sri Lanka, but common to the entire SAARC region. A potent explosive mix of burgeoning populations, poverty, uneven distribution of incomes, religious bigotry and, not least, all pervasive corruption. The grave crisis such factors have led to, has brought in its train a shift towards authoritarianism, which has not only threatened democracy but also institutionalised politics of terrorism. It will be observed that this phenomenon has application much nearer home, giving no comfort, inspite of what the I.P.K.F. might eventually achieve or not.

The solution he has to offer is also no novelty to SAARC scholars. That is, to accept pluralism, renounce linguistic and ethnic separatism and enforce rule of Law. This prescription is fully endorsed and applauded by other neighbouring regions similarly afflicted, but awaits resolute and courageous application. A penetrative study, worthy of the attention of political scientists and scholars.

-- Brig Romesh Chandra (Retd)

India Briefing , 1987

By Marshall M Bouton

Published by Westview Press, Inc: Frederick A. Praeger. Publishers: 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301, 1987; Pages 222, Price not given.

M. Weiner, in assessing in mid 1987, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's

Performance, has concluded, "For a brief historical moment there was an opportunity for significant change. That moment appears to have passed." What F.R. Frankel said in 1987 about the Punjab situation "At year's end, few victories could be counted by the Punjab Government in its war against the terrorists", - perhaps holds good even in March 1989. However, one cannot agree with A.T. Embree's contention that not only Sikhs but also Christians, Jews, Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus "declare that religion and politics cannot be separated". The difference is that some 'upholders' of certain religions exploit their faiths for political gains.

About the economy J.P. Lewis sounds interesting when he says, "But the balance is now so close between the continued forward thrust of liberalism and pragmatic proequity reforms on the one hand, and retrogressive rent - keeping socialist sloganeering, on the other, that, to my disappointment as an Indophile, I am loath to bet very heavily one way or the other." Girish Karnad has covered various facts of Indian culture, but has not indicated whether culturalisation should be given priority over eradication of large-scale poverty and illiteracy. About the field of India's foreign relations in 1986, M.M. Bouton has been struck by its narrowing options and increasing defensiveness, inspite of the country's impressive foreign policy resources.

The book contains a chronology of important events of 1986, a glossary of names of persons, organisations, etc., an Index and a couple of maps. It will certainly be welcomed by India-watchers.

-- B C Chakravorty

**The Black Pom-Poms: History of the Madras Regiment 1941-1983 :
Story of the Thambis in War and Peace**

By Lt Col J R Daniel (Retd)

*Published by Commandant, The Madras Regimental Centre, Wellington
(Nilgiris), Tamil Nadu, 1986, Pages 600, Price Rs. 200.00.*

The author, Lt Col J Robinson Daniel, breathed his last on 24 Jan 1987 at Military Hospital, Wellington, soon after the release of the book. It has been a major and a very successful accomplishment by the author. May his soul rest in eternal peace.

The book is a successor to "The Madras Regiment - 1758-1958", written by late Lt Col EG Phythian Adams, OBE. Disbanded in 1928, the Madras Regiment was resurrected in 1941, and Lt Col Daniel painstakingly picks up the threads left behind by Lt Col Adams and builds a remarkable Regimental Pyramid covering the glorious years of the Madras Regiment till 1983.

After partition the famous state forces such as Cochin, Mysore and Travancore, (with each of these battalions having a history older than any of the regular army battalions of India and Pakistan), joined this Regiment 'in toto'. The Regimental Centre was earlier at Madukarai, but moved to Wellington where it has remained since.

The book is written in a clear, concise and gripping manner with crisp and engrossing accounts of various actions, often supported by newspaper extracts and other quotations. Undoubtedly a well researched book, giving an insight not only into the history and ethos of the famous Regiment but into the origin of the Indian Army as well.

-- Maj Anil Shorey

The Baluchis and Pathans (Report No. 48)

By Robert G Wirsing

Published by Minority Rights Group Ltd., Benjamin Franklin House, 36 Craven Street, London WC2NSNG U.K., 1987, Pages 23, Price £ 1.80.

In this study, attention is given to the internal problems of the two tribal groups, to the relationship between them as well as developments within the three states they inhabit.

Iranian Baluchis have been assimilated to Persian culture, Afghan Baluchis speak Dari or Pushtu in addition to their own language. The Brahni group of tribes is settled on the central Kalat plateau of Pakistani Baluchistan and their language is related to Dravidian language of South India.

Pathan's embrace one third of Afghanistans 250,000 square miles of territory. The Durand line cuts through the highland tribal areas.

The loyalty to clan and tribe claim their highest allegiance and this has acted as a brake on the utility of Islam as an integrative force. Economic integration appears to be highly destructive of traditional tribal relationship. The land holders (Khans) are selfless in regard to accumulation of wealth and display unstinting generosity towards their followers. The monetary rewards of urban markets offer an alternative way to obtain status, and many of the khans no longer live up to expectations.

Between 1973 and 1977, eastern Baluchistan was swept by a major rebellion against the government of Pakistan, it is estimated that 5000 insurgents and 3000 government troops lost their lives.

By the end of 1980, 1267,000 refugees were in Pakistan and 250,000 in Iran. In Pakistan 80 per cent refugees were in NWFP and 20 per cent

in Baluchistan. 40 to 60,000 refugees were arriving in Pakistan each month. The overwhelming refugees were Pashtun tribes-men and created difficulty in ethnopolitical balance in Pakistan. There would have been little problem had the refugees been temporary, but as knowledgeable observers feel most would never leave Pakistan.

The crisis is not by accident but by design of political strategists and a peaceful, mutually acceptable solution will be difficult.

-- Maj Gen BD Kale (Retd)

Arms Control : Has the West Lost its Way? (Occasional Paper No. 28)

By Robin Brown

Published by Institute for European Defence and Strategic Studies, 13/14, Golden Square, London W1R 3AG(U.K.), 1987, Pages 63, Price £ 4.50.

In an international system the actors (Nation-states) are always in a security dilemma and in order to overcome this, they maintain armed forces. This is precisely the case in Europe, which has seen perennial warfare and is accompanied by endless processes of building and maintaining Armed Forces.

In order to avoid war, states should have no weapons. This calls for the idea of 'disarm' which existed as early as 600 B.C. in China. This idea which gained momentum after the First World War, faded away with the advent of nuclear weapons, which brought in the process of Arms Control.

Robin Brown, Lecturer in politics at the University of Lancaster, in his study on Arms Control throws light in his first chapter on the origins of Arms control which was developed as early as 1950s. He maintains that the main purpose of Arms Control, to create a safer nuclear balance rather than disarmament, has been forgotten because of short term political aims of the countries concerned.

Today, after the INF agreement, his plea to reconsider 'zero-option' has little relevance. Though he expresses his unwillingness to 'zero option', he does not give us an alternative.

However, his analysis of Arms Control is systematic and highly informative.

-- NBS

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
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